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Abstract 
Executive remuneration is a prominent issue of corporate governance in the UK. Executive 
pay packages are regarded as excessive with no apparent link to company performance. 
This study examines the regulation of the determination of executive remuneration, 
especially in quoted companies. The study considers the regulation of the determination of 
executive remuneration as an important foundation that can potentially link executive pay 
to company performance. The study considers the principles of UK Corporate Governance 
Code on the determination of executive pay, and the Companies Act 2006’s provisions on 
executive remuneration.  
The study adopts a mixed method approach which includes quantitative and qualitative 
studies. The UK Corporate Governance Code does not make recommendations on specific 
performance measures that companies should use to determine company performance. To 
investigate the link between pay and performance and the effect different performance 
measures have on the pay for performance link, the study examined 25 companies from 
five different sectors from 2010 FTSE 100 companies. Data was collected mainly from the 
company’s annual reports and accounts to determine the link between executive pay and 
company performance. The results indicated in general a weak link between pay and 
performance. It also demonstrated that different performance measures have different 
effects on the pay for performance link. The Code does not make recommendations on the 
factors that the remuneration consultants should consider in benchmarking. To this effect, 
interviews were conducted to establish the method of executive remuneration 
benchmarking as there exist no guidelines on benchmarking. Six prominent remuneration 
consultants where interviewed for which the data was obtained to analyse executive 
remuneration benchmarking. The findings demonstrated a lack of uniformity in 
benchmarking practices particularly in the factors considered in selecting comparator 
companies. 
The Companies Act 2006 makes no provision on the determination of executive pay but 
rather adopts a corrective approach towards the determination of executive remuneration. 
This position of the law has been analysed in this study and suggest that the role of the law 
is inadequate and ineffective. The study demonstrates a need for a reform on the provisions 
of executive remuneration.  
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Introduction 
This thesis discusses the regulation of the determination of executive remuneration of 
quoted companies in the UK. Executive remuneration emerged a controversial issue 
during the early 1990s. Executives of privatized utility companies received pay 
increases which were condemned by the public and the media as having no 
corresponding link to the performance of the company.
1
 The criticism of executive 
pay by the public and the media came under headlines such as ‘Fat Cats in the Dock’,2 
‘Executive Gluttony under Attack’3 and ‘Derailing the Gravy Train’.4 More than two 
decades later, executive pay continues to be a prominent issue of corporate 
governance in the UK. Firstly, there is continued concern that executives are receiving 
excessive pay packages with no corresponding link to company performance.
5
 
Secondly, executive pay seems to be increasing even when company performance
6
 is 
falling. Third, directors’ pay (banker’s bonuses) was considered as partly responsible 
for the financial crisis in 2008
7
 and lastly, the pay gap between executives and 
average employee of the company continues to widen.
8
 
The academic background 
Academic interest in executive remuneration increased in the UK from the early 
1990s following the excessive pay increases received by executives from privatised 
utility companies. Most of the early studies on executive pay were based on the 
remuneration committees (REMCOs)
9
; their composition,
10
 role,
11
 independence
12
 
                                                          
1
 Discussed in detail under chapter 1. 
2
 ‘Fat Cats in the Dock’ (1995) Economist March 4th.e 
3
 D Cohen,’ Executive Gluttony under Attack’ (1994) Financial Times November 26/27th at 3. 
4
 ‘Derailing the Gravy Train’  (1995) Sunday Times January 22nd. 
5
 BBC News, ‘Why is Chief Executives’ Pay not Linked to Performance?’ (2012) February 9th. 
6
 the results of activities of an organisation or investment over a given period of time. 
7
 Paul Gregg, Sarah Jewell and Ian Tonks, ‘Executive Pay and Performance: Did Bankers’ Bonuses 
Cause the   Crisis’ (2012) 12(1) IRF 89-122; Charlotte Villiers, ‘Controlling Executive Pay: 
Institutional Investors or Distributive Justice?’ (2010) JCLS 309, 310. 
8
 BBC News, ‘Pay Gap Between Executives and Employees is ‘Widening’ (2013) November 18 th. 
9
 Martin Conyon and Simon Peck, ‘Board Control, Remuneration Committee, and Top Management 
Remuneration’ (1998) 41(2) AMJ 146-157. 
10
 Catherine Daily, Jonathan Johnson, Alan Ellstrand and Dan Dalton, ‘Compensation Committee 
Composition as a Determinant of CEO Compensation’ (1998) 41(2) AMJ 209-220. 
11
 Martin Conyon and Simon Peck, ‘Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and Top Management 
Remuneration’ (1998) 41(2) AMJ 146-157. 
2 
 
and their effects on executive pay level.
13
 Past studies on the determination of 
executive remuneration have been based mostly on examining the links between 
executive remuneration and company size,
14
 industry,
15
 performance,
16
 human 
capital.
17
  
Various pieces of research investigating the link between pay and performance have 
yielded inconsistent and conflicting results, suggesting that there is either no 
relationship or a weak relationship between pay and performance.
18
 Thus there is a 
need to investigate further the variation in results and examine the effect of different 
performance measures on the pay for performance link. Academic studies on 
executive remuneration continue to increase as pay continues to be a controversial 
issue in the UK. Recently, academic studies started investigating the use of 
remuneration consultants (RCONs) in advising the REMCO on the determination of 
remuneration structure and levels.
19
 The wide use of RCONs in advising on executive 
remuneration determination process in the UK has been evidenced by past studies.
20
  
However, no study has particularly considered what factors the consultants considered 
to arrive at their decisions. 
Most past studies have examined the effectiveness of remuneration disclosure 
requirements
21
, shareholder voting
22
, but little has been done on these factors in the 
light of the determination of executive remuneration. The study of the role of law in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12
 A Zattoni and F, Cuomo, ‘How Independent, Competent and Incentivized should Non-executive 
Directors be? An Empirical Investigation of Good Governance Code’ (2010) 21(1) Brit J Manage 63, 
66. 
13
 BGM Main, C O’Reilly, and J Wade, ‘The CEO, the Board of Directors and Executive 
Remuneration: Economic and Psychological Perspective’ (1995) 4 ICC 293-332. 
14
  Peter F Kostiuk, ‘Firm Size and Executive Remuneration’ (1990) 25(1) JHR 90-105. 
15
 Sydney Finkelstein, ‘Why is the Industry Related to CEO Remuneration?: A Managerial Discretion 
Explanation’ (2009) 3 TOJ  42-56. 
16
 S Girma, S Thompson and W Wright, ‘Corporate Governance Reforms and Executive Compensation 
Determination: Evidence from the UK’ (2007) 75 The Manchester School 1, 65-81. 
17
 Ian Gregory-Smith and Brian G.M. Main, ‘Testing the Participation Constraint in the Executive 
Labour Market’ (2013) http://homepages.ed.ac.uk/mainbg/Files/jobmoves2013_08_27.pdf 1, 2 
assessed 22
nd
 of June 2014. 
18
 H Jouber and H Fakhfakh, ‘Does CEO Performance-Based Compensation Waits on Shareholders? A 
Cross National Analysis’ (2011) 2(3) IJBAM 68-82. 
19
 See L Goh and A Gupta, ‘Executive Compensation, Compensation Consultants, and Shopping for 
opinion: Evidence from the UK’ (2011) 25(4) JAAF 608-644. 
20
 For example, Ruth Bender, ‘Paying for Advice: The role of the remuneration consultant in UK listed 
companies’ (2011) 64(2) Vand. L. Rev.  361-398. 
21
 Lee Roach, The Director’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 and the Disclosure of Executive 
Remuneration’ (2004) 25 The Comp. Law. 141. 
22
 ibid. 
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the determination of executive remuneration is important, as it will inform policy 
makers on the gaps in the law, the effectiveness of the law, and possible law reforms 
that may be required. 
Background of the regulation of the determination of 
executive pay 
The determination of executive remuneration is regulated principally by the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (UKCGC) and the Companies Act (CA) 2006. The 
UKCGC makes recommendations on how pay should be determined, whereas the CA 
2006 does not make any provision on how pay should be set. Rather it adopts a 
corrective measure which applies on the already determined pay package. The 
intention of the law-makers is for the outcome of the corrective measures to influence 
the executive pay setting process. For example, one of the measures is to provide 
shareholders with voting rights on the company’s remuneration report. If the 
shareholders vote a remuneration report down, the REMCO would have to review the 
remuneration policy and consequently, review the pay setting process. The Act also 
establishes significant disclosure obligations, making it easier for shareholders and 
other interested parties to obtain information on directors’ pay. The shareholders are 
expected to use the information to make informed judgment on executive 
remuneration. Therefore, the CA 2006’s provisions on executive remuneration setting 
process are not direct as they do not make express provisions on how pay should be 
set, but rather make provisions that will indirectly influence the pay setting process.  
The first UK corporate governance report was published in 1992 by the Cadbury 
Committee.
23
 Since then corporate governance has gone through various reforms on 
various governance issues and in particular executive remuneration.
24
 However, the 
UKCGC has made limited recommendations on how executive remuneration should 
be set (which are examined under chapters 3, 4 & 5).  
The various recommendations on executive pay setting process did not abate the 
continuous rise in executive pay nor did it significantly strengthen the link between 
executive remuneration and company performance. The government consequently 
                                                          
23
 The Committee on the Financial Aspect of Corporate Governance, Report of the Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee Publishing 1992). 
24
 Discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
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took interest in the levels of pay of some executives of quoted companies which led to 
the enactment of the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (DRRR) 2002. 
These Regulations only applied to quoted companies and were eventually largely 
incorporated into the CA 2006.
25
 After the DRRR 2002, the government made more 
provisions under the CA 2006 which have recently been strengthened by the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.
26
 The main purpose of the regulation of 
executive remuneration setting process by the UKCGC and the CA 2006 is to provide 
accountability and transparency on the determination of executive pay.  
Research problem and question 
The remuneration package of a director has a substantial effect on how the director 
behaves which is why remuneration is such an important governance mechanism. 
Research has demonstrated that executive remuneration continues to increase without 
a proportionate link to company performance. In addition to this, executive 
remuneration seems to be increasing even when the company is performing poorly. 
Furthermore, the pay gap between executives and average employees of the company 
continue to widen. Despite the vital need for an effective regulatory method on 
executive remuneration, limited empirical research studies exist in the UK that have 
considered the full extent on the determination of executive remuneration. Thus there 
is a need for this study to examine the regulation on executive remuneration 
determination. 
The research question this study would be seeking to answer is ‘how effective are the 
regulatory methods on the determination of executive remuneration in UK quoted 
companies?’ The aim of the study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulatory 
methods in the determination of executive remuneration. The objectives of the study 
would be to examine the methods used in benchmarking executive remuneration 
particularly the factors considered when selecting comparator groups and its effect on 
pay levels. This thesis will investigate the link between executive remuneration and 
company performance. A comparative study of performance measures and their effect 
on the pay for performance relationship will be conducted to determine the effect of 
                                                          
25
 Companies Act 2006, s 420. 
26
 The provisions of the Companies Act and its indirect influence on the remuneration setting process 
would be examined in chapter 6. 
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performance measures on pay. Furthermore, the study will examine the influence of 
remuneration disclosure requirements, shareholder votes and other shareholder 
remedies on executive remuneration determination.  
Research methods and analyses 
In order to effectively answer the research question, empirical (qualitative and 
quantitative) research methods are employed (discussed in detail in chapter 2). In 
brief, quantitative analysis was used to examine the relationship between executive 
pay and company performance. Data was obtained from the 1996-2011 annual reports 
of 25 companies selected from the 2010 listing of the FTSE 100, in order to provide a 
good time frame for data analysis. This time frame was chosen because companies 
started disclosing remuneration figures for individual directors in 1996. The time 
frame stopped at 2011 to enable time for data analysis and thesis write up. The fifteen 
year time period allows the identification of trends which might not be possible in a 
more limited time scale. After eliminating companies with missing and inconsistent 
data, 19 companies were used in the final analysis and statistical software was used to 
analyse the relationship between executive remuneration and company performance. 
The findings of the study are discussed in chapter 6. 
Qualitative analysis was used to investigate the methods used in executive 
remuneration benchmarking. Data was obtained from six unstructured interviews with 
RCONs. Content analysis and thematic analysis were used to analyse the interview 
findings (discussed in detail in the methodology chapter 2). The finding of the 
qualitative analysis is discussed in chapter 4. 
Significance of the study 
A review of the existing academic literature revealed that little attempt has been made 
to explore the regulation on executive remuneration process in the UK. Studies on the 
determination of executive remuneration have examined different elements 
considered in setting executive remuneration.
27
 None have examined specifically the 
factors considered in selecting comparator groups when benchmarking executive pay 
and its effect on the pay setting process. This demonstrates a gap in knowledge as 
                                                          
27
 As explained above, some studies have considered size, sector, human capital etc. 
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benchmarking is a key determinant of executive remuneration. The study will 
examine the methods of benchmarking and its effect on executive remuneration 
setting process and pay levels. The findings of this study will provide details on the 
factors considered by the RCONs in benchmarking executive remuneration which will 
give a wider understanding of pay determination process and pay levels. 
The CA 2006 does not make provisions on how directors’ pay should be set. 
However, its provisions on executive pay do have an indirect effect on the pay setting 
process. With most studies done base on examining the role of the law on the levels of 
executive pay it important that this study examines the regulation on executive 
remuneration determination. This study would examine these provisions of the law 
and discuss its indirect influence on the pay setting process which will expose how the 
law influences directors’ pay setting process. 
Past studies have examined the relationship between pay and performance using 
various performance measures but not much has been done in regards to comparative 
study on performance measures and its effect on the pay setting process whilst 
determining the pay-for-performance relationship. Studies examining the link between 
executive pay and company performance have used limited time frames and different 
methodologies. In this study, the time frame from 1996-2011 has been chosen, 
twenty-five companies of the FTSE 100 companies, and three performance measures 
used to analyse the pay for performance relationship. The study also considered 
separately the relationships between company performance with directors’ cash pay, 
variable pay and total remuneration.  
Major areas of contribution 
The potential findings on the factors considered in executive remuneration 
benchmarking could influence policy makers to consider best practice on 
benchmarking or consider a law reform to incorporate benchmarking practices. 
Furthermore, the potential findings could also influence how individual companies 
benchmark executive pay. Most importantly, the Remuneration Code may be revised 
to include the best practice on how RCONs should select comparator groups for the 
purposes of executive remuneration benchmarking. 
7 
 
Furthermore, the findings obtained from the indirect role of the CA 2006 on executive 
pay setting process could influence the government to consider a law reform on 
executive pay. It could also influence the members of the company (particularly the 
shareholders) to be more involved in executive remuneration issues by voting in the 
annual general meetings. Also, findings on pay for performance relationship could 
influence the government on whether or not it is necessary for companies to use 
specific performance measures to measure performance. It will also influence the 
individual company’s setting of performance targets and performance measures to 
better reflect company performance (preferably the long term success of the 
company). 
In general, the results of this study could influence both the policy makers and the 
individual companies in their methods of setting executive remuneration. This is 
because curbing excessive directors’ pay requires the joint effort of the policy makers 
and the individual companies. 
Thesis outline 
The thesis consists of three parts. Part 1 (chapters 1 and 2) provides background 
information and sets out the methodology used; Part II (chapters 3-5) looks at best 
practice recommendations; Part III (chapter 6) discusses the role of the law. 
The thesis begins with an introduction which explores the research background, 
research problem, significance of the study, contribution to knowledge, research 
methods and analyses and the limitations of the study. 
Chapter 1 will look at the components and drivers of executive remuneration package 
focusing on the evolution of executive remuneration package, elements of the 
remuneration package and factors that increases executive remuneration levels. 
Chapter 2 will discuss the methodology of the study which covers the empirical 
research approaches followed in the study. The chapter includes the rationale for 
doctrinal, qualitative and quantitative approaches of this study, data sample, response 
rate, and selection of research participants, selection of companies and methods of 
analysis. 
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Chapter 3 will examine the corporate governance mechanisms discussing the 
evolution of corporate governance mechanisms in regulating executive remuneration 
determination process. This chapter serves as an introductory chapter to chapters 4 
and 5 that follow. 
Chapter 4 discusses the REMCO focusing on the composition of the REMCO, their 
role in executive remuneration determination process, the factors that they consider in 
setting executive remuneration package, RCONs and the advice they offer the 
REMCO on executive remuneration benchmarking. This chapter further provides the 
qualitative findings and analysis of this study. 
Chapter 5 will look at pay for performance relationship, which will examine the 
performance measures used by selected companies to determine company 
performance, the link between executive remuneration and company performance, 
and how this link affects executive remuneration determination process. This chapter 
also provide the quantitative findings and analysis of this study. 
Chapter 6 will look at the role of the law which focuses on the CA 2006 provisions on 
executive remuneration. It discusses executive remuneration disclosure requirement, 
shareholder voting rights on executive remuneration policy and its significance on the 
pay determination process; and shareholder remedy in cases of excessive executive 
remuneration and its impact on the pay determination process. 
The conclusion will provide a summary of the key findings which answers the 
research question stated in the introductory chapter. It will also provide the study’s 
contribution to knowledge, opportunities for further research in the subject area and 
suggest possible recommendations as to the determination of executive remuneration. 
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Chapter 1: Executive Remuneration 
Package 
Introduction  
Executives comprise an important (although small) part of the labour force as 
decision-makers in large public companies. Consequently, the remuneration of 
executives is of special interest because it could influence their decision-making 
process.
28
 An executive is someone in the top level of an organisation. They generally 
receive high levels of remuneration in return for the work they do and the 
responsibilities they carry in a company. The remuneration package serves different 
objectives, which are to attract, motivate and retain high potential executives.
29
 
Without an attractive remuneration package, a company may not be able to attract and 
retain an individual of the required calibre.
30
 Executive pay packages have evolved 
through the years from a simple base salary and benefits to a more complex 
package.
31
 The past two decades have seen a considerable increase in the levels of 
executive remuneration as well as increase in remuneration regulation. By 2011, 
executive remuneration in the UK had risen by up to 5000% since 1980.
32
 To aid the 
understanding on how executive remuneration is determined in the UK, it is important 
to discuss how executive remuneration has evolved in the UK, the components of the 
pay package and what drives remuneration levels. This chapter will therefore, be 
divided into three parts; part one will discuss the evolution of the executive 
remuneration package; part two will focus on the components of a remuneration 
package and; part three will examine the drivers of executive remuneration. 
The Evolution of the Executive Remuneration Package 
The last three decades have seen the development of widely varying forms of 
executive remuneration. Almost total reliance on wages and salaries as a means of 
                                                          
28
 Carola Frydman, “Learning from the Past: Trends in Executive Remuneration Over the Twentieth 
Century” (2008) CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2460, SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1303386 
assessed 17 of March 2011, pg 1. 
29
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the Year 2000: Pay for Performance’ (1996) 22(3) Health Manpow Manage.  31,31. 
30
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31
 including base salary, annual bonuses, share options, long-term incentive plans etc. 
32
 Ben Heineman, ‘The Political Case Against Out-sized Executive Pay’ (2011) Harv. L. R.  December 
10
th
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rewarding executives has given way to remuneration packages wherein fringe benefits 
and other non-salary items accounts for more than 100% of executive’s base salary.33 
UK executives in the 1960s had no financial incentives and remuneration was not 
used to obtain effective utilisation of individuals. Rather honours and awards were 
used for services on government committees to motivate executives.
34
  
In the 1970s executive remuneration packages consisted of a salary and a pension 
together with a number of benefits selected mainly for a combination of status and tax 
avoidance reasons, of which the best known was the company car.
35
 Base salary 
accounted for up to 90% of the remuneration package.
36
  
As time went on (from the 1980s), the increasing size of large companies and 
functional complexity of such businesses (both in terms of technology and 
management) meant that the company needed directors who had the interest of the 
shareholders and the company to make all necessary decisions for the company’s 
growth. Executives had to research on ways of adapting the company’s business 
policies and strategies to conform to the evolving technology.
37
 This caused the UK 
companies to adopt the practice of offering defined profits to individual managers so 
they could take the responsibility of reorganising the company to make a profit. This 
practice was subject to detailed accountability and budgeting by the company. The 
bonus scheme motivated directors to work hard and acquire the knowledge required to 
take decisions that promoted the success of the company and in return be rewarded. 
This practice compelled companies to set a policy standard of efficiency and 
motivation to achieve their goal. It then follows that the main aim for introducing 
defined profits (bonuses) to executives was to motivate them to improve corporate 
efficiency.
38
 
Different companies used different motivational schemes to encourage executives to 
act in a way that was profitable to the company and the members at large. Companies 
used organisational motivation like specific individual responsibilities in the 
                                                          
33
 Thomas A Mahoney, Remuneration Preferences of Managers: Managerial Motivation and 
Remuneration (Michigan 1972) 315. 
34
 AJ Merrett, Executive Remuneration in the UK (The Camelot Press Ltd, 1968) 2. 
35
 AP Williams, Just Reward? The Truth about Top Executive Pay (Clays Ltd 1994) 104. 
36
 ibid. 
37
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company, detailed reporting and assessment, competitive comparisons of 
performance, towards fulfilling a high standard of efficiency. Other companies used 
staff promotion to motivate their executives.
39
 
The introduction of share option scheme in the UK as part of the remuneration 
package started in the 1970s but its use was very far from popular among companies. 
In 1978, only 10% of UK companies offered share options to their top executives, but 
the number increased to 30% by 1983.
40
 The use of share options increased 
dramatically between the late 1980s and the early 1990s with the majority of quoted 
companies offering share options to their executives in 1986.
41
 Companies realized 
that by requiring executives to invest a portion of their personal wealth in the 
company, it would encourage them to have the same objective as the company and 
maximize the share price.
42
 Furthermore, UK companies were conscious of the global 
executive labour market and did not want to lose their executives to US companies 
because the grant of share options had become an established remuneration 
component in the US since 1970s.
43
 Share options granted to the executives at the 
time were not subject to rigorous performance conditions as is now the case. 
Executives were rewarded automatically as the share price of the company 
appreciated as oppose to the present day conditions in which share options are subject 
to challenging conditions that must be met before the award vests. Executives made 
lots of gains in share options especially in the bull markets which did not necessarily 
reflect the performance of the company.
44
 Due to the lack of rigorous performance 
conditions attached to share options, it was criticised by shareholders and the media 
when executives in privatized companies began disclosing the gains made from share 
options in the early 1990s.
45
  
                                                          
39
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40
 T Boeri, C Lucifora and K J Murphy, Executive Remuneration and Employee Performance-Related 
Pay: A Transatlantic Perspective (Oxford University Press 2013) 55. 
41
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42
 ‘Re-examining Stock Options as a Way to Compensate Executives’ (2002) Knowledge at Wharton 
March 13
th
 http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/re-examining-stock-options-as-a-way-to-
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This drawback on share options led to the introduction of long-term incentive plans 
(LTIPs) in the UK recommended by the Greenbury Report.
46
 LTIPs are defined as the 
grant of shares or cash with performance conditions.
47
 LTIPs were regarded as a more 
tailored, company specific and challenging incentive that would align the executive’s 
interest with that of the company because it was based on performance. The 
performance conditions were in relation to specific targets over a pre-specified period, 
in which if the targets were met the award would vest, or if not met the award would 
lapses.
48
 The performance conditions attached to LTIPs were intended to motivate the 
executives to achieve the long term strategic objectives of the company upon which 
rewards were based. LTIPs awarded executives with free shares that were contingent 
on the achievement of a level of relative performance that was more rigorous than the 
performance condition of share options. This introduction of LTIPs therefore added 
another component to the executive remuneration package to the already existing 
components of base salary, annual bonus, benefits and share options. In 2000, 60% of 
UK quoted companies offered LTIPs to their executives with a decline in the use of 
share options with only 18% of UK companies granting share options.
49
  
The mid-1990s was characterised by the evolution of deferred annual bonuses and the 
increase in performance share plans which are all designed to link executive 
remuneration to company performance. The graph below represents the shift in 
incentive plans in FTSE 100 companies from 2002-2010. 
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Figure 1: A graph indicating the trend in incentive plans in FTSE 100 from 2002-2010 
 
Source: Steve Tatton, Adam Alston and Jessica Matthews, ‘What are we Paying for? Exploring 
Executive Pay and Performance’ (The High Pay Centre, 2010) 13. 
Deferred bonus requires participants to defer part of their award on a voluntary or 
compulsory basis or a combination of both to a later date (normally after three years). 
By 2012, 74% of FTSE 100 companies and 52% of FTSE 250 companies had 
deferred annual bonus plans
50
, with about two-thirds of deferred annual bonus 
arrangements at FTSE 100 companies operated on a compulsory deferral basis.
51
 In 
reference to FTSE 100 companies, less than 10% of the companies have a policy of 
granting share options to their executives and about 30% of the companies operate a 
share matching plan. The share matching plan is an executive share incentive 
arrangement which encourages the executive to buy shares in the company as a ‘buy 
one get one free’ award.52 Three quarters of the FTSE 100 companies require part of 
their bonus to be deferred into shares for a period of time. 
                                                          
50
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Exchange 2012) 8. 
51
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Survey, January 2012. 
52
 ‘UK Share Plans’ Pinsent Masons April 2014,    
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The present day executive remuneration package is characterised by a shift in the 
balance between fixed and variable pay. Executive pay is based more on variable pay 
of executives which are dependent on contingent performance measures. The pay 
package of executives has the increasing potential of paying out the maximum for 
incentive schemes, and with more directors receiving incentives of higher values. 
Executive variable (variable pay includes pay from annual bonuses, share options and 
long-term incentive schemes discussed in detail later in this chapter) pay makes up 
60%-65% of the pay package of FTSE 100 companies in 2013. Furthermore, 60% of 
variable pay was related to the long-term performance of the company. The FTSE 
100’s 30 highest paid executive remuneration packages were made up of about 70% 
of performance linked variables.
53
 These figures demonstrate the great shift from 
fixed pay to variable pay so as to link executive remuneration to company 
performance. The chart below demonstrates the incentives used by FTSE 100 
companies for their executives. 
Figure 2: Chart demonstrating the use of incentive plans by FTSE 100 in 2013 
 
Source: New Bridge Street, Report on FTSE 100 Directors’ Remuneration (New Bridge Street 2013) 
20. 
From the chart above most of the FTSE 100 companies offer only LTIPs to their 
executives and very few companies offering only share options to their executives. 
These components of the executive remuneration package have different effect on the 
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remuneration levels. Therefore, it is of primary importance to this thesis that these 
components and their effect on the executive remuneration package be discussed. The 
next section will discuss the various components of the executive remuneration 
package. 
Elements of the Remuneration Package 
Executive remuneration package is made up of direct and indirect remuneration 
elements which take the form of monetary and non-monetary rewards. The common 
forms of direct remuneration are base pay and variable pay. The direct form of 
remuneration could also be described as annual remuneration and long-term 
remuneration. The level of executive remuneration depends on the type of 
remuneration package which includes annual and long-term remuneration.
54
 Annual 
remuneration consists of a base salary and annual bonus pay tied perhaps to the 
financial performance of the company. Long-term remuneration consists of share 
options, long-term incentive plans and restricted shares. Executive benefits make up 
the indirect remuneration which consists of various perks such as health insurance 
schemes, private use of company aircraft or cars, pension etc. Other elements that 
feature in the remuneration package include severance payments, golden hellos and 
golden handshakes, which are not elements of executive package per se but are 
included in the remuneration package depending on the circumstances. Each elements 
of the executive remuneration package is discussed below. 
Base salary 
A base salary is the contractual amount paid to an executive on a monthly basis, and 
in the case of an executive director, it includes directors’ fees although these are 
decided and disclosed separately.
55
 This element is not related either to performance 
of the company or to the performance of the individual director.
56
 The amount is set 
with due regard to the size of the company, the industry sector, the experience of the 
individual director and in comparison with other companies in the same industry.
57
 
The base salary is revised annually to take account of various factors like changes in 
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responsibility, performance of the company and other elements that make up the 
remuneration package. 
Base salary is a key component in executive pay as most risk adverse executive 
prefers a small increase in base salary to a much larger increase in ‘target’ bonus or 
variable remuneration. This is because executives devote substantial attention to the 
salary-determination process as most components of remuneration are measured 
relative to base salary levels (e.g. target bonuses are typically expressed as a 
percentage of base salary, and option grants are often expressed as a multiple of base 
salary. Defined pension benefits and severance arrangements also depend on salary 
levels). Therefore an increase in base salary has a positive influence on many other 
remuneration components.
58
 For example, Tesco plc remuneration policy for annual 
bonuses is to award up to 250% of base salary. But the base salary of Tesco plc CEO 
increased from £1,093,000 in 2012 to £1,114,000 in 2013, reflecting a percentage 
increase of 1.92%. This implies that the annual bonus of 2013 at 250% of base salary 
would be more by 1.92% than the annual bonus of 2012 at 250% of base salary. 
Annual bonus 
Annual bonuses (or bonus schemes) were and still are used as a motivational factor 
for directors to achieve higher levels of performance.
59
 Annual bonuses are obtained 
upon achieving a performance target set by the company for the executives.
60
 Bonus 
schemes provide executives with the incentive to perform better and therefore are 
regarded as a mechanism for improving executive performance. Executive 
performance can be difficult to determine, but bonus remuneration must have to 
reflect some kind of performance criteria for it to be meaningful. The company will 
have to set a performance target for which the executives will achieve, and a 
performance measure with which the performance would be determined.
61
 This gives 
the executives the chance to share in the success of the company.  
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Most companies use short-term annual bonus plans to remunerate their executives. 
Salary and annual bonuses are usually described as ‘cash pay’ although the bonus 
sometimes is paid in shares. One advantage in using an annual bonus is that it can 
better reflect current performance while at the same time managing costs for the 
organisation. There has been a rapid growth in the use of annual bonuses by 
companies over the years with most quoted companies in the UK offering bonuses to 
their executives. Annual bonus schemes can encourage short-termism at the expense 
of the company’s long term success if relied upon too much by a company. Annual 
bonus plans are constructed for a 12-month period in the UK in line with the 
company’s financial reporting year to encourage a year-on-year performance 
improvement. At the beginning of the financial year, performance targets are set, 
monitored during the year and assessed at the end of the year in order to determine 
payment. If the performance targets are met, the bonus will be paid and if not met the 
bonus will not be paid. Some bonus plans are paid in shares after a holding period
62
  
or subject to other conditions set by the company. The successful achievement of the 
objective of bonus plans depends greatly on the performance target and performance 
measure set by the company. The performance target and measure must be chosen 
carefully to reflect the company’s strategy and promote the success of the company in 
order to achieve the desired outcome.
63
 Even though bonuses are paid based on 
performance, it is distinguished from other forms of incentive pay in that, it is 
allocated on the basis of past performance rather than future performance. It is also 
based on subjective (rather than objective) rating of employees measuring individual 
executive performance rather than group performance.
64
  
Conyon et al.
65
 cited a study carried out by the Income Data Services (IDS) in 1993 
indicating that in 1979 only 8% of large UK companies had an annual bonus scheme 
for their top executives. The 1980s and 1990s saw a more obvious move to paying 
incentive bonuses to directors with most quoted companies offering bonuses to their 
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executives in 1993.
66
 However, at the time executive remuneration was not disclosed 
in the annual reports and accounts according to the components of the remuneration 
package. A survey on executive pay by Labour Research
67
 found out that of the one 
thousand companies involved in the survey, only two executive pay packages were 
broken down into base salary and bonus pay. By 2003 only six FTSE 350 companies 
had not offered an annual bonus to their executives, with 54.3% of the companies 
paying their executives bonuses in cash; and the rest of the companies paying bonuses 
in cash, shares, deferred shares and matching shares.
68
 The use of annual bonuses has 
grown rapidly amongst the FTSE All-share companies, with FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 
companies in 2011 offering annual bonuses to their executives as demonstrated in the 
chart below. 
Figure 3: Chart indicating the percentage use of annual bonuses by FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250 
 
Source: KPMG, KPMG’s Guide to Directors’ Remuneration (KPMG, 2011) 13. 
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There has been a massive increase in bonus payments over the years ranging from 
practically nothing to millions of pounds.
69
 Executives can receive bonus pay that is 
more than 100% of the base salary,
70
 although EU rules have pu a cap on bonuses 
primarily in the banking sector (discussed below). Comparison with earlier years is 
difficult as prior to 1996, pay disclosures for named executives were rare and most 
companies disclosed only the cash pay of the highest paid director. Annual bonuses 
can have a massive effect on the total remuneration package of an executive as it 
increases remuneration levels. Sam Chisholm former CEO of British Sky 
Broadcasting in 1996 had a pay rise of 609.2% giving £4,716,000, which was boosted 
by a £2.7 million bonus following the company’s successful flotation on the share 
exchange.
71
 In 2010, Bart Becht the CEO of Reckitt Benckiser plc, had a base salary 
of £987,000, plus a bonus of £3.5 million which was 354% of base salary.
72
 A more 
recent example is in 2013, Gulliver Stuart Thomson, the CEO of HSBC Holdings  plc  
had a base salary of £1,250,000 and a bonus pay of £6,428,000 which was 514.24% of 
his base salary.
73
 These examples demonstrate how much annual bonus can affect the 
total level of executive remuneration and also provide evidence that annual bonuses 
have increased and continue to increase. 
The banking crisis of the year 2007 and 2008, in which five banks were saved from 
collapsing by the government in the UK, was alleged to be partly caused by the use of 
bonus plans.
74
 Bonus plans encouraged excessive risk taking as executives focused 
only on the short term profitability of the company at the expense of its long term 
success.
75
 Addressing this problem, the European Parliament on the 16
th
 of April 
2013, approved a cap on banker’s bonus pay to a maximum of 100% of base salary, 
rising to 200% (if the shareholders agree) of the base salary applicable to all banks in 
the European Union. This cap indicated a massive cut back on the percentage of 
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executive bonus pay in the UK. However, despite the bonus cap, banks have found a 
way of going round the cap and rewarding their executives. For example, in 2014, 
HSBC’s CEO, Stuart Gulliver, had a pay rise of 140% after being handed a weekly 
allowance worth £32,000 as a means to get around the EU's cap on bonuses.
76
 This act 
by the HSBC bank may be emulated by other banks. Furthermore, this cap might 
encourage banks to increase fixed pay which could be more risky to the banks 
because they will not be based on any performance conditions consequently 
unaffected by the company’s performance. 
Annual bonuses also represent the most direct and immediate link between managerial 
actions and consequences. It does not generate further risk or commitment to the 
executive director as it is based on past performance and is not affected by how well 
the company performs in the future.
77
 The disadvantage of using annual bonus is that 
it encourages short termism in which directors will concentrate more on business 
strategies that will yield profit in the shortest possible time so that they can claim their 
bonus. This may cause directors to be reluctant to incur expenditure that is not 
immediately productive such as capital investment, maintenance and training.
78
  
Executive Benefits and Perks 
Executive benefits include health insurance, flexible work schedules, deferred 
remuneration and club memberships. The difference between executive benefits and 
other employee benefits is that the normal benefit may be expanded for the 
executives. For example, the normal benefit of flexible work schedule may be 
expanded for executives to include reimbursement for travel expenses between the 
work place and the executive’s home. In the 1970s, a director could receive benefits 
equal to about a quarter of his pay consisting of items such as company pension 
contribution, company car, housing, interest-free loans (e.g. Michael Nicholson was 
granted an interest free loan of £75,000 by Cigarette and Luxury Goods Group 
Dunhill)
79
 as well as payment of private school fees for children, free company flat in 
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‘town’, free meals and entertainments, lavish furnishing of offices and even homes. 
An example was BOC International that had a directors’ scheme allowing 
refurnishing of homes and other ‘hidden’ perks worth £2,500 a year.80 Furthermore, in 
the 1970s, disclosure requirement of executive remuneration were limited and thus the 
annual report did not specify what the ‘fringe benefits’ were. Some executives receive 
benefits that are almost the same as their base salary. For example in 2013, Sorrell 
Martin Stuart, the CEO of WPP plc had a base salary of £1,300,000 and benefits of 
£1,296,000. These figures indicate that executive benefits are also increasing and 
almost reaching 100% of the executive’s base salary. This increase will raise the 
levels of executive remuneration. 
Another unique component of executive remuneration package is perks also known as 
perquisites. Perks are additional non-monetary benefits that provide comfort and 
luxury to the work and/or personal environment, usually intended for senior 
managements and executives.
81
 For example, in 2012, Angela Ahrendts, the then 
CEO of Burberry  plc  received £387,000 as a ’cash allowance’ which included a 
clothing allowance in addition to her staff discount, and money relating to her 
relocation to Britain in 2006, her children’s school fees and some travel.82 Perks are 
used to motivate the executives to work hard and have been seen to enhance 
productivity when it gives the executive all the facilities to carry out his contracted 
duties.
83
 Firms find it cheaper to generate incentives by providing perks instead of 
additional remuneration to the executives.
84
 Perks are not strictly necessary for the 
accomplishment of the executive’s duties and thus, have been criticized as being a 
diversion of corporate resources by the management at the expense of the 
shareholders and the company.
85
 Executive perks are the least transparent of all the 
components of executive remuneration package. This is because they are hard to 
observe by the shareholders and the value is often underreported if disclosed in the 
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company’s accounts.86 Rajan Raghuram and Wulf Julie87 carried a research on perks 
and argued that perks are important and are regarded as an excess only when they are 
too large.  
Pension  
Executive pension is guaranteed as a function of base salary before retirement and 
plays a crucial role in affecting incentive schemes. Pension motivates the executive to 
work hard with a desire to remain on the job because pension is not received until the 
individual retires. The use of performance contingent pension is essential to ensure 
that executives continue to perform in their final years on the job.
88
 An increase in 
salary will consequently have substantial implications for the pension fund for many 
years to come. There has been a significant increase in the amount of pension 
executives receives. For example, Sir Anthony’s Tennant pension fund of £204,000 
was largely criticised in the early 1990s but in 2005, the former Chairman of Unilever 
had a pension pot of £17million with an annual retirement income of £850,000.
89
 
Although some directors are experiencing pension cuts, others are still receiving 
substantial sums from pension pots. For example in 2013 Albanese Tom, CEO of Rio 
Tinto plc had a pension of £1,113,760.
90
 
Factors affecting pension build-up depends on whether pensionable pay is based 
exclusively on basic salary or includes some or all of any bonuses paid and length of 
service. For example Tony Greener former CEO of Diageo Food and Drinks Group, 
who had a pension fund of £437,000 in 1999, had a salary of £710,000 but a 
proportion of his bonuses were included in pensionable pay. Some of the pension are 
based on base salary alone like in the case of Sir Thompson Clive of Rentokil Initial 
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Business Service Group who had a pension fund of £314,000 based on his £840,000 
base salary.
91
 
Share Options 
Share options are a benefit given by the company to an employee (executive) to buy 
shares in the company at a discount at a pre-specified price for a pre-specified term.
92
 
It may require the employee to complete a specific period of service in order to be 
able to exercise the option or requires a specified performance targets to be met by the 
company or employee. In the 1980s when more companies started offering share 
options to their executives, the Inland Revenue Rules under the framework of the 
Finance Act 1984, plus Best Practice Guidelines from the Association of British 
Insurers 1995 and the National Association of Pension Funds placed a restriction on 
UK companies on how to grant share options. Share options were granted up to a 
maximum of four times the earnings
93
 and exercisable within a period from 3-10 years 
after the date of the grant with provisions for automatic top-up (that is, the granting of 
additional option after exercise) to the specified multiple.
94
 During this period, share 
option was granted at a discount of up to 15% of the share price and the discount 
generated instantaneous increase in director’s wealth which was not linked to 
company performance.
95
 Furthermore, the share options were unrelated to the long 
term success of the company. At the time and up to present, there exists no legislation 
providing express limits upon the remuneration of directors in quoted companies.  
During the 1990s, share options were regarded as the most effective tool for linking 
executive pay to corporate performance and aligning the interest of managers and 
shareholders.
96
 However, the share options schemes did not guarantee loyalty for 
which it was designed due to lack of rigorous performance conditions; rather they led 
to over generous pay.  
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Unlike in the US, share option seemed to have no motivational effect on executives in 
the UK.
97
 The motivational aspect of share option was weaken in the UK with the 
collapse of the share market
98
 after UK companies granted large quantities of option 
to many directors. The reason was that executives make high gain when share price 
appreciates but lose nothing when share prices are bad while the shareholder incur a 
loss. Meanwhile, in the US, options had been used in executive packages on a 
substantial scale and clearly had a significant motivational effect especially for its 
CEOs.
99
 Premium-priced options were adopted and widely used in the US as an 
approach to enhance the motivational effect of share option, but very little used in the 
UK.
100
 
The value of the shares granted to the executives increases as the share price 
appreciates. The offering of share options in lieu of cash remuneration, allows 
companies to attract highly motivated and entrepreneurial executives.
101
 It also allows 
companies to obtain employment services without expending cash.
102
 More 
importantly, it also aims to link pay and performance. Share options are intended for 
only executives who remain with the firm to benefit thus providing retention 
incentives. They are non-tradable, and are typically forfeited if the executive leaves 
the firm before vesting (vesting is when the share option is exercised by the 
employee).
103
 Granting of share options cost the firm more than the value of the share 
option to the director receiving it. Share options can be more valuable as the company 
improves financially, and therefore, ownership of share is intended to encourage the 
executives to make the organisation more profitable. 
The purpose for introducing share options was to enable executives to become 
significant shareholders by purchasing shares cheaply and accordingly, linking 
executive’s interest with that of the company and tying pay to company 
performance.
104
 However, the granting of share options can dilute shareholdings by 
increasing the number of shares in the market. Directors like share options because 
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they offer a risk free opportunity to make a big profit.
105
 It is risk-free to the 
executives because they do not lose anything if the share price falls and they make 
gains if the share price appreciates. Directors are then faced with a temptation of 
focusing on ways of ensuring that the company’s share price increases when the share 
option vest. Thus, they might manipulate profit to improve the financial performance 
of the company to investors and the market as a way of giving upward impetus to the 
share price.
106
 The purpose of share option seems to have failed as majority of shares 
acquired in this way are sold almost immediately and the gain being additional 
income to the executive, e.g. the CEO of Reckitt Benckiser in 2010 took home a total 
remuneration of £92.6 million in total driven by the crystallisation of share awards 
accounting for £88 million of his total pay package.
107
 Also, the holding of shares 
makes the executive more sensitive to the interest of the company, but the executives 
do not exercise their right if the share price falls. Consequently, share option loses it 
incentive value if the share price falls, but at the time the option is negotiated, the 
executive is still incentivised.
108
 
Long-term incentive plans 
The undesirable short-term behaviour of annual bonuses and the lack of rigorous 
performance conditions on share options in the UK, led to the introduction of long-
term incentive plans (LTIPs). Before the 1990s very few companies had LTIPs in 
place. The number increased in the 1990s particularly following the Greenbury Report 
of 1995
109
 recommendations for companies to replace share options with LTIPs. 
LTIPs encourage and motivate directors to concentrate on long-term strategic 
objectives, and to be less influenced by the short-term negative aspects of decisions. 
LTIPs usually comprise of share options and restricted shares.
110
 
Long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) take the form of cash or a grant of shares that 
becomes transferable to the executive only upon attainment of certain performance 
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objectives.
111
 Companies use LTIPs as a means to encourage and reward long-term 
performance and thus align the interest of the executives more closely with that of the 
company.
112
 LTIPs require the fulfilment of certain performance criteria over a period 
of time.
113
 Such criteria include total shareholder return, earnings per share, share 
price, profit, growth in net asset value, return on capital and cash flow (discussed in 
detail in chapter 5).
114
 Most companies in the UK use earnings per share or total 
shareholder return as targets for measuring LTIPs (discussed in detail in chapter 5).
115
  
LTIPs are similar to share options in terms of the objective and the grant procedure 
but differ in the mode of vesting. LTIPs’ performance targets are more varied and the 
company’s performance judged relative to a group of other companies rather than the 
Retail Price Index.
116
 Setting the appropriate performance target can increase 
shareholder value while inappropriate performance criteria or a complex LTIP will act 
as an opportunity for the executives to tilt the design in their favour.
117
 This is because 
shareholders find it hard in judging the targets involved in complex LTIPs. For 
example, in 2003, HSBC Banking Group had an LTIP scheme that rewarded 
executive if the firm could clear a performance hurdle of earning-per-share (growth 
2% above an average earnings-per-share rate) adjusted upward for inflation in Hong 
Kong (50% weighting), UK (35% weighting), and the US (15% weighting). If the 
hurdle was cleared, the number of shares distributed to the executive would depend 
upon total shareholder return in a comparator group of nine companies (50% 
weighting), a ‘top 20’ of banks (25% weighting) and an index of 300 other banks 
(25% weighting). If the HSBC’s total shareholder return performance was above the 
fiftieth percentile of the composite group, executive received shares in full, with an 
additional 20% of the full award if the performance is in the top quartile. To 
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understand the complexity of this LTIP required the shareholders of the HSBC to 
track the share prices of 329 companies to estimate the relative performance of 
HSBC’s total shareholder return in the past, which was a very difficult task which no 
shareholder is willing to do except maybe the institutional investors.
118
 
Dividends 
Dividends are not regarded as remuneration per se, but there are considered for the 
purpose of this thesis as remuneration. This is because executives are rewarded by 
shares when they achieve certain performance targets, and they would consequently 
receive dividends on the shares which can be considered as remuneration. Dividends 
are the income that shareholders receive from their shares. They are payments from 
the profits the company makes and are not paid out from the company’s capital.119 
The methods of paying out the dividends are generally laid out in the company’s 
article of association. Directors do not only profit from share options vested, but they 
also make profit from dividends paid on the shares. In 1996, Ronald Hobson of Group 
National Parking Corporation got an increased dividend of over 1000% and a special 
dividend of 155pence per share resulting in dividends of £60,413,139 on his 37.64 
million share stake in the company.
120
 Furthermore, an executive could acquire 
significant number of shares through share options and as a result receive large 
dividends on them. 
Healthy and consistent dividend pay-out can convey information to investors who are 
not directly involved in managing a company, that its management has confidence in 
the business and its prospects. Such message passed to investors can increase the 
benefit to the company through the increase of the share price.
121
 Inconsistency in 
dividend pay-out is interpreted by investors as a signal of long-term problems within 
the company rather than a temporary crisis of profitability or liquidity.
122
 
The directors of a company recommend how much of the company’s profit should be 
distributed as dividends. The directors understand the company and have more 
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information about the company’s affair than the shareholders. Thus the level of 
dividend which the directors recommend is seen as an important signal of what they 
think of the company’s prospect. However, executives are capable of abusing this 
information privilege as they hold shares in the company and can make huge gains 
from dividend pay-out on the shares which is the reason why the directors’ 
recommendation must be approved (declared) by the members.
123
 
Restricted Share 
Restricted shares are shares held by the company in trust for the executive, for a 
predetermined period to ensure that they cannot be sold during the restricted time.
124
 
These restrictions lapse over a period of years provided the executive remains with the 
company.
125
 Dividends may or may not be paid during the restricted period. 
Companies use restricted share as a retention incentive to reduce the likelihood of 
executives leaving the company. Restricted share is more commonly used in the US 
than in the UK.
126
 
Restricted shares differ from share options in that restricted shares vest regardless of 
the change in share price from the date granted to the date of vesting.
127
 Restricted 
shares provide a stable incentive to the executives as it is not effected by share price, 
whereas the incentive value of share option depends on the market price of the share 
relative to the exercise price. Share option provides similar incentive as restricted 
shares only when the market price is well above the exercise price and zero incentive 
when market price falls below exercise price.
128
 Companies treat restricted shares as 
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remuneration expense when the restriction lapse and not at the time of the award. The 
expense is the fair market value of the shares at the time of vesting.
129
 
Payments for loss of office 
Payments for loss of office (severance payments) are agreements in the executive’s 
service contract or in the company’s articles of association spelling out how long and 
how much he will be paid after termination of his contract. Senior executives are often 
given contracts that include a severance agreement and change of control protection. 
Change of control provisions provide the executive with protection in the event of 
losing his job as a result of the sale of the company, or any other event resulting in 
change of control. The provision of severance payment is intended to protect honest 
executives who faithfully serve the company.  
However, pay-offs often go to directors who are sacked for not being up to the job, or 
have left the company to pursue other business interests, or have resigned over 
boardroom disagreement or merely retired from the boardroom.
130
 For example, Peter 
Davis former chairman of publishers Reed International resigned after a dispute over 
management responsibilities and was paid £1,247,000.
131
 Sir Phillip Watts, former 
Chairman of Shell received £1 million as severance payment following an act of 
misrepresentation that cost the company’s share price to fall. His severance payment 
was six times his basic salary under the contract.
132
 
Another form for payment for loss of office is golden handshake. A golden handshake 
is a payment made by a company to a senior executive upon termination of 
employment before the contract ends.
133
 Golden handshakes emerged in the late 
twentieth century when severance packages were frequently offered to resigning 
executives. An example is the golden handshake awarded to Klaus Esser (who headed 
Mannesmann, the German Telecoms company before it was taken over by the UK 
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Group Vodafone) by Vodafone of £9.1 million.
134
 In 2012, Ian Marchant the then 
CEO of Scottish and Southern Energy plc took home a golden handshake of £15m 
after quitting the company.
135
 Executives can receive golden handshake despite clear 
evidence of failure.
136
 In 2001, Telecoms Company Marconi gave its former CEO 
Lord Simpson a golden handshake of £1 million plus a pension payment of £2.5 
million less £300,000 after a protest by its shareholders. His package was criticised as 
a lot for someone who helped to bring the firm to the brink of collapsing. Prior to his 
departure the company had received a two profit warnings within two months and 
sacked thousands of employees.
137
 Golden handshakes are regarded as excessive and 
not necessary at a time when the economy is suffering and companies are cutting back 
on jobs, the top executives that are affected walk away with big pay-offs while other 
walk away with absolutely nothing. For examples, Jim Mueller, the then CEO of 
Invensys plc, who presided over 14000 job cuts when a merger created Invensys, left 
the company with a £3.2 million handshake.
138
 
Golden Hello 
Golden hello is a payment offered to induce a executive to leave one company and 
join another.
139
 It is a guaranteed remuneration package with no link to company 
performance (because no performance has yet taken place). The UKCGC
140
 
recommends that executive remuneration be set as to link pay to individual and 
corporate performance. Golden hellos clearly undermine this recommendation, and 
could justify the weak relationship that exists between executive pay and company 
performance. For example, Mr Christopher Bailey, the new chief executive of 
Burberry, was given a golden hello in shares worth up to £7.6m.
141
 Mr John Browett 
former CEO of PC World and Currys was given a golden hello of £36 million by 
                                                          
134
 ‘The £9 Million Handshake’ (2002) 91(1) Labour Research 17-18. 
135
 ‘Scottish & Southern Energy boss gets £15m Golden Handshake - After Tripling Energy Bills’ 
(2013) Daily Record and Sunday Mail January 24
th
. 
136
 ‘More than a Fond Farewell’ (1994) 83(9) Labour Research 24. 
137
 ibid. 
138
 ‘Company Directors get Record Golden Farewells’ (2002) Labour Research Press Release Jan. 
139
Julia Cresswell, Oxford Dictionary of Word Origins (Oxford University Press 2010) 192. 
140
 FRC, The UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2012) D.1. 
141
 Simon Bowers, ‘Burberry Hands Christopher Bailey Golden Hello Worth up to £7.6m’ (2014) The 
Guardian, May 14
th
. 
31 
 
Apple for taking charge of its retail arm.
142
 Golden hellos have been criticised by 
shareholders as a waste of the company’s resources. This criticism could be seen in 
the reaction of Marks & Spencer investors who voted against the remuneration report 
in protest of Marc Bolland (new CEO) golden hello of £15 million pay package and 
other boardroom bonus pay out.
143
 
Golden hello undermines the reason for which share options and executive long-term 
incentive schemes where designed; which is to encourage executives to achieve 
performance targets, and stay in the company to receive the full value of their 
remuneration package. Most golden hellos do not vest on the executive until they 
serve the company for three years.
144
 This includes elements such share options and 
restricted shares are always linked to performance and require some years of service 
to vest. Furthermore, elements such as pension benefits which require years of service 
get handed down to the new executive subject to three years of being in the 
company.
145
 For example, WHSmith in 2004, awarded a golden hello of £2.6 million 
to its new CEO Kate Swann following the company’s poor Christmas sales was 
criticised by the shareholders. Kate Swann had resigned as managing director from 
catalogue retailer Argos. Her golden hello package was made up bonus of £220,000 
that could increase to £475,000 after Swann completes three years with the company, 
and a share option worth three times her annual salary – netting her £1.4 million. In 
addition, she was offered £500,000 remuneration over two years for the loss of 
benefits when she resigned from Argos.
146
 There were no performance measure 
attached to Swann’s pay package (presumably there were performance measures 
attached to the share options) apart from the fact that she has to remain in the 
company for three years. After discussing the elements that make-up the executive 
remuneration package, this next section will discuss the factors that increase executive 
remuneration levels. 
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Factors that can increase executive remuneration 
Executive remuneration levels have increase greatly in the UK over the past two 
decades, e.g. the pay of an average FTSE 100 chief executive in the UK between 1998 
and 2011 rose from £1 million to £4.8 million.
147
 Companies in the UK are prepared 
to pay executives up to the value of their perceived potential contribution in the 
company. On the other hand, executives want a remuneration package that is at least 
equivalent to what they can earn in other companies. It is important that policymakers 
understand the factors that have led to this significant increase, when deciding how 
best to regulate the determination of directors’ pay, starting with the effect that 
privatisation has had upon remuneration. 
Privatization 
Privatization of some utility companies in the early 1990s saw one of the striking 
consequences being the increases in executive remuneration.
148
 Prior to privatization 
in the UK, the determinants of the level of remuneration was more bureaucratic with 
little variation across executives and firms, no pay for performance and systematic 
age-related pay increases. There existed two markets for executives, namely the 
market for executives in state-owned companies, and the market for executives in 
publicly traded companies. The executives in state-owned companies received about 
half what the executives in publicly traded companies were receiving.
149
 The state-
owned companies were characterised by limited managerial discretion, low incentives 
to those monitoring their performance and more severe political constraints on pay 
settings. These factors led to differences in the remuneration contract of executives in 
state-owned companies and publicly traded companies.
150
 Executives in publicly 
traded companies had more managerial discretion and incentives (for example share 
options). 
Privatization facilitated the convergence of these two markets giving the privatized 
companies the opportunity to access the same labour market and capital markets as 
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existing publicly traded companies. An opportunity they did not have considering that 
their executives were drawn from a distinct labour market other than from publicly 
traded companies. Privatisation changed the contracting environment giving the 
managers increased discretion which increased their potential productivity. 
Competing with the market created increased demands for managers with financial 
skills and the ability to raise capital. The competition in this market forced newly 
privatized companies to offer competitive wage packages to their executives with 
reference to their peers.
151
 Furthermore, managers were allowed to diversify into 
businesses with other countries that were unregulated, creating the incentive to attract 
managers with broader set of skills, talents and experiences. Privatised companies 
were also given the opportunity to alter their remuneration policies at their 
discretion.
152
 Privatization affected executive remuneration in two ways: firstly, it 
removed the constraints on the level of top executive pay, thereby allowing directors’ 
remuneration to rise to market levels. Secondly, top executives could as a result of 
privatisation be rewarded with share option schemes, thereby allowing the new 
owners to incentivise their managers in a way not easily possible in the public 
sector.
153
 
Due to the massive pay increase that the executives enjoyed as a result of 
privatization, agency theory suggested that new principles be sought to introduce 
incentive-based payment systems, especially among top management to ensure that 
the agents behave in the principal’s interest.154 However, the huge increases awarded 
to the executives could not be justified as there was no relationship between executive 
pay and company performance. The scale and structure of the companies were 
unaffected by the privatisation and there were no dramatic changes in the British 
labour market for executives (meaning there was so sudden demands for former 
public sector executives).
155
 These increases aroused public scrutiny as there was no 
correlation between salary increases and share market returns, as well as other 
measures of firm performance.  
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Example of pay increases due to privatization includes Eastern and London Electricity 
in 1990/91 that increased the chairman’s remuneration from £114,620 to £242,818 
within a year.
156
 A classic example of excessive executive remuneration that further 
fuelled the debate in the UK is the British Gas plc case that grabbed the attention of 
the media, public and policymakers.
157
 When the government unexpectedly 
announced it was going to open the domestic gas supply industry to competition 
(privatization) in the early 1990s British Gas had to undertake one of the biggest 
corporate restructuring programmes ever undertaken in Britain to make its cost 
structures competitive.
158
 This was a measure to enable the company to keep up with 
the competition in the market. In the late 1994, British Gas awarded the then CEO 
Cedric Brown, a 70% pay increase, thereby increasing his pay to £475,000 per year. 
The public condemned the pay rise and the media published articles such as the 
‘Derailing the Gravy Train’159 and ‘Fat Cats in the Dock’160.  
A study by Conyon
161
 examining the relationship between the remuneration of the 
highest paid director and company performance in the privatized utilities companies, 
found that top directors’ salary plus bonuses increased but with no relationship 
between director remuneration and the company performance. He also found out that 
the use of share option as a result of privatisation considerably inflated overall 
remuneration. 
The graphs below show the difference in executive remuneration before and after 
privatization of some utility companies. This is a study that was carried out by Cragg 
et al
162
 examining executive pay systems in state owned and privatised firms against 
the backdrop of remuneration systems in publicly traded firms in UK. The graph 
below indicate that executives of privatised utility companies in the UK after 1990 
were receiving a remuneration package that was equal if not more than publicly traded 
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companies. Executives of non-privatised companies of the same industry (state owned 
utilities) were receiving less than their counterparts that were privatised. Looking at 
the graph it is obvious that privatisation increased executive remuneration levels. 
Figure 4: Graphs indicating the level of executive pay in privatized utility 
companies
163
 
 
Although privatization is not still the driver of executive remuneration today, 
however, the effect of the part it played in the early 1990s is still being felt today as 
remuneration levels keeps increasing. Cedric Brown’s pay increases at the time was 
significant but cannot be compared to the present executive pay increases as they are 
many times more than Cedric Brown’s pay package at the time.  
Globalisation and Executive Labour Market 
The globalisation of the labour market, business operations and the capital markets 
produces incentives that result in a convergence in the remuneration practices 
worldwide. Globalisation in economic context includes: 
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the liberalisation and deregulation of markets, privatisation of assets, retreat of 
state functions... diffusion of technology, cross-national distribution of 
manufacturing production (foreign direct investment), and the integration of 
capital markets. In its narrowest formation, the term refers to the worldwide 
spread of sales, production and manufacturing processes all of which 
reconstitute the international division of labour
164
 
Executives in the US are the highest paid in the world.
165
 This means that any non-US 
company facing US competitors, possessing US operations, employing a CEO 
capable of managing a US corporation, or exposed to the US legal environment has 
incentives to align their pay practices with those of the US companies.
166
 The UK and 
other countries pay their executives less than their US counterparts however; their 
interaction with their US market may push up executive remuneration levels. Gerakos 
et al
167
 studying 416 publicly traded UK companies over 2003-2007 found that UK 
firms that interact with US market are influenced by the US pay practices, with total 
remuneration increasing with firms exposed to the US market and the presence of US 
based operations. They found that the total remuneration of these companies had a 
direct relationship with the percentage sales derived from the US market and firms 
with greater sales using more incentive based pay. 
It has been argued that the trade of UK companies with US companies puts pressure 
on the UK companies to offer similar pay packages to their executives to prevent 
them from taking up similar positions in peer companies with lucrative firms. 
However, a study by the High Pay Centre found that only 0.8% of UK companies 
recruited executives from outside UK, whilst 80% of the executives are promoted 
from within the company.
168
 Although, the use of international talent is very limited, 
it might still have an impact on executive remuneration levels. One reason why US 
executives are paid the highest in the world is because US executive pay package is 
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highly incentivised as opposed to non-US companies.
169
 Non-US companies place 
less emphasis on performance oriented pay and award executive remuneration 
packages that are less lucrative compared to their American counterparts. The award 
of variable pay is much more important component of executive remuneration 
package in US than any way else.
170
 Share options and long-term incentive plans to 
base salary ratio are higher in US than non US counterparts. Annual bonuses for US 
executives are quite generous by world standards, but not inordinately so. Trading 
with US companies inevitably has a positive influence on executive pay levels in the 
UK.
171
 
US executives do not sacrifice job security for higher pay as they are paid the highest 
in the world but with executives of non-US companies, there is a high potential of job 
sacrifice for higher pay. As a result of globalisation, most big companies are publicly 
traded with many investors owning blocks of shares. These investors could be from 
other countries trading in another and as a result there is bound to be a rise in 
executive pay levels.
172
 
The growing internationalisation of the executive labour market also accounts for 
increases in executive pay packages.
173
 The international executive community has 
produced examples of executives using their business skills in countries other than 
their own. This is very common in companies of dual/cross listing in two or more 
share markets. Executives generally will want a remuneration package that is at least 
equivalent to what they can get elsewhere or can enjoy in other pursuits.
174
 Executive 
remuneration packages are influenced by information available to the executives and 
any other source of negotiating power. Under the principal/agent dichotomy that 
arises from separation of ownership and control, information asymmetry is very 
important in the executive labour market.
175
 This is because the executives acting like 
the agents in controlling the company are always in possession of very vital 
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information about the company. Considering that the company can only function 
properly with the information in the executive’s possession, the executives can use 
this as a justification for high remuneration. 
Executive remuneration packages should be designed to attract, motivate and retain 
executives.
176
 A possible implication of this design is that companies would offer 
excessive pay to executives and justify it on the basis of attracting, retaining and 
motivating them.
177
 Bebchuk and Fried
178
 viewed this design of executive 
remuneration package as being the result from opportunistic exploitation of 
managerial power. They suggested that executive remuneration was subject to 
manipulation by the executives and using managerial labour market to justify their 
pay package. Gregory-Smith and Main
179
 study considered the participation constraint 
in the executive labour market using a sample of 953 UK companies over the period 
1995-2008, demonstrated that executives are more likely to move companies when 
their pay is low. The mobility of executives is more particularly when they are paid 
less than prevailing market conditions suggest is possible. The mobility of executives 
leads to increases in remuneration levels with the greatest improvement falling on the 
executives that switch companies. Marc Bolland left his former company (Morrisons) 
to join Marks & Spencer after the latter offered him a more lucrative pay package of 
£15m. In his first year, he was to receive at least £8.5m, a sum that includes £7.5m 
compensation for lost bonuses and shares that he would have received in his old job. 
On top of his basic salary, he could earn a bonus worth up to £2.5m. The package also 
included an ‘exceptional’ award of shares worth nearly £4m.180 
The fear of companies losing top management people as a result of global executive 
talent market can increase the level of executive pay in the UK. For example, in 2012 
the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) awarded its then CEO, Mr Hester a £963,000 
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bonus that was regarded as excessive and undeserving (he eventually gave it back), on 
top of his £1.2 million base salary. The company justified the bonus award by arguing 
that there was a real fear of losing Mr Hester and the rest of the board members had 
they been paid less.
181
 However, a report by the High Pay Centre on the contrary 
found out that lower pay does not drive executives overseas as 80% of executive 
appointments are promotions from within the company.
182
 Top management in the 
UK might be tempted to migrate to America to take up job opportunities that would 
offer them generous remuneration packages. As a result of this market force, the UK 
companies are forced to restructure managerial remuneration to close up the 
differences in pay package and retain their top management without fear of losing 
them.
183
 The effect on remuneration package is not just as a result of executives from 
UK migrating to the US, but there exist same pressure when executives from the US 
migrate to the UK. Executives from the US are not prepared to migrate and assume a 
position in a different country if they are not going to be paid higher than he would 
receive in the US.
184
 Thus UK companies recruiting from the US board will definitely 
pay more to attract, motivate and retain the executives and this ratchet up executive 
pay and eventually passed unto other companies in the same industry through 
benchmarking. The reason for which the UK would want to recruit executives from 
the US is because the US has a comparatively deep executive talent pool and UK 
companies might want to take advantage of this. The UK companies might also want 
to show to its investors that they are maximising shareholder value as their priority by 
employing highly skilled and talented executive in the executive market.
185
 Gerakos et 
al
186
 study found out that UK companies with executives that have US board 
experience tend to pay the executives more than companies without. UK companies 
do this to prevent the executives from seeking positions in a US peer company. 
The competition for managerial skills and talent is causing most companies to want to 
recruit competent executives even from an international spectrum. Companies that 
                                                          
181
 ‘RBS Chief Stephen Hester’s £963,000 Bonus Criticised’ (2012) BBC News, January 27th 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16752358?print=true assessed 27 January 2012. 
182
 ‘Global CEO Appointments: A Very Domestic Issue’ (2013) High Pay Centre February 12th. 
183
 Brian Cheffins and Randall Thomas, ‘The Globalisation (Americanization?) of Executive Pay’ 
(2004) 1(2) Berkeley Bus. L.J. 223, 256. 
184
 ibid.  
185
 ibid. 
186
 Joseph Gerakos, Joseph Piotroski and Suraj Scinivasan, ‘Globalisation and Executive 
Remuneration: An Analysis of Pay Practices in UK Companies’ (2009) 
http://www.hbs.edu/units/am/pdf/Srinivasan.pdf assessed 31 October 2011. 
40 
 
carry out business on an international scale seek executives who are capable of 
operating in a global market place irrespective of the country of origin. This 
internationalisation of the labour market has caused a significant convergence in 
executive pay between the UK and other countries.
187
 UK companies, as well as other 
non-US companies, use the fear of losing their executives to defend and justify the 
significant increase in executive pay.
188
 Further from the study of the High Pay 
Centre, this fear is not justified as most new appointments are staffs of the same 
company who have been promoted. 
Factors affecting the executive labour market include supply of services, supply price 
and the company demands for executives. The minimum amount required by an 
executive is influenced by a number of factors. These factors include: the cost of 
accumulating the skills, education, experience, the nature of the job, the risk involved 
and the effort it demands, potential remuneration in alternative position, as well as any 
non-pecuniary benefits. Although there may be many people with managerial 
experience and qualifications, executive quality vary with limited number of 
executives perceived to have a range of key elements which includes leadership, 
communication and judgement skills to a sufficient high degree. Consequently, the 
sensitivity of supply of executive to the remuneration they get depends on the 
suitability of the executive to the job.
189
 
The function of the task, together with the skills and capability brought to the 
company by the executive determines the value of the executive. However, the 
demand value is always high in companies as executive functions can only be 
performed by an executive with appropriate characteristics. For a company that 
requires efficiency on the part of an executive will need to hire the most suitable 
executive, paying up the value of the executive contribution to the position. There is 
no single market price for executives as they all poses different abilities. Thus 
differences in their pay package reflect different levels of skills, talent and ability in a 
broadly similar job and willingness of the company to pay.
190
 It therefore means that, 
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for a company to attract, motivate and retain talented executives, they must be 
prepared to pay what other potential companies are prepared to pay or even more. 
If a US firm enters the UK executive labour market, it can also create an incentive to 
align pay with US executive pay practices. A US firm acquiring or starting a business 
unit in the UK may choose to pay their UK based executives in accordance with the 
US pay practices. Consequently, when other UK companies in the same industry 
benchmark with the US company the presence of the US company in the foreign 
market can exert pressure on the foreign company’s remuneration practices.191 The 
presence of a US company in the UK market with its executive paid at the US rate 
causes disparities in pay within and across the firm. To alleviate the adverse incentive, 
the company may be required to revise its remuneration arrangement to resolve the 
differences in pay levels. 
UK companies that list their shares on US exchange expose their executives to greater 
responsibilities and risk as a result of the company’s exposure to US laws and legal 
environment. They would be expected to comply with US securities law and related 
regulation, including all provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, exposing the executives to potential civil and criminal penalties. Listing 
on the US exchange will require the company to hire and/or retain a highly skilled 
executive able to comply with the market rules and thus will be expected to demand 
higher remuneration package to cover the incremental effort and extra risk borne.
192
 
The UK and the US share strong economic interdependencies, with companies that 
have shares listed on each other’s main exchange. The sharing of a common language 
and legal tradition and in many dimensions, similar financial and regulatory systems, 
there is an increase in the mobility of executive’s talent between the two countries. 
Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions 
When two different companies from two different countries merge, there will be a 
need to merge managerial remuneration to a single pay system, as the two companies 
almost certainly had different remuneration arrangements. There is a convergence in 
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remuneration practices following a merger, with the new company usually paying 
higher than what the executives had in their previous companies, if not adopting the 
remuneration practice from the company that paid more.
193
 It is rare/almost 
impossible to find a company that will pay its executives the same or less after a 
merger.
194
 Studies have proven that executive remuneration has a significant effect 
and relationship with the company size.
195
 Consequently, increase in the firm size 
through acquisition could increase the remuneration of an existing executive, 
regardless of whether the acquisition creates value or not.
196
 Companies always 
increase in size after a merger and as a result merger can be considered as drivers of 
executive remuneration. Companies increase the level of executive remuneration after 
mergers to avoid crippling efforts to attract, motivate and retain key incumbent 
talent.
197
 No increase in the level of executive pay can cause the executives to seek for 
jobs in other companies that pay well. 
The UK is one of the leading players in cross-border acquisitions, with an increase in 
the number and value of foreign acquisitions by UK companies since the mid-
1980s.
198
 When a UK company acquires a non-UK company, the home country 
remuneration practices are adjusted to facilitate the integration of the new businesses 
and to alleviate any pay disparities among the acquiring firm’s executive relative to 
the target firm’s executive.199 Cross-border acquisitions may result in a complex 
organisation due to factors such as multiple currencies, cultural differences and 
geographical dispersion giving the executives to demand for higher levels of pay for 
the increase responsibility and risk that they are exposed to. The level of pay in the 
target company has a significant impact on executive remuneration in an acquisition. 
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Where the target’s level of pay is lower than that of the bidder, there is a tendency for 
the target to increase their executive pay level to at least that if the bidder’s level 
following acquisition. The same holds true for international acquisitions. With the US 
accounting for almost half of all cross-border acquisition by UK acquirers, UK 
acquiring US subsidiaries face huge internal pay inequalities which are often resolved 
by increasing home-country executive pay.
200
 Guest found out in the his study on the 
impact of mergers on executive remuneration that pay changes resulting from 
acquisition are not affected by target nationality or organisational form, although 
cross-border acquisition results in higher executive remuneration.
201
 
Foreign acquisitions by UK companies lead to higher executive remuneration than 
domestic acquisitions. Executives who undertake acquisitions leading to a global 
diversification in the company’s operations are paid higher. Girma et al202 study on 
the impact of executive pay with the completion of acquisition activity found out that 
mergers increased the levels of executive pay. Their findings suggested that the 
executives of a company have more incentives to grow their companies by acquisition 
and merger as this will inevitably increase the size of the company and consequently 
their remuneration level. It can then be drawn from existing literature that the increase 
is executive pay after an acquisition is as a function of the increase in the company 
size after the acquisition.
203
 However, Girma et al studies also found significant and 
substantial executive pay increases in excess of those generated by growth in firm size 
consequent upon the merger. This could be explained by the fact that acquisition 
reveals more information about the quality of management (executive performance) 
which is useful to the firm’s REMCO when setting executive remuneration. 
The Growth of Multinational Companies 
Companies that do business on a multinational scale almost always set executive pay 
levels at an agreed standard that will reflect the remuneration levels of the countries 
involved to ease the company-wide systems of promotion and incentivised 
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remuneration.
204
 Setting executive remuneration on a universal scale gives a uniform 
structure unlike on a local basis. UK companies that do business on a multinational 
scale with countries like the US (whose executives are the highest paid in the world) 
and adopting the universal remuneration level would mean adopting the US 
remuneration structure which will definitely increase the pay level.
205
 Companies that 
do business on a multinational scale are unable to pay levels with reference to the 
domestic remuneration norms, domestic national tax and consideration and other local 
conditions. Paying the executives in reference to the domestic characteristic will not 
lead to an increase in executive pay levels, but the pay structure may not be tenable 
for a multinational company headquartered outside the UK. Furthermore the company 
will not be able to keep up with the competition in the executive labour market, 
consequently, will be unable to attract, motivate and retain executives of a high 
quality.
206
 Executives that work in a multinational company have more responsibility 
and are also exposed to legal actions more and in return they always expect a lucrative 
pay package. 
Board independence 
Increases in executive remuneration are also driven by a weak or compromised board 
as they might be expected to give in to the executive demands for higher pay as 
opposed to an independent and competent board.
207
 In the UK, the board contains 
sub-committees that are responsible for different areas of the company. Among these 
committees is the REMCO
208
  The REMCO is responsible for setting the pay of all 
executives’ directors and chairman of the company.209 This committee should be 
made up of independent non-executive directors (NEDs).
210
 However, this committee 
is not totally independent from the board as the vital information they require to make 
informed decisions needs to come from the executives. The reliance of the REMCO 
on the executives for relevant information, gives the executives the opportunity to 
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manipulate the information disclosed to the REMCO in a way that will work in their 
favour. Furthermore, the REMCO set the remuneration level of the executives bearing 
in mind that the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the executives will either reflect their 
dismissal/retention on the REMCO or even in the company. The REMCO employ the 
services of the RCON to advise them on executive remuneration based on data from 
the market. Although, RCONs are experts in the market, their advice is not entirely 
objective as they are not independent from the board. They are paid by the board, and 
they also supply other services (advisory services such as share scheme, corporate tax 
planning, international taxation, and corporate finance) to the company apart from 
remuneration services. Consequently, they turn to act in favour of the executives 
rather than the shareholders to retain their positions and the other business deals they 
have the company. 
Remuneration disclosure 
It has been argued by Iacobucci
211
 that the enhanced requirement for the disclosure of 
executive remuneration in the company’s annual report has been a significant 
contributor to pay increases. Remuneration disclosure improves access to market 
comparator information for both the executive and the board and could strengthen 
executive bargaining power.
212
 Disclosure requirements increase pressure on 
executives to set pay packages that are more sensitive to the company’s performance. 
This adoption of pay sensitivity pay increases remuneration levels, because to provide 
incentive for executives, the size of pay would have to be more than pay without 
incentive.
213
 Furthermore, linking pay to performance, the executive is risk-averse 
because if the performance targets are not met then he would lose the pay as well as 
the time and efforts put into the job consequently, the pay must be higher. The 
REMCO uses executive remuneration data from companies to make their own 
assessment of appropriate external relativities to benchmark their executives’ pay 
levels. Disclosure makes this data available and each company aiming to reward its 
executive at the median or upper quartile which mounts autonomous pressure on the 
executive remuneration levels on all companies. The media, newspaper and 
magazines always list the remuneration of the top-earning executives, and with this 
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information executives use it to establish their respective expectations and negotiating 
stances.
214
 
Shift to incentive pay 
Principle D.1 of the UKCGC 2012 recommends that ‘levels of remuneration should 
be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality required to run the 
company successfully, but a company should avoid paying more than is necessary for 
this purpose. A significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should be 
structured as to link reward to corporate and individual performance’. This means that 
the bulk of a director’s pay should derive from performance-related components. 
Executive fixed pay on the contrary has risen in recent years from about £500,000 in 
2000 to £800,000 in 2010.
215
 The performance-related elements of executive 
directors’ remuneration should be stretching and designed to promote the long-term 
success of the company. As discussed above under the component of remuneration 
package, the forms of performance-related pay are worth many times the base salary. 
Annual bonuses could be worth 200% or more and long-term incentive plans 700% or 
more of base salary.
216
 In the UK presently, there is a greater focus on LTIPs of the 
pay package. This is a measure to reduce the principal agent problem that might arise 
if executive are paid cash only. The focus on LTIPs is to get the executive to align 
their interest with that of the shareholders and maximise company profitability. The 
success of this scheme will depend on the quality of their implementation in practice. 
Their successful implementation will also depend on the quality of their design, which 
in turn is influenced by the capacities and experience of the executive.
217
 LTIP 
introduces variability and hence uncertainty about the level of remuneration 
executives. The drive to link executive remuneration to company performance 
through the use of performance-related payments has resulted in the increase of 
average FTSE 100 executive bonus from about £300,000 in 2000 to £1 million in 
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2010, whilst long term incentive plans have risen from £200,000 to £1.4 million over 
the same period.
218
  
Peer benchmarking 
Most companies today set executive pay benchmarking with other companies in the 
same industry (benchmarking is discussed in more detail in chapter 4). This practice is 
regarded as generating a ratchet effect that leads to continued growth in the level of 
pay. The company awards its executives a level of remuneration above median pay in 
their relevant peer group to signal to the market that the executive is of a high-quality. 
The REMCO relies on RCONs for advice on peer benchmarking. The REMCO are 
expected to offer a remuneration package with reference to the company’s industry, 
size, performance, as well as the pay package should be able to attract, retain and 
motivate the executives. A remuneration package that effectively considers all of 
these elements is very difficult and the REMCO often than not strive more to retain 
the executives by offering them very attractive remuneration packages rather than 
putting more emphasis on the performance of the company. For example, in March 
2014, the Co-Operative Bank ignored the poor performance and loses of the company, 
and was ready to offer their CEO a pay package of £3.6 million which contained a 
retention payment of £1.5 million.
219
 One reason for this difficulty could be the fact 
that the market for executive is scarce and considering the present day complexity of 
executive duties, companies try more to retain their executives and putting the 
shareholder interest secondary. 
The board of directors tend to determine executive pay with regard to executives of 
their peer companies, by upwardly adjusting the pay of the underpaid executives. This 
is done with the intention of providing pay package that can “attract, motivate and 
retain” an executive. For this reason the pressure to adjust pay would be stronger 
when executives are underpaid relative to other peer firms.
220
 In most cases the 
REMCO benchmarks pay levels across companies and industries with whom the firm 
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competes for talent. Even though the REMCO benchmark with the intention of 
‘attracting, motivating and retaining’ directors, executive benchmarking has 
contributed largely to the continuous rise of executive remuneration. Benchmarking 
has the tendency of rising executive pay, as where the company is below pay level of 
their counterparts in their peer group with same size, talent, executive characteristics 
and industry, they turn to receive pay rise that are larger both in percentage terms and 
monetary terms.
221
 
The REMCOs may select peer groups with companies that have a higher executive 
remuneration. In a situation where a company benchmark against other companies 
that offer higher remuneration packages the effect will inevitably be a rise in the 
remuneration levels. One disadvantage of benchmarking is the existence of a wide 
range of market data and competitive pay levels giving executives more chance to 
influence their pay. At first sight, it seems that this is a sensible way of setting a total 
value for a remuneration package. Unfortunately over reliance on competitive pay 
data has resulted in upward spiral in executive remuneration.
222
 Because salaries 
below the 50th percentile and often labelled “below market” while those between the 
50th and 75th percentile are considered “competitive”, remuneration surveys have 
tended to “ratchet up” base salaries.  
Conclusion 
Executive remuneration packages have grown in complexity and size over the last 
three decades. Remuneration packages have moved from simple combination of base 
salary and benefits to a complex package that includes more elements (e.g. base 
salary, annual bonus, long-term incentive plans, pension schemes and benefits). 
Severance payment is not a component of the remuneration package per se, but its 
influence on pay package considering that it is agreed upon on the date of the 
executive appointment, makes it very important to be considered as a component of 
the remuneration package. The growth has been reflected in the responsibilities of the 
executives and consequently on the size of the pay package as well. The complexity 
of the modern remuneration package makes it more difficult for the shareholders to 
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comprehend executive pay and this may hinder their ability to hold the directors to 
account over it. This may also give the directors the opportunity to make benefits as 
they are the custodians of vital information needed for the appropriate designing of 
the remuneration package.  
The increase in executive remuneration is influenced by a number of factors. 
Privatisation is seen as the first and primary driver of executive remuneration in the 
UK during the 1990s. Even though, privatisation is no longer the modern day driver 
of executive remuneration levels, other drivers of executive remuneration are just 
building on its effect. Disclosure requirements, executive labour market and 
globalisation are the most influential drivers of modern remuneration levels. The 
regulation of executive remuneration will not be effective if the remuneration package 
and the drivers of remuneration are not taken into consideration. The next chapter will 
discuss the methods used in this thesis to examine to understand how executive 
remuneration is determined and how some of these drives influence the pay setting 
process 
  
50 
 
Chapter 2: Research Methodology 
Introduction  
To understand the discussions and conclusion made in this thesis, this chapter will 
provide a description of the research design and methods are used to answer the 
aforementioned research questions. The study adopts a mixed method approach 
(which includes doctrinal, qualitative and quantitative analyses) which is all discussed 
in detail below. This chapter is divided into two sections. First, the research design 
will be explained and second, the research methods will discussed. 
Research paradigm 
Research design is an accepted set of theories, procedures, and assumptions about 
how researchers look at the world.
223
 It is important to discuss the research paradigms 
as they are related to the selection of research methodologies. Three different research 
paradigms have been adopted in this study to be able to answer the research question.  
The first research paradigm is the legal realist approach of knowledge. Legal realism 
is an approach in thinking and studying the results of the application of the law.
224
 It 
is not only concerned with the origin and basis of the law, but also with its application 
and results. Furthermore, according to legal realist, law cannot be understood in an 
autonomous vacuum: law can only be understood as law in action, and this means 
paying due attention to law’s sociological, political, economic and even psychological 
aspects. The legal realist advocates empirical approaches to understanding law. Based 
on this research paradigm the regulation of executive remuneration in the UK by the 
Companies Act 2006 and the UKCGC- will be discussed and empirical methods 
(qualitative and quantitative) will be used to investigate its impact on the companies 
and the public at large. 
The second research paradigm is the constructivist approach of knowledge. 
Constructivism is the notion that knowledge lies in the minds of individuals, who 
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construct what they know as the basis of their own experiences.
225
 The role of the 
researcher in this approach is to ‘attempt to understand individual construction of 
knowledge and ways in which individuals construct meaning’.226 Adopting this 
approach, this study relies on the participants’ experience and practice in relation to 
executive remuneration benchmarking. Executive remuneration benchmarking is an 
important determinant of executive remuneration levels. This benchmarking exercise 
is carried out by the RCONs. There exist no guideline on the method and factors to 
consider in benchmarking executive remuneration. Therefore, in order to understand 
the process involved in the benchmarking executive remuneration, the experience of 
the RCON need to be relied upon. 
The third research paradigm is the positivist approach of knowledge. Positivist 
believes that reality can be observed and described from an objective viewpoint.
227
 
Positivists hold that all phenomena should be understood through the employment of 
scientific method and aims to create a theoretically neutral language of observation by 
stripping hypothesis and theories of subjective content.
228
 For a positivist researcher, 
reality is objective and exists apart from the researcher. The role of the researcher in 
this approach is to use the research to generate laws and theories, test, support or 
reject theories.
229
 Adopting this approach, this study will be testing hypothesised 
relationships on executive remuneration (discussed later in the chapter).  
Research design 
A research design is a plan of the methods and procedures that is used by the 
researcher to collect and analyse the data needed to answer the research question(s).
230
 
In this section the various methods used in this study will be discussed. A mixed 
method approach is used to discuss the existing law and corporate governance 
mechanisms on executive remuneration determination (using a legal doctrinal 
approach); evaluate the law and makes possible recommendations using an empirical 
(qualitative and quantitative) research approach. The evaluation of the law would be 
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based on empirical, legislative and case law evidence. The justification for the use of 
mixed method approach will now be discussed. 
Justification of mixed method approach 
To understand the determination of executive remuneration it is important to assess 
the effectiveness of its regulation. The doctrinal approach is used to describe, explain 
and interpret the law, its administration and evaluate the effectiveness of the law. It 
lies at the basis of the role of law in executive remuneration determination and is the 
core legal research method. This study seeks to evaluate whether in practice ‘the 
rules’ of the law are complied with or effective in achieving any of the goals which 
underpins the setting of executive remuneration package. It is in this respect that an 
empirical mixed method approach is adopted as it aims to understand the law, lay the 
groundwork for reform, build up a set of generalisations about the law, support 
doctrinal method and contribute to the legal theory.
231
 Priest commenting on mixed 
methods approach in legal studies said: 
It is no longer sufficient to defend legal doctrine on the mere grounds that a 
rule is a rule, or that the doctrine derives from time immemorial. Rather, it is 
necessary to show that the doctrine has a beneficial effect on the society, is an 
expression of an important public value, or otherwise serves the public 
interest.
232
 
The purpose of evaluating the law is to assess its effectiveness and to identify any 
gaps that may need attention. Traditional doctrinal research can benefit from a better 
clarification of the research question it seeks to answer by using empirical methods.
233
 
Empirical methods build the theoretical understanding of the law as a social and 
political phenomenon and contribute to the development of social theory. In this 
research, for example, the qualitative analysis on how RCONs benchmark executive 
remuneration, would inform policy makers on executive remuneration benchmarking 
and its effect on remuneration determination process, and consequently remuneration 
levels. 
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Watkins and Burton
234
 argued that legal scholarship must entail a sociological 
understanding of law which would involve a study of the law in practice from a stand 
point outside the legal system using scientific or social science methodologies. Using 
empirical investigation to determine the link between executive pay and company 
performance; and method of executive remuneration benchmarking will help inform 
policy makers on the determination of executive remuneration in the UK. It is 
therefore on this premise that this study adopted the mixed method approach to enable 
the researcher answer the research question. The mixed methods adopted in this study 
will now be discussed. 
The doctrinal research method 
Doctrinal research is research which provides a systematic exposition of the rules 
governing a particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, 
explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps, predicts future developments.
235
 Doctrinal 
research in simple terms is the research which asks what the law is in a particular 
area.
236
 It consists of either a simple research directed at finding specific statement of 
the law or a more complex and in depth analysis of legal reasoning.
237
 The 
researcher’s main objective is to describe the body of law, how it applies and provides 
an analysis of its application.
238
 This research demonstrates what the law and 
corporate governance mechanisms are in regards to executive remuneration (the 
determination of executive remuneration in particular) in the UK. Doctrinal research 
determines what the law is in terms of legislation and case law, but the application of 
the law is a contentious issue justifying the adoption of empirical methods (qualitative 
and quantitative methods).  
Doctrinal research method is characterised by the study of legal texts and it is often 
described colloquially as ‘black-letter law’. Doctrinal law is based on authority and 
hierarchy and the objective is to base any statement about what the law is on primary 
authority (legislation). Secondary sources such as journal articles or textbooks may be 
used in supporting a particular interpretation. The databases that are used in this study 
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would include relevant legislation on executive remuneration (e.g. the CA 2006). 
Furthermore, the UKCGC, case-law, textbooks and journals that cover the subject 
matter are used and cited where relevant. These sources will be used to identify and 
examine the regulations on executive remuneration determination, its application by 
companies and its implication on the remuneration levels.  
Quantitative method 
Quantitative research methods are one of the social science’s approaches for research 
which has been used in different academic disciplines such as sociology, psychology 
and legal studies. It is used to test or verify appropriateness of exiting theories to 
explain the phenomena under study.
239
 Quantitative research deals largely with 
numbers, statistics and reports its findings objectively – the researcher assumes a 
neutral position in this study. Quantitative methods will be used in this study to 
analyse relationships and test the hypothesis set below. 
Hypothesis  
Past studies in the UK investigating the link between executive remuneration and 
company performance have mixed results.
240
 These differences in findings maybe 
attributed to the use of different variables
241
  in assessing the relationship between pay 
and performance. There exists a gap in knowledge as to why there exist 
inconsistencies in the findings of past studies which this study intends to find out. The 
study will also determine the effect of different performance variables on the pay for 
performance link. 
Furthermore, limited (if any) research has been done to investigate the link between 
pay and performance on a company to company basis
242
 to establish why the constant 
weak relationship. The individual company’s method of measuring company 
performance is vital to the understanding of the link between pay and performance. 
Following the implied requirement of the law and the UKCGC recommendation, 
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executive remuneration should be linked to company performance, thus following 
hypothesis is made: 
H1: It is hypothesised that there is a significant positive relationship between 
executive/CEO remuneration and company performance. 
Company size has been proven by past research as an important determinant of the 
level of executive remuneration as executive pay tends to increase with increase in 
firm size.
243
 Company size can increase as a result of expansion of the business, 
acquisitions or mergers which could be as a result of the good performance of the 
company. Assuming that growth in company size indicates good performance of the 
company, a strong relationship would be expected between company size and 
company performance
244
 which could in turn be used to justify the increase in 
executive remuneration. Thus the hypothesis: 
H2: it is hypothesised that there is a significant positive relationship between 
executive/CEO remuneration and company size. 
Several variables
245
  can be used to determine the size of a company. Depending on 
the variable used to determine the size of a company, it might not necessarily indicate 
that the company is performing well. This could therefore suggest that in such cases, 
the increase in executive remuneration due to the increase in company size is 
unjustified. The performance of the company and the growth of the company are used 
by companies to justify executive remuneration. It is important to investigate if 
company size is strongly related to company performance as to justify increase in 
executive pay based on these factors. If growth in company size increases executive 
remuneration and good company performance also increases executive remuneration 
then a significant relationship between size and performance to will be expected to 
justify pay levels.  Thus the hypothesis:  
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H3: it is hypothesised that there is a significant positive relationship between 
company size and company performance. 
The researcher will investigate these hypothesis from a positivist stance (as explained 
above) adopting a quantitative method of research.  
Data sample  
The sample population for this study was the FTSE 100 companies listed in 2010. 
This sample population was chosen because they are usually the ones in the spotlight 
on executive remuneration issues. The researcher classified the one hundred 
companies under different sectors as demonstrated in the table below. 
Table 1: 2010 FTSE 100 companies classified into their various sectors 
Sector Companies (plcs) 
Aerospace BEA Systems, Roll-Royce 
Catering, information, 
support, publishing, Testing 
and Security 
Capita Group, Compass Group, Intercontinental 
Hotel Group, Whitbread, G4S, Experian, Reed 
Elsevier, Intertek Group, Serco Group 
Consumer goods, Brewery, 
Beverages and computer 
software 
SABMiller, Reckitt Benckiser, Sage Group, Diageo, 
Autonomy Corporation 
Engineering Amec, Smiths Group, GKN, IMI, Petrofac, Weir  
Group 
Financial services and 
banking 
Barclays Bank, Lloyds TSB banking group, HSBC, 
ICAP, Legal and General, Man Group, Prudential, 
Royal Bank of Scotland, Standard Chartered Bank, 
Standard Life, Alliance Trust, Investec Bank 
Generator hire Aggreko 
Insurance Admiral Group, Aviva, Old Mutual, Royal & sun 
Alliance 
Investment Resolution, Schrodes 
Microprocessors ARM Holdings 
Mining 
 
Eurasian Natural Resources, Rio Tinto Group, BHP 
Billiton, Antofagasta, Anglo American, Lonmin, 
Vandanta Resources, Xstrata, Fresnillo, African 
Barrick Gold, Kazakhmys 
Pharmaceuticals, chemical 
and medical device 
GlaxosmithKline, Johnson Mattley, Shire, Smith & 
Newphew, Astrazeneca 
Real estate and property British Land, Land Securities, Hammerson, Capital 
Shopping Centers 
Retail, packaging, 
distribution and clothing 
Associated British Food, Mark and Spencer, WM 
Morrison Supermarket, Rexam, J. Sainsbury, Tesco, 
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Next, Kingfisher, Bunzl, Burberry 
Telecommunication and 
communication 
Vodafone, BT Group, British Sky Broadcasting, 
WPP Group, Inmarsat 
Tobacco British America Tobacco, Imperial Tobacco 
Transportation, Aviation Carnival, Tui Travel, International Airlines Group, 
Invensys 
Utility and energy BG Group, International Power, Royal Dutch, 
Scottish & Southern Energy, Severn Trent, United 
Utilities, British Energy Group, National Grid, 
Tullow Oil, Cairn Energy, Centrica, Essar Energy 
Five sectors were chosen to provide an effective cross-section of industries. These 
sectors were financial, retail, mining, pharmaceutical and utility sectors. From each 
sector, five companies were chosen to be studied. Three sectors (pharmaceutical, 
financial and utility) out of the five were chosen for particular reasons. The financial 
sector was chosen due to the financial crisis the sector suffered over recent years 
(2008-2009 banking crisis). Part of the reason for the crisis was attributed to excessive 
executive remuneration.
246
 The pharmaceutical sector was chosen because one of its 
companies was the first
247
  to see its executive remuneration report voted against by 
the shareholders.
248
 The utility sector because the debate on executive remuneration 
has its roots in the privatization of utility companies in the 1990.
249
 The retail and 
mining companies were chosen at random from the rest of the sectors to provide the 
researcher with a cross section of sectors for comparison. This resulted in a sample 
size of twenty-five companies chosen from the one hundred companies that made the 
FTSE 100 listing of 2010.  
All the one hundred companies could not be included in the study because the volume 
of data would have been with no sufficient time to collect, analyse and write-up the 
thesis. To make selection manageable, 1996 was chosen as the start date because it is 
the year in which most companies started disclosing executive remuneration by 
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components
250
 providing data for the study. Data collection stopped at 2011 because 
the researcher needed a cut-off date to allow time to collect and analyse the data.  
The annual report and accounts for each company were obtained from the company’s 
website for the years 1990-2011. Five out of the 25 companies were formed through 
mergers at some point within the study period. These companies include 
GlaxoSmithKline plc, ICAP plc, Lonmin plc, Scottish & Southern Energy plc and 
AstraZeneca plc indicating that the data for these companies did not go as far back as 
1996. Below is a table representation of the five sectors and the companies that were 
selected. 
Table 2: 25 selected 2010 FTSE 100 companies classified into sectors 
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1 GlaxoSmith
Kline plc  
Severn Trent 
plc  
Tesco  plc  HSBC plc  Antofagasta 
plc  
2 Shire plc  Scottish and 
Southern 
Energy plc  
J. Sainsbury 
plc  
Barclays 
plc  
Rio Tinto 
plc  
3 Johnson 
Matthey plc  
United 
Utilities plc  
WM 
Morrisons plc  
ICAP plc  Lonmin plc  
4 Smith and 
Nephew plc  
National Grid 
plc  
Kingfisher 
plc  
Legal & 
General 
plc  
Xstrata plc  
5 AstraZenec
a plc  
Cairn Energy 
plc  
Mark and 
Spencer plc  
Prudential 
plc  
BHP 
Billiton plc  
Out of the 25 companies 19 was analysed and discussed. The six companies out of the 
25 companies that are not analysed were: GlaxoSmithKline plc, BHP Billiton plc, 
Xstrata plc, AstraZeneca plc, Rio Tinto plc and, Antofagasta plc. These six companies 
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were from the Pharmaceutical and Mining Sector. These companies were not 
proceeded with because of the inconsistent disclosure of information in annual reports 
and accounts. Their remuneration figures were disclosed in dollars with no indication 
of the exchange rate used at the time. For GSK, the annual report and account 
indicated that the dollar to pounds exchange rate considered was the average 
exchange rate of the year. Exchange rate changes on a daily basis and to get the 
average for the year was a difficult task, as a result the companies were excluded from 
the analysis. These companies were not replaced with other companies from the same 
sector, or replaced the sector with another because the reason for their exclusion 
demonstrate an example of inconsistencies in executive remuneration disclosure 
methods discussed in chapter 6.  
Data collection 
The executive remuneration data was obtained from the annual report and accounts.
251
 
The act of selecting the required data from the company’s annual report and accounts 
is a method that had been used in the past by McKnight and Tomkins
252
 and Buck et 
al.
253
 This method of data collection has an advantage over data obtained from a 
database in that the researcher determines the information needed and is able to carry 
out any statistical calculation using methods which the researcher desires. Whereas, 
with data obtained from a database information is predetermined by the data provider 
and limited only to one or two calculations. This method therefore, allows the 
researcher to utilise data in a way which best fits into the research design of the study. 
The selected companies do not have the same fiscal year. Some of the companies have 
fiscal year beginning in April and ending in March, while others run from January to 
December or, November to December which is typical of UK firms. This difference in 
accounting years can cause a problem when comparing companies and results. There 
was no attempt on standardising the fiscal year as it would have been difficult because 
some companies may defer their fiscal year to a later date in the accounting year, or 
bring forward their accounting year to an earlier date.  
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Company performance is measured by the variables total shareholder return (TSR), 
earnings per share (EPS) and return on assets (ROA). TSR is the total return on 
investment achieved for shareholders during the review period.
254
 This is the net stock 
price change plus the dividends paid during a particular period. It measures share 
price growth and dividends. Stock price represents the cost of one share of the 
company. Data for the calculation of TSR which include: share price at the start of 
period, share price at the end of period and dividend paid under the period, was 
obtained from the annual report and accounts. EPS is earnings available to the 
shareholder
255
  divided by the number of common shares outstanding (shares of the 
company that has been issued and are in the hands of the public).
256
 Data for the 
calculation of EPS (diluted and basic) were obtained from the annual reports and 
accounts. Return on equity (ROE) is another profitability performance measures 
which assess the rate of return on the ownership interest or shareholders' equity of the 
common stock. It is a measure that shows how much profit a company has made from 
the money shareholders invested in the company.
257
 Data for ROA, market 
capitalisation, total assets and total revenue were obtained from the Bloomberg 
database. There are several performance measures that can be used to measure 
company performance. However, each performance measure has a limitation and the 
limitations of the three performance measures used in this study are acknowledged.
258
 
In order to understand how the statistical analysis were done, it is important to 
understand the variables used in the calculations. 
Definition of variables 
For the purpose of this study, executive remuneration, company performance and 
company size are defined using different variables. The increase or decrease in the 
levels of executive remuneration will depend on the increase or decrease of company 
performance and company size meaning that executive remuneration is a dependent 
variable as it depends on company performance and company size. Company size and 
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company performance are the independent variables as their increase or decrease does 
not depend on the increase or decrease in levels of executive remuneration. 
Dependent variables 
Dependent variables are variables whose values are determined by other variables. 
For example, the levels of executive remuneration (dependent variable) are 
determined by the performance of the company (independent variable). Three 
variables of directors’ remuneration were obtained from the annual report and 
accounts (particularly from the remuneration report). These are total remuneration, 
total cash remuneration and performance-related pay.  
 Total cash pay includes, base pay and benefit pay.  
 Performance related pay includes annual bonuses, LTIPS and share options.  
 Total remuneration includes base pay, benefits, cash bonus, deferred bonuses; 
LTIPs pay and, share options (which are basically total cash plus performance-
related pay).  
 
In this study loss of office pay is not included in the pay package as it is not a constant 
payment and only given to directors who are leaving the company. Also, pension 
payment is not included as it is regarded as personal savings. 
Independent variables 
An independent variable is a variable whose change does not depend on the other e.g. 
performance does not depend on executive remuneration. There are two sets of 
independent variables used in this study – company performance and company size. 
Company performance is the independent variable which can be measured by using 
TSR, EPS and ROA.
259
 TSR is chosen for this study because it is the total return on 
investment achieved for shareholders. It is an important measure considering that the 
main purpose of performance-related pay is to align the interest of the directors with 
those of the shareholder. TSR was also chosen based on its long term potential. The 
stock price at the start of the period and the stock price at the end of the period were 
obtained from Bloomberg data stream. Dividends were hand collected from the 
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annual reports. ROA was chosen because it does not have the shortcomings of Return 
on equity which is the commonly used financial performance measure. ROA values 
were obtained from Bloomberg data stream. EPS values were obtained by adding 
values of basic EPS to values of diluted EPS
260
 obtained from Bloomberg data stream. 
EPS was chosen because it the most important measurement and indicator of financial 
performance of a company that is universally accepted because it drives the share 
price of a company.   
The second independent variable used in this study is company size. Company size 
could be measured using a variety of variables which includes total sales, total 
employee heads, market capitalisation, total assets etc. Three variables for measuring 
company size adopted by this study include market capitalisation, total asset and total 
revenue. Market capitalisation was chosen as it is a common variable used by most 
companies to determine company size. Total asset is often rarely (as compared to total 
revenue) used by companies and academia to determine company size.  Using these 
three variables would allow the study to investigate whether they all demonstrate the 
same relationship with executive remuneration. These variables would now be 
discussed in turns below.  
Market capitalisation is the total value of the company based on its current share price 
multiplied by the number of outstanding shares.
261
 Outstanding shares are the 
company’s shares currently held by its shareholders and restricted shares are shares 
owned by the company. A company’s outstanding shares can increase if the company 
issues more shares. Market capitalisation depends on the share price of the company 
at a particular time. The share price of the company can decrease or increase at any 
given period. Therefore, depending on the share price volatility (constant changes in 
share price) the market capitalisation of a company (the worth of the company) can 
significantly increase with the increase of share price without an increase in the 
number of shares. If the company issues new shares and the share price is at its best 
for the period, it would lead to a significant increase in market capitalisation. 
Measuring company size by market capitalisation would therefore indicate a 
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significant increase in the company size. For example, Shire plc at the beginning of 
the financial year in 2011 had a share price of £15.35 and at the end of the financial 
year the share price had increased to £22.43 per share. This increase in share price for 
the company would indicate a significant growth in the size of the company. 
However, the fall in the share price of the company at any given time would result 
into the decrease in market capitalisation consequently, a decrease in the size of the 
company. This share price volatility pose a weakness to the use of market 
capitalisation as an effective measure of company performance. Total assets represent 
the total value of the entire assets (tangible and intangible) of the company. Tangible 
assets are assets that can be physically seen and touch such as machinery and 
intangible assets are those that cannot be felt such as patent and copyrights. The value 
of total assets will fluctuate depending on whether the company is acquiring or 
disposing of the assets and the effect will be a change in company size. Total assets 
are presented in the balance sheet of the company’s annual reports and account. It 
takes into account all the properties of the company and not the debt and liabilities of 
the company. Total asset could be presumed as a better indicator of company size than 
market capitalisation because market capitalisation depends on share price that is not 
determine by the company but the selling or buying of assets is a decision of the 
company and also a better indicator of directors performance. 
Total revenue as discussed above, is money the company makes over a period of time 
before expenses are deducted. Depending on how much money the company makes 
over a particular period and its expenses, this will affect the size of the company 
either positively or negatively.  
Data analysis 
A statistical package for the social science (SPSS) is used to analyse the relationships 
between executive pay and company performance; executive pay and company size; 
and company size and company performance. SPSS is a computer application that 
provides statistical analysis of data and allows for analytical reporting. This method of 
data analysis was chosen because it was relatively easy to learn and the ease of 
obtaining results after loading all the data on to the system. By using this program 
quantitative data is analysed quickly, eliminating long hours of calculations and 
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mistakes that comes with it.
262
 In determining the relationships between executive pay 
and company performance, executive pay and company size and company size and 
company performance, Pearson’s correlation coefficient will be used in the 
calculations to determine the strength of the relationships between these varaibles. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient represents the linear relationship between two 
variables. A linear relationship represents a relationship in which any given change in 
one variable (independent variable) should always produce a corresponding change in 
the other variable (the dependent variable). This means for example that, for a linear 
relationship between company performance and executive pay, a one per cent increase 
in company performance should also result in a one per cent increase in executive 
pay. Pearson correlation coefficients will be calculated to examine the linear 
relationship between CEO remuneration, company performance, and company size.  
The correlation coefficient takes on values ranging between +1 and -1. A 0 value 
indicates no linear relationship. For example that, if the correlation coefficient obtain 
for the relationship between executive pay and company performance is 0, it means 
that there is no relationship between the two suggesting that they are independent of 
each other. A Pearson’s correlation coefficient of +1 indicates a perfect positive linear 
relationship. This means that as one variable increases in value, the other variable also 
increases in value through an exact linear rule. For example, if the correlation 
coefficient obtained is +1 for the relationship between executive pay and company 
performance, it means that there is a perfect positive relationship between the two 
(e.g. if company performance increases by ten percent, executive pay will also 
increase by exactly ten percent). A Pearson correlation coefficient between 0.5 – 0.99 
will indicate a strong positive relationship. Correlation coefficient between 0.3 – 
0.499 will indicate a positive moderate relationship and a correlation coefficient 
between 0.01 – 0.299 will indicate a positive weak relationship. 
A Pearson’s correlation coefficient of -1 indicates a perfect negative linear 
relationship. This means that as one variable increases in its values, the other variable 
decreases in its values through an exact linear rule (e.g. if company performance 
increases by ten percent, executive pay will decrease by exactly ten percent). A 
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Pearson correlation coefficient between -0.5 – -0.99 will indicate a strong positive 
relationship. Correlation coefficient between -0.3 – -0.499 will indicate a positive 
moderate relationship and a correlation coefficient between -0.01 – -0.299 will 
indicate a positive weak relationship. The table below sets out Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient values and what the values mean. 
Table 3: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient table and meaning 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient  Meaning 
+1 Perfect positive relationship 
0.5  to 0.99 Positive strong relationship 
0.3 to 0.5 Positive moderate relationship 
0.1 to 0.3 Positive weak relationship 
0 No relationship 
-0.1 to -0.3 Negative weak relationship 
-0.3 to -0.5 Negative moderate relationship 
-0.5 to -0.99 Negative strong relationship 
-1 Perfect negative relationship 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient is adopted as the most suitable because the data is 
continuous and not ranked or grouped.
263
 Total cash pay, total variable pay and total 
pay are the variables for executive remuneration. Market capitalisation, total revenue 
and total asset are the variables for company size. Total shareholder return, return on 
asset and earnings per share are the variables for company performance. The objective 
of linking pay to performance is to ensure that executive remuneration is linked to the 
company’s performance. Following this objective, it would therefore mean that 
executive remuneration will be expected to increase when the company makes profits 
and decrease/remain the same when the company profits decreases or remains the 
same.  
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Qualitative methods 
Qualitative study is research that focuses on understanding the naturalistic setting or 
everyday life, of a certain phenomenon or person.
264
 Qualitative researchers study 
things in their natural settings, collecting, analysing and interpreting data in an 
attempt to make sense about a phenomenon in terms of the meaning people bring to 
them.
265
 
The main objective of this research is to examine the regulation of executive 
remuneration determination in the UK. The qualitative study is aimed at 
understanding how RCONs influence executive pay setting process and what factors 
they take into account in benchmarking executive pay. The CA 2006, under the Large 
and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulation 2008, 
Sch. 8, part 3, s22, requires all quoted companies to disclose the names of any 
remuneration adviser (consultants) used, whether they provide any other services to 
the company, and how their advice was assessed as objective by the company. 
Consultants advise companies on the setting of executive remuneration by comparing 
(benchmarking) the remuneration of executives across companies. This practice has 
become common amongst quoted companies in the UK, but there exists no best 
practice or guidelines on the criteria for benchmarking. This therefore implies that 
only the consultants know what criteria they employ in executive benchmarking 
which this study sets to investigate. Past academic literature on RCONs focused on 
their influence on the remuneration levels
266
, but no study has investigated the criteria 
for benchmarking. Qualitative method is used because the only way of getting 
information is by interviewing the consultants. 
The key criteria in a qualitative study as identified by Maxwell
267
, is the activities of 
collecting and analysing data, developing and modifying theory, elaborating or 
refocusing the research question, and identifying and dealing with validity threats 
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(factors that affect research findings). This study involved the collecting of data from 
the RCONs by interviews, analysing and interpreting the data to help answer the 
research question. Different studies
268
 have identified differences between qualitative 
and quantitative research approaches, but the one key issue that distinguishes the two 
is in the methods of data collection. Qualitative method allows for data to be collected 
which cannot be obtained from quantitative studies.
269
 Qualitative research study 
‘things’ in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret phenomena 
in terms of meanings people bring to them.
270
 For this study the nature of data 
required to understand the executive benchmarking process is dependent on the 
information collected from the RCONs. This research design was greatly affected by 
access to the participants which will be discussed in detail below. 
Sampling  
For this study the purposeful sampling approach was adopted. Purposeful sampling is 
a strategy in which particular persons are selected deliberately to obtain information 
that cannot be obtained from other methods.
271
  This approach is used where the 
researcher already knows something about the specific people, allowing the researcher 
to deliberately select people that are seen as likely to produce the most valuable data. 
They are selected with a specific purpose in mind, and that purpose reflects the 
particular qualities of people and their relevance to the topic under investigation.
272
 
The advantage that this approach possesses over others is that, it is more concerned 
with the appropriateness, purpose and access to good information than representation 
and random probability statistical sampling.
273
 Random statistical sampling is a 
characteristic of quantitative research intended to produce results that may be 
generalized to a larger population; whilst purposeful sampling is a characteristic of 
qualitative research intended to draw emphasis on appropriate information that elicit a 
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detail understanding of a particular phenomenon.
274
 It allows for small samples to be 
studied intensively with each one generating a large amount of information. This 
approach enables the researcher to limit the sample to participants that would provide 
appropriate information relevant to answer the research question, and exclude 
participants that do not fit the criteria of selection. Finally, the sampling approach 
allows for possible analytical generalisations but not statistical generalisation because 
the sample size is generally small.
275
  
For this study, a guide as to the sample population was obtained from the 25 
companies chosen for this study as they disclose their RCONs in the company’s 
annual reports and accounts (particularly in their remuneration report). From the 
twenty-five companies’ remuneration reports, nineteen consultancy firms were 
identified. It was realised that seventeen out of the twenty-five companies used one or 
more consultancy firms from the ‘Big Four’.276 Out of the nineteen consultancy firms 
identified, five were US based and the rest fourteen were UK based or had branches in 
the UK. A random list of fifty consultants was shortlisted from the 14 consultancy 
firms based in the UK.  
The subject matter of this study covers consultancy firms that engage in executive 
remuneration benchmarking. This is because the aim of the study is to understand the 
process of benchmarking, the factors chosen and why they are considered for 
selecting comparator companies. The RCONs were the appropriate people for this 
study because they maintain proprietary databases which collect comparative data on 
pay levels and structures in different industries and sizes of business. This information 
supplemented by surveys conducted by the consulting firms, are used in comparing 
market levels of pay. From this information, the RCON would then advise the 
REMCO on comparators they should use in determining executive pay.
277
 The 
RCONs are experts in the field of benchmarking and their advice have considerable 
influence on the level of pay. It means that only the RCONs will possess this type of 
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information, and may not give people access to this data because of commercial 
confidentiality- consequently the interviews required. 
Pilot study 
A pilot study is a study that takes place before the actual study to determine the 
feasibility and limitations of the study.
278
 This includes conducting a preliminary 
study on a limited scale before the original study is carried out in order to gain some 
primary information, on which the main research would be planned and formulated.
279
 
In this study the purpose of the pilot study was to get primary information on the 
methods of benchmarking, and also to test whether the methodology adopted for the 
study would yield desirable results. Due to lack of access to participants for the study, 
one participant was used as a pilot study. Out of the six willing participants, only one 
agreed to a face-to-face interview and the rest choose telephone interviews for 
convenience. The participant who agreed on a face-to-face interview was used as a 
pilot. It was explained to the participant on the reasons of considering the interview as 
a pilot and consent was given to the interview by the participant.  A pilot study was 
undertaken to identify the factors that are considered when benchmarking, which 
elements of the pay package that were considered for benchmarking and what they 
considered was the effect of benchmarking on executive remuneration. The 
importance of doing a pilot study is that it helps in identifying problems in research 
methodology, data gathering technique and also important in determining the 
questions which could be used in the interviews.
280
 The pilot study was conducted to 
evaluate the suitability of the interview questions in achieving the research aim. An 
unstructured open-ended interview was held with one RCON for the pilot study. From 
the pilot study, it was clear that the research design was suitable and would yield 
desirable results for the study which was to investigate the method employed in 
benchmarking executive remuneration.
281
 Information from the pilot study was used 
in the final analysis as excluding the pilot study would result in too small a sample in 
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the main study.
282
 In qualitative research, some or the entire pilot can be included in 
the main study were excluding the pilot would result in too small a sample.
283
 This 
interview identified different factors considered in benchmarking, why they are 
considered and also which elements of the remuneration package are considered in the 
benchmarking process. This then set a platform on which the rest of the interviews 
were conducted as well as served as probes for the interviews where necessary.  
Access to participants 
The selection of interview participants was based on the information that was 
published on each consultancy firm’s website. The participants were identified from 
the firm’s websites by job role (RCON), name, emails and their office telephone 
numbers. The first problem encountered was that some of the firm’s websites were 
not up to date and therefore had the names of persons that had left the firm. Invitation 
letters, information sheets and consent forms, were dispatched to the randomly 
selected 50 consultants by post. These invitations yielded two positive responses and 
4 negative responses. Despite the low rate in responses, Pirkko & Silk
284
 said respond 
rate in qualitative study can range from one to one hundred participants depending on 
ease of getting access to the participants. Where access to participants is very 
limited/or restricted one or more key informant would be enough to provide the 
required information.
285
 Therefore, two responses obtained were considered as good 
response because RCONs are key informants on executive remuneration 
benchmarking. One face-to-face interview and one telephone interview appointments 
were booked with the two participants.  
Follow-ups on the other 44 invitations were made via email and the results was a 
further 4 positive responses with 5 negative responses. The four positive responses 
were all booked for telephone interviews as the interview participants’ chose 
telephone interview option as being most convenient for them. Telephone interviews 
as oppose to face-to-face interviews allows data to be collected faster and at a lower 
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cost than a face-to-face interview.
286
 However, it is not easy to establish a rapport 
with the interviewee and the interviewee may find it easier to terminate the interview 
before it finishes or refuses to respond to some questions without facing the 
interviewer.
287
 Also there is the inability of the interviewer to observe the body 
language of the interviewee.
288
 The advantage of the face-to-face interview was that it 
allowed the interviewer to observe the body language of the interviewee. Judith 
Sturges
289
 compared interview transcripts of face-to-face interviews and telephone 
interviews and found no significant differences in the interviews. In this study, 
telephone interviews were in retrospect the only possible way of getting the 
interviews, consequently, both the face-to-face interview and the telephone interviews 
to collect data for the study.  
A further attempt to increase the chances of recruiting more participants, the 
researcher followed-up the invitations by telephone. The researcher proposed to send 
questions generated from the pilot study to the participants by email for them to go 
over it and then decide on whether or not to participate in the study. This attempt 
yielded 28 negative responses with reasons such as ‘no time’, ‘your study brings no 
benefit to our firm’290 or ‘the firm is not interested in your study’.291  Three 
consultancy firms (with a total of nine randomly selected RCONs) requested evidence 
of other firms had agreed to participate in the research before they would decide 
whether or not to participate. The evidence they requested for included the name of 
the firm and the consultant who would be participating. The researcher could not meet 
these demands as the requested information was treated as confidential.  
All efforts to contact the remaining sixteen consultants proved unsuccessful as they 
were either out of the country, left the firm, gone on sick leave or were on maternity 
leave.
292
 As an alternative means of recruiting more participants, the researcher 
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contacted one of the willing participants recommend willing participants. This 
approach yielded no positive result as the participant classed the topic under 
investigation as ‘sensitive’. Despite the high negative response rate, the six 
participants were all that were willing to help thereby acknowledging the limitation of 
this study (insufficient data). This study acts as a basis for further study in the area. 
Unstructured questions 
The study adopted an unstructured (open-ended) interview approach which allows for 
an in-depth collection of data. Interviews are a purposeful conversation between the 
researcher and the participants where the researcher focuses on the participants’ 
experiences as the participants expresses in their own words.
293
 The main area which 
the study aimed to cover is on the methodology of benchmarking thereby exploring 
the factors used in selecting comparator companies and why, and the nature of advice 
the consultants offer to the REMCO and how it affects the pay setting process. 
Unstructured interviews allow the interviewer to use the immediate context to ask 
questions instead of relying on predetermined questions. This approach is suitable in a 
research where the researcher knows very little about the problem under investigation 
to uncover important issues that can guide the interview.
294
 The lack of best practice 
on executive remuneration benchmarking and absence of past studies on the subject 
justifies the use of unstructured interviews. Unstructured interviews would enable 
researcher to uncover information that would not be exposed if using structured or 
semi-structured interviews. Unstructured interview allows the researcher to ask a 
question to which the interviewee freely responds to. The interviewer probes and 
responds to points made by the interviewee that seems relevant to the study.
295
 
Responses from the interviewee in an unstructured interview most often leads to 
further questions. This method helps the researcher to gain access to the participants’ 
world in order to understand their interpretation and motivation.
296
 This method was 
chosen because it represents the best way of understanding participants’ thoughts and 
experiences on the benchmarking. Unstructured question interview is informal and 
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conversational in nature thereby creating a relaxed research atmosphere. This relaxed 
research atmosphere could be replicated in telephone interviews because some 
interviewees find it easier to discuss sensitive issues on the phone where they cannot 
see the interviewer. A mixed of face-to-face and telephone interviews was used as it 
was the only way the interviews could be obtained. Interviews were the appropriate 
method for this study because the participants were the key informants for the 
study.
297
  
Data recording procedures 
Permission was obtained from the participants, both face-to-face and telephone 
interview participants for the interviews to be recorded and the data used in the thesis. 
A digital recorder was used to record the interviews and later transfer to a computer 
where the file was password protected. The interviews were transcribed by the 
interviewer on a word-for-word basis and the transcripts send to the interviewees for 
verification. One transcript was send back from one interviewee with amendments 
and confirmation and the other five were silent. A follow-up on the five was done via 
emails and the five interviewees confirmed that they were happy with what they said 
and did not have to go through the transcripts. The one major reason that they gave for 
not looking over the transcript was their busy schedule thus having no time to go 
through the transcripts. 
Ethical Issues 
Ethical approval was obtained for this study from the University of Portsmouth 
Business School ethics committee (Reference no: E176). The primary concern was 
confidentiality of the participants and they were assured that their identities would 
remain anonymous. This concern arose because within a firm, only a few individuals 
are involved in this specialty and they deal with commercially sensitive data – 
meaning that the consultancy firm as well as the consultants needed to be anonymous. 
The study could mean the RCON revealing confidential information from their clients 
which could result in them losing their clients. Thus there was a need for 
confidentiality and anonymity in this study. This situation therefore influenced how 
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the results have been presented by simply naming them consultant 1 to 6 without 
including any further information. 
Interviews with respondents were voluntary and based on informed consent and 
anonymity was assured by the interviewer. For an interview participant to give 
informed consent, the interviewer must make clear how extensive they plan to use 
their participant’s own words in the final report of the research.298 In this study, it was 
explained to the participants that their interviews would be used extensively in the 
thesis, word-for-word quotes will be used, and made-up names (e.g. consultant 1, 2, 
etc.) would be used.  The consent letter included contact information of the 
researcher, should the interview participant have questions or concerns about the 
research. Informed consent may be given be individuals capable of such consent 
either in a written format, verbally or audio-taped.
299
 To fulfil this requirement of 
informed consent, consent letters (indicating the interviewee’s voluntary participation 
and consent to the use of the information given) were send to the respondents together 
with the invitation letter (inviting the interviewee to take part in the study) and 
information sheets (giving the interviewee all the relevant information about the study 
and their right under the study).
300
 One respondent signed the consent form and the 
rest five respondents who were interviewed over the phone gave their consent at the 
beginning of the interview. The consent of these five respondents are held in an audio-
taped form on the researcher’s laptop and placed under a password locked folder. 
Assuring the respondents that no personal data (other than name and position) was 
collected and that none of the respondents would be identified in the thesis; and the 
University of Portsmouth Business School Ethical conditions, caused the respondents 
deliver information willingly. One of the respondents gave information using phrases 
that were very revealing of his identity which were not included in the thesis write-up. 
In this study, there were no identified conflicts because the researcher is independent 
of the participants and their consultancy firms. All of the respondents were informed 
of the researcher’s aims and objectives, and their right to withdraw before the 
interviews were analysed. 
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Data analysis 
Data analysis involves organising and interrogating data in ways that allow 
researchers to see patterns, identify themes and develop explanations which will help 
to answer the research question.
301
 In order to identify themes and develop 
explanations, this study adopted content analysis and thematic analysis to analyse the 
data. Content analysis is the analysis of the frequency and patterns of use of terms or 
phrases in the data. Farmer
302
 defines content analysis as a method that is used to 
determine the presence of certain words, themes and concepts within a document and 
to analyse this presence in an objective and systematic manner. The method of data 
analysis was chosen because the coding scheme can be clearly set out to enable 
replication and follow-up studies on the subject. Furthermore, this method of analysis 
will enable the researcher to track changes in the frequency of use of different factors 
considered in executive remuneration benchmarking with further research in future.
303
 
However, this study acknowledges the weakness of using this method of data 
analysis. The frequency counting in content analysis may not reflect the structure or 
underlying phenomenon. A point/factor that is not mentioned or mentioned less 
frequently in an interview is considered less important in content analysis which may 
in fact be an important point.
304
  For this reason, thematic analysis was also used in 
this study to minimise the weaknesses of content analysis. 
Thematic analysis is a method for identifying and analyse patterns, or themes within a 
data.
305
 This method of analysis is used when dealing with the individual experiences 
of the research participant. The basic unit of thematic analysis is the identification of a 
descriptive pattern and its significance that can be used to answer the research 
question.
306
 The data used for thematic analysis is the same data used for content 
analysis (e.g. the interview transcript). The method of coding is the same for both 
methods. Combining both methods in the analysis of the research data is important as 
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it enables the researcher to better interpret the data (e.g. what factors considered in 
benchmarking, why they are considered and how they affect executive remuneration 
determination process) in order to answer the research question. Common 
terminologies that are used in qualitative data analysis (content analysis and thematic 
analysis inclusive) are defined below to aid the understanding of this study’s data 
analysis. 
Table 4: Key terms used in qualitative research methods
307
 
Term Meaning 
Theme A recurring pattern that conveys something 
significant about somebody’s experience on a 
particularly subject matter 
Clustering The process of comparing and contrasting 
quotes and connecting or separating quotes 
with similar meaning 
Tag A label that is attached to a selection of data 
to identify its meaningful piece of 
information 
Category The collection, organisation and banding 
together of similar data and themes 
Analysing data using content analysis and thematic analysis follows ordered steps: 
1. Reading the interview transcripts over and over to become familiar 
with the data 
2. Search for, identify and label themes in each case 
3. Connecting and ordering themes by independently clustering the raw 
data themes into meaningful categories that seems to connect and fit 
together 
4. Cross-checking that the categories gives the same meaning and idea 
and used by the research participant 
5. Display the themes on a table in a hierarchical nature.308 
In coding the data for this study, each interview transcripts was analysed. The coding 
provided the structure for analysing and interpreting the data. No computer software 
was used for coding as the researcher found it easy to code manually given that only 
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six interviews were made. It would have been more demanding and time consuming 
for the researcher if computer software were to be used as trainings would have been 
required. The codes were developed from the interview data and the interpretation of 
the themes as described by the participants. 
Some factors considered when benchmarking were identified from the interview 
transcripts that help answer the research questions. These factors varied with 
consultants. These factors were classified into various categories that are exclusive 
and exhaustive of each other. Some of the key words identified during the coding 
process had one or more synonyms (e.g. objective had synonyms like unbiased, 
transparent, robust, best, fair, impartial etc.). These words were noted and all the key 
words and synonyms put together and considered as same. This is important in this 
method of data analysis as the strength and importance of a word is determined by the 
number of times (frequency) it is being said by the respondent. Examples of key 
words identified and their synonyms for all categories are identified on the table 
below. 
Table 5: Key words and synonyms identified in the interviews 
Category Key words 
describing the 
category 
Synonyms of the 
words used 
Size  Total revenue 
 Market 
capitalisation 
 Total employee 
heads 
 Company 
complexity 
 Company turnover 
 
 
None 
Company 
remuneration 
policy 
 Median quartile 
 Top quartile 
 Lower quartile 
 Position in the 
market 
 
 
None 
Sector  Across sector 
 Same sector 
 
 Similar 
 specific 
Nature of advice from the 
consultant 
 objective 
 
 suggestive 
 unbiased 
 transparent 
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 robust 
 best 
 fair 
 impartial 
Company performance  company 
profitability 
None 
Peer group selection  specific  
 general 
None 
Elements of remuneration 
package considered for 
benchmarking 
 total 
 element on element 
basis 
 all elements 
Geography  global 
 
 domestic 
 multinational 
 international 
 overseas 
 foreign 
Effect of benchmarking  decrease pay 
 increase pay 
 renders pay setting 
transparent 
 
 
None 
Role of the executive  role of executive None 
After coding the data, the last step in content analysis and thematic analysis is the 
representation of the information in a hierarchical manner as demonstrated by the 
chart below. The full meaning of elements and theory will be discussed in chapter 4 
under results and discussion. 
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Figure 5: Flow chart indicating the process of executive remuneration benchmarking 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the methods used in this study to answer the research 
question. The study has used a mixed method approach which includes doctrinal, 
qualitative and quantitative research methods. All the methods have been based on 
different research philosophies which include realism, positivism and constructivism. 
A combination of the findings obtained from each method is used to answer the 
research question. Data collection for the study was from companies’ annual reports 
and account, Bloomberg data stream and interviews. Variables used have been 
defined and data analysis specified. The findings of this study are discussed across the 
rest of the chapters depending on which research method the chapter adopts.  
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Chapter 3: Corporate Governance 
Reports and Codes 
Introduction 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled.
309
 Financial scandals in the 1980-1990s in the UK undermined confidence 
in the quality of financial reporting and the ability for external auditors to provide 
sufficient assurances on the financial situation of companies. This lack of 
accountability and transparency prompted policy makers to consider corporate 
governance as a means of controlling and monitoring company dealings. The last two 
decades have seen the introduction and revision of reports and codes in corporate 
governance in which issues of executive remuneration have also been addressed. All 
these corporate governance codes aimed at pursuing transparency and accountability 
in the determination and disclosure of executive remuneration and other corporate 
governance issues at large. One of the major issues in corporate governance since the 
early 1990s is executive remuneration. This was and still is, because of public and 
investors’ concerns over the rapid growth of executive remuneration and the apparent 
lack of link between executive remuneration and company performance.
310
 Executive 
remuneration in the UK is regulated by the law
311
 and corporate governance codes 
also contain a notable number of key recommendations. This chapter will discuss the 
evolution of corporate governance codes and their recommendations on executive 
remuneration and related provisions only. The principal recommendations will be 
discussed further in subsequent chapters. 
Evolution of corporate governance mechanisms 
The development of corporate governance mechanisms on executive remuneration in 
the UK started in the early 1990s. The concerns and criticism of excess growth in 
executive pay with no apparent link to company performance was one of the issues 
the Cadbury Report sought to address.  
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The Cadbury Report 1992 
The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance was chaired by Sir 
Adrian Cadbury in response to three inter-related (accountability, financial reporting 
and auditing) areas of concern in the then existing corporate arrangements which 
included public concerns about the rapid growth of executive remuneration not linked 
to company performance.
312
 The committee published its final report in December 
1992 which included a Code of Best Practice. The Code of Best Practice was 
appended to the Yellow Book (the forerunner to the Listing Rules), and the ‘comply 
or explain’ rule (discussed later in this chapter) was made a requirement for all listed 
companies.
313
 
The Code of Best Practice contained the main provisions of the report. The Cadbury 
Report addressed the issue of executive remuneration in three out of its nineteen 
recommendations; Cadbury advocated a sharp break to what was the traditional UK 
corporate practice of executive remuneration setting process of which directors 
determining their own pay package. The most important recommendation the 
committee made was for the board to appoint a REMCO consisting of wholly or 
mainly NEDs.
314
 The responsibility of the REMCO was to make recommendations to 
the board on the remuneration of the executives in all forms. This recommendation 
marked a big change in the process of determining executive remuneration. This 
raised the issue of conflict of interest as executives were considered as awarding 
themselves pay that did not correspond to the company’s performance. The Cadbury 
Report recommended that executives should be precluded from taking part in 
decisions relating to their own pay.
315
 The REMCO was allowed to draw advice from 
outside if necessary.
316 The company’s board were recommended to disclose the 
membership of the REMCO in the annual account and report. The REMCO was to 
put the interest of the shareholder first at all times and in all their decision making 
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processes.
317
 By recommending that executive remuneration be determined by a 
REMCO, Cadbury sought to strengthen the role and independence of NEDs.
318
 NEDs 
are appointed on a part-time basis, to the board of a company and are involved in the 
management but are not employees of the company.
319
 Furthermore, by 
recommending the establishment of the REMCO, the Cadbury Report was seeking to 
make the process of determining executive remuneration more transparent and less 
subject to the influence of the executives.
320
 The spirit of the Cadbury Report was not 
intended to reduce the level of executive remuneration and/or the growth rate of 
executive remuneration;
321
 rather Cadbury’s objective was to encourage executive 
remuneration to be more transparent and more closely related to company 
performance.
322
 Transferring the pay-setting responsibilities to the REMCO 
dominated by NEDs was believed to better align shareholders’ and executives’ 
interests more closely and so link pay more directly to performance. 
The Cadbury Committee recommended that the total emolument of the chairman and 
highest paid director be disclosed with separate figures representing their salary and 
performance related elements in the annual report.
323
 Given that disclosure was also a 
legal requirement, the Cadbury committee went further than the Companies Act 1985 
to recommend that disclosure should be done on the various elements of the pay 
package as opposed to the a single figure for the highest paid director required by the 
Companies Act. The committee recommended companies to disclose and explain the 
performance criteria and all relevant information on stock options, stock appreciation 
right and pension.
324
 The names of the chairman and the highest paid director were 
not required to be disclosed and the remuneration of the other executives were not 
required to be disclosed either. The aim of this recommendation was to make 
                                                          
317
 Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of the Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee Publishing 1992) para 4.44. 
318
 Steve Thompson, ‘The Impact of Corporate Governance Reforms on the Remuneration of 
Executives in the UK’ (2005) 13(1) Corporate Governance 19, 20. 
319
 A, Mohd-Suliman, ‘Strengthening the independence criteria – a comparison of the UK, Malaysia, 
Hong Kong and Singapore’ (2010) 21(7) ICCLR 239, 239. 
320
 Sourafel Girma, Steve Thompson and Peter Wright, ‘Corporate Governance Reforms and Executive 
Compensation Determination: Evidence from the UK’ (2007) 75 The Manchester School 65, 69. 
321
 ibid at 70. 
322
 Steve Thompson, ‘The Impact of Corporate Governance Reforms on the Remuneration of 
Executives in the UK’ (2005) 13(1) Corporate Governance 19, 21. 
323
 Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of the Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee Publishing 1992) para. 4.40. 
324
 ibid. 
83 
 
executive remuneration determination more transparent as disclosing the figures and 
how they came about, would enable the shareholders to either criticise or accept the 
remuneration process. 
Companies were bound by contract to pay huge sums of money to an 
underperforming executive that was forced to leave the company before the expiry of 
his contract. The purpose of this recommendation was to limit the size of payoff that 
companies offered to executives that were forced to leave the company.  
However, the report rejected a proposal to give the shareholders an opportunity to 
determine matters such as executive pay at an annual general meeting.
325
 The 
committee did not see how such a complex issue could be determined by shareholder 
by saying ‘... A directors’ remuneration is not a matter which can be sensibly reduced 
to a vote for or against; where the vote to go against a particular remuneration 
package, the board would still have to determine the remuneration of the director 
concerned’.326 However, the law rejected this approach and now provides 
shareholders with a binding vote (discussed in chapter six).
327
 
Although, the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee were voluntary, their 
endorsements by the London Stock Exchange caused many listed companies in the 
UK to comply with its provisions very rapidly.
328
 A study by Conyon
329
 found out 
that in 1993, 94% of British quoted companies had a REMCO. Girma et al
330
 study on 
the relationship between CEO cash remuneration and firm performance over the 
period of 1981 – 1996 found that the rate of increase in CEO remuneration slowed 
down after the Cadbury Report, indicating that Cadbury Report did have an impact on 
                                                          
325
 Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of the Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee Publishing 1992) para.  4.43. 
326
 ibid. 
327
 Companies Act 2006 (The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013) s439A. 
328
 Martin J Conyon, ‘Institutional Arrangement for Setting Directors' Compensation in UK 
Companies’ (1997) in K Keasey, S Thompson and M Wright, Corporate Governance: Accountability, 
Enterprise and International Comparisons (Oxford, 2005) 105. 
329
 Martin J Conyon, ‘Corporate Governance Changes in UK Companies Between 1988 and 1993’ 
(1994) 2 Corporate Governance 87-99. 
330
 Sourafel Girma, Steve Thompson and Peter Wright, ‘Merger Activity and Executive Pay’ (2002) 
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3255. 
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/19111/1/Merger%20Activity%20and%20Exec
utive%20Pay.pdf?1 assessed 14 November 2013. 
84 
 
the executive remuneration determination process. However, Girma et al
331
 in another 
study on the impact of Cadbury Report on executive remuneration determination 
found out that, the Cadbury Report had very little impact on the pay-setting process as 
a whole. Girma et al
332
 findings suggested that executive remuneration remained less 
sensitive to company performance and depended more on company size. However, a 
study by Guest
333
 found out that the Cadbury Report influenced the pay setting 
process, with an increase in the number of NEDs leading to an increase in the 
correlation between executive pay and company performance. Past studies on the 
impact of Cadbury Report on executive remuneration setting process yielded mixed 
findings. However, Cadbury Report recommendation of separating a REMCO that 
would be responsible for the determination of executive remuneration marked a 
significant change in the executive remuneration determination process. Despite the 
recommendations made by the Cadbury Report and the changes it effected, growing 
public concern on executive remuneration issues led to the Greenbury Report 1995. 
Greenbury Report  
After the Cadbury Report 1992, executive remuneration became a hot political issue 
with the media and newspapers
334
 highlighting executives’ lengthy service contracts, 
substantial perks and large pay increases without a proportionate increase in company 
performance. This public debate fuelled by media stories on executive remuneration 
gave birth to the Greenbury Report 1995. Pension Funds who were major investors in 
listed companies wanted to see a greater link between pay and performance. A 
particular target of criticism was the pay of directors in privatized industries.
335
 The 
rallying point was Cedric Brown’s (the then chairman of British Gas plc) 75% pay 
rise as there was no justifiable link between his pay increase and company 
performance and the fact that the company was making many employees redundant at 
the same time. A committee under the chairmanship of Sir Richard Greenbury was 
setup under the instigation of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and reported 
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in 1995. The committee’s gold was to identify good practices in determining 
executive remuneration and prepare a code of such practice for use by UK 
companies.
336
 The committee’s findings were documented in the Greenbury Report 
which incorporated a Code of Best Practice on director’s remuneration. The 
Greenbury Code of Best Practice was divided into four sections: the RC, disclosures, 
remuneration policy and service contracts and remuneration. The committee’s 
objective was to provide possible answers to concerns on the process of determination 
executive remuneration and greater transparency. The key themes in the Code of Best 
Practice were alignment of executives’ interests with those of the shareholders to 
improve company performance, full disclosure and responsibility. The Greenbury 
Report’s Code of Best Practice was endorsed by the listing rules of London Stock 
Exchange requiring a compliance or non-compliance statement in the annual report 
and accounts of the company. 
Unlike the Cadbury Report which recommended that the REMCO should consist 
wholly or mainly of NEDs, the Greenbury Report recommended that the REMCO 
should comprise exclusively of NEDs
337
 who have no personal interest in the matters 
of the company, no potential interest and with no day-to-day running of the 
company’s business.338 This recommendation was intended on making the REMCO 
independent of the executives to enhance their objectiveness in the determination of 
executive remuneration. The Greenbury Report went further to recommend that the 
REMCO should be made up of at least three NEDs or at least two NEDs in the case of 
small companies.
339
 The REMCO would report to the shareholders each year on the 
remuneration policy, including full disclosure of elements in the remuneration of 
individual directors. This recommendation was to give the shareholders information 
on the executive pay setting process as a means of encouraging accountability and 
transparency. 
The report recognised the importance for companies offering wages that are high 
enough to attract suitable executives that are capable of running the company and 
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cautioned the REMCO to be careful to avoid paying more than is necessary.
340
 This 
recommendation was justified on the basis that there exists a market for executive 
talent, meaning that companies who do not offer attractive pay packages will not 
attract, recruit and retain executives of high calibre to run the company. This meant 
that the REMCO had to consider the pay structure and practices of other companies 
when setting executive remuneration levels. This recommendation seemed weak as 
the REMCO was given the chance to set the pay at a level they desire and justify it as 
being the right package to attract, retain and motivate a quality director.
341
  
The Greenbury Report recommended that directors’ contracts be reduced from three 
years to one year as a means of preventing excessive golden handshakes.
342
 This 
recommendation also recognised that removing a director before the expiry of his 
office can amount to breach of contract for which compensation will need to be paid 
for each year remaining on the contract. This recommendation simply express what 
was stated in the CA 1985/2006. The rationale for recommending a reduction of 
director’s service contract was to prevent directors from entrenching themselves by 
making it prohibitively expensive to remove from office. The report added that a 
notice period of two years could still be reasonable in some circumstances.
343
  
Furthermore, the Greenbury Report recommended executive pay structure to be made 
up of multiple elements which included base salary, benefits in kind, annual bonus, 
share options, other long-term incentive schemes and pension rights.
344
 All bonus 
schemes, share options and long term incentive schemes were to depend on 
satisfactory performance and needed shareholder approval. Annual bonuses were to 
be rewarded based on some financial performance measures.
345
 Long term 
performance schemes were to encourage the long term success of the company 
subject to challenging performance criteria.
346
 Performance measures were to be 
applied relative to what other companies in the same industry are applying.
347
 The 
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Greenbury Report failed to provide guidelines on what was to be considered as 
satisfactory performance, leaving the subject to the discretion of the REMCO.
348
 
Share option schemes for directors were to be linked to long term corporate 
performance and not to be offered at a discount. 
The Greenbury Committee was keen on ensuring that executive remuneration be 
linked to company performance and was not bothered about the levels of pay so long 
as they were justified on the basis of company performance: 
A key concern should be to ensure, through the remuneration system, that 
directors share the interest of shareholders in making the company successful. 
Performance-related remuneration can be highly effective in aligning interest 
in this way. In many companies therefore, there will be a case for high gearing 
of performance-related to fixed pay...The gearing which suits one company 
may be quite unsuitable for another.
349
  
The Greenbury Report was the first to recommend that parts of the executive 
remuneration package be tied to performance as a means of aligning the interest of the 
executives with that of the company and the shareholder.  
The Report recommended extensive disclosure on remuneration matters which went 
notably further than the disclosure requirements in the CA 1985
350
 and the Cadbury 
Report as a means of ensuring accountability to shareholders and reassuring the 
public. This was intended to give the shareholders reasonable information to enable 
them to assess the company’s general policy on executive remuneration and the entire 
remuneration package of individual directors.
351
 The remuneration of each named 
director with details of the various components of the pay package (which include 
base salary, annual bonus, benefit, share options, long term incentive plans and 
compensation for loss of office) to be disclosed.
352
 The report recommended that 
explanation and justification be provided whenever any element of remuneration other 
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than the basic salary was pensionable.
353
 All notice periods of more than twelve 
months were to be disclosed and explained together with the names of the directors in 
the annual report. The REMCO was to write a report which was to be included or 
annexed to the annual report and account of the company on behalf of the board. The 
report had to provide information on the remuneration policy and the actual 
remuneration packages including share options and pension entitlement earned of 
each named executive, and how the executive remuneration was benchmarked with 
other companies.
354
 Despite the extensive disclosure requirement, the report did not 
set a standardised format on how the companies should disclose this information. This 
left the companies to adopt disclosure format that they deemed satisfactory and thus 
creating a variation in disclosure format amongst companies.
355
 Furthermore, the 
Report did not require shareholders to approve the general remuneration policy which 
meant that companies submit the amount of information the liked.  
Despite these recommendations on executive remuneration, the Report failed to 
consider what would be its effect on pay levels. It was argued that the availability of 
substantial information in the annual reports and accounts on executive remuneration 
encouraged pay comparisons amongst executives that resulted in pay rises.
356
 A study 
by Gregg et al
357
  examined the relationship between executive pay and company 
performance for a large sample of UK companies over the period 1994-2002.  Their 
findings suggested that there existed a weak relationship between executive 
remuneration and company performance. This finding meant that the Greenbury 
Report like the Cadbury Report failed to strengthen the link between executive pay 
and company performance. Executive remuneration continued after Greenbury Report 
1995 to hit headline news as pay continued to rise faster than average earnings with 
little relationship to the company’s performance.  
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Hampel Report and the Combined Code 
A review of the implementation of the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports took the form 
of the ‘Committee on Corporate Governance’ chaired by Sir Ronald Hampel. The 
committee published it findings in 1998. The committee suggested that the 
recommendations of Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel be integrated into a single 
Code of Corporate Governance.  
The Hampel Report covered director’s remuneration as well as operations of the 
board, accountability and audit, relations with institutional shareholders and the 
responsibilities of institutional shareholders. The important contribution of this 
committee was the avoidance of a prescriptive approach to corporate governance. It 
emphasized the need to maintain principles-based, voluntary approach to corporate 
governance rather than a regulated approach.
358
 The committee recommended 
principles of good governance and the reduction of the regulatory burden on 
companies. It recognised that good governance will largely depend on individual 
companies and favoured shareholder involvement in company affairs. However, 
Hampel did not advance the debate on executive remuneration rather it re-iterated the 
provisions of the Greenbury Report. Remuneration packages should be structured so 
that rewards are linked to individual or company performance.
359
 The committee 
warned that while setting remuneration level in comparison with other companies, 
caution should be taken to avoid ratcheting-up remuneration by the uncritical uses of 
comparisons.
360
 The report emphasised that parts of the remuneration package that are 
tied to individual and corporate performance should not only be achievable but 
challenging.
361
 The REMCO was required to use informed judgment in devising 
scheme appropriate for specific circumstances of their company and to explain their 
reasoning with the shareholders. The committee also recommended that notice period 
should be one year or less. Like the Cadbury Report, the Hampel Report did not 
believe that director’s remuneration should be a matter for shareholders to vote on at 
the AGM. Reiterating the recommendation of Greenbury Report on the disclosure 
requirement, Hampel recognised that disclosures were often too excessively detailed 
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to the point of obscuring essential features of remuneration packages which only 
experts can understand. It therefore advocated a simplified form of disclosure by the 
companies to be accessible for the non-experts to understand.
362
 The committee also 
pointed out that full disclosure of individual executives total emoluments led to an 
upward pressure on remuneration in a competitive field.
363
  
The recommendations of the Cadbury, Greenbury and the Hampel Reports were 
consolidated in the Combined Code 1998. The code was appended to the listing rules 
with a requirement for companies to provide a statement for compliance or non-
compliance. The code also required instances of non-compliance to be explained. The 
recommendations of the Code were the same as those of the Greenbury Report on 
executive remuneration with the exception that the Code recommended that the board 
should report to the shareholders on remuneration matters rather than the REMCO as 
recommended by the Greenbury Report. The Code was appended to the listing rules 
and operated on ‘comply or explain’ basis. 
Higgs Report  
The Higgs Report focused on the effectiveness of NEDs. Following the 
recommendation of the Greenbury Report, Higgs recommended that the REMCO 
should comprise of at least three members, all of whom should be independent 
NEDs.
364
 Most importantly Higgs recognised that one of the roles of NEDs was to set 
the levels of executive remuneration. The Higgs Report recommended that the 
REMCO has delegated responsibility for setting remuneration for executive directors, 
senior executives, and the chairman and should be responsible for appointing 
remuneration consultants.
365
  
Unlike its predecessors, the Higgs Report highlighted certain relationships and factors 
which could compromise independence. The Higgs Report recommended that the 
independence of the REMCO could be compromised if they have been former 
employees of the company five years after their employment ended or persons who 
still have business dealings with the company. The Higgs Report reinforces the notion 
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of independence by recommending that the board identifies in its annual report its 
independent NEDs explaining why they are considered independent.
366
 The test of the 
independence of NEDs was an important recommendation to support the 
accountability and transparency of the executive pay setting process. In addition to the 
already existing recommendations on executive remuneration in the Combined Code, 
the Higgs Report recommended that the number of meetings the board and its 
committees hold a year must be disclosed in the annual report and accounts including 
the attendance records of individual directors.
367
 Higgs recommended that the 
remuneration of NEDs should reflect the workload, complexity and responsibility 
involved. They could also be part paid by shares, and were allowed, subject to 
shareholders’ approval, to own shares in the company.368 The Higgs Report 2003 led 
to the amendments of the Combined Code to incorporate its recommendations. 
The Combined Code (2003, 2006 and 2008 updates) 
The Code emphasised the importance of independent NEDs on the REMCO that they 
bring objective judgement to their role. Following the recommendation from the 
Higgs Report, the Code recommended that the board should determine relationships 
that are likely to affect the judgment of independent NEDs and state its reasons for 
regarding a non-executive as independent where there exist factors that could affect 
his/her judgement.
369
  It went further from the Combined Code 1998 to recommend 
that a significant proportion of the executive remuneration should be structured so as 
to link rewards to corporate or individual performance.
370
 Furthermore, it also 
recommended that the remuneration of NEDs should not include share options.
371
 The 
Code cautioned that where the executive directors or senior management were 
involved in advising or supporting the RC, care should be taken to recognise and 
avoid conflicts of interest.
372
 Directors’ eligibility for annual bonuses and long term 
award schemes were subject to satisfactory performance and required all new long 
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term schemes proposed to be approved by shareholders.
373
 It also recommended the 
performance evaluation of the REMCO by the board annually. The Combined Code 
2006 recommended that the chairperson of the company could serve on the REMCO 
where he/she was considered independent at the time of appointment. Apart from 
these few changes all the provisions remained the same. The Combined Code 2008 
contained the same recommendations on executive remuneration as the Combined 
Code 2006. 
The Walker Review 
Despite the updates on the Combined Codes, executive remuneration continued to be 
in the spotlight with constant increase in executive pay with little or no relationship 
with the company’s performance.374 Coupled with the banking crisis of 2007 and 
2008 in the UK in which the government had to save five banks from collapsing led to 
the Walker Review.
375
 This committee was set up by the government chaired by Sir 
David Walker to look at corporate governance in the banking sector.  
One significant problem that contributed to the banking crisis was the excessive risk 
taken by the banks. It was argued that excessive executive remuneration by the use of 
bonus payments encouraged excessive risk taking by the executives.
376
 Pay 
arrangements in the financial industry provided reward to some staff in the bank 
entitled to bonus payment as an integral part of their pay package, encouraged 
recklessness in respect of valuation of assets and the calculation of profits.
377
 
Executive bonus rewards were linked to short-term performance rather than the long-
term performance recommended by the Combined Code. The Walker Review 
considered amongst other issues whether an incentive and bonus remuneration 
scheme encourages risk taking in the banking sector. The main changes of Walker 
Review was to ensure that performance related remuneration is linked to long term 
success and that the remuneration incentives are compatible with risk policies and 
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systems. The Walker Review recommended that the REMCO should have a sufficient 
understanding of the company’s approach to pay and employment conditions to 
ensure that it is adopting a coherent approach to remuneration in respect of all 
employees.
378
  
Similar to the Combined Code 2008 where REMCO were allowed to determine the 
remuneration policy and packages for board-level executives, the Walker Review 
recommended an extension of the role of the REMCO to cover firm-wide 
remuneration policy. This was to ensure that the committee had appropriate oversight 
of the overall remuneration policy of the entity with particular focus on the risk 
dimension relevant to performance conditions, deferment and claw-back. The Walker 
Review recognised that reward by bonuses which had been locked into the structure 
of corporate governance by the Greenbury Report might be an unsuitable way of 
rewarding the executives.
379
  
The Walker Review recommended that the REMCO should oversee the remuneration 
policy and outcomes in respect of all ‘high end’ employees.380 The REMCO report 
should confirm that performance objectives are linked to compensation for this ‘high-
end’ group.381 The REMCO report should confirm the review of remuneration 
arrangements for the “high end” group, satisfaction with the link between 
performance objectives remuneration structure; and disclose the principles underlying 
performance objectives and remuneration structures. The total remuneration of the 
‘high end’ group, in bands, indicating numbers of executives in each band should be 
disclosed.
382
 Despite calls for disclosure of salaries of high-earning individuals, 
Walker does not require banks to name high earners due to issues of privacy – 
commercial confidentiality. Rather an anonymous disclosure of salary packages in 
excess of £1m. Disclosure of high-end employees (whether board members or not) 
falling into bands from £1-£2.5m, £2.5-£5m, and £5m upwards, with details provided 
of the main elements of salary, cash and deferred bonus, performance-related long-
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term awards and pension contribution. The £1m benchmark represents a shift from the 
earlier proposal for disclosure of pay that exceeds the median of a company’s 
executive directors.
383
 At least half of variable remuneration should be in the form of 
long term incentive scheme with half of the reward vesting after not less than three 
years and the remainder after five years. Short term bonus awards should be paid over 
three year period, with not more than one-third in the first year. Walker uses this 
deferral of incentive payments as the risk adjustment mechanism to align rewards 
with performance. It recommends claw backs should be used in cases of material 
misstatement and misconduct.
384
  
The Walker Review recommended that the REMCO should seek advice from the 
board risk committee
385
 on specific risk adjustments to be applied to performance 
objectives.
386
 The Review sought for more ways of linking executive remuneration to 
company performance by recommending that the chairman of the REMCO should 
stand for re-election the following year should the non-binding resolution on a 
REMCO report attracts less than 75 per cent of the total votes cast.
387
 The REMCO 
report should state whether any executive board member has the right to receive 
enhanced benefits beyond those already disclosed and whether the committee had 
exercised its discretion during the year to enhance benefits.
388
 The recommendations 
of the Walker Review were principally aimed at the financial industry and a review of 
this report led to the UKCGC 2010.  
The UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 and 2012 
A review of the Walker Review, by the Financial Reporting Council, FRC
389
 led to a 
new code with a change of name from the Combined Code to the UKCGC. Parts of 
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the Walker Report that applied to all companies were incorporated into the UKCGC, 
and those that applied only to the banking sector were left as example of best practice. 
The recommendations of the UKCGC apply to a wide range of companies, but only 
listed companies must comply or explain regardless of whether they are incorporated 
in the UK or elsewhere. The Code made some key changes relating to executive 
remuneration. The Code recommended that remuneration of NEDs should not include 
any performance-related elements or stock options as these tend to jeopardise their 
independence.
390
 It also recommends that the performance-related elements of 
executive director’s remuneration should be designed to promote the long-term 
success of the company.
391
 Furthermore, the Code recommends that remuneration and 
incentive schemes should be subject to non-financial performance criteria where 
appropriate and compatible with the company’s risk policies and systems; it also 
makes clear that companies should give consideration to the use of provisions that 
permit the company to reclaim variable components in exceptional circumstances of 
misstatement or misconduct.
392
 The UKCGC 2012 contains the same provisions on 
executive remuneration as the UKCGC 2010. These provisions are contained in 
section D and schedule A of the Code. 
The UK Corporate Governance Code 2014 
A review of the UKCGC 2012 led to the publication of the UKCGC 2014 released on 
the 17 September 2014. The Code has made a few changes in relation to executive 
remuneration. These changes will only apply to the companies with accounting 
periods beginning on or after 1
st
 October 2014. The Code recommends that executive 
directors’ remuneration should be designed as to promote the long-term success of the 
company which was a supporting principle under the 2012 Code to a main 
principle.
393
 This principle is emphasising on the importance of linking executive 
remuneration to company performance because executive pay is presumed to lack a 
link between pay and performance. The principle has dropped the statement that 
‘levels of pay should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the 
quality required to run the company successfully’. This may be because of the 
excessive pay packages that some newly hired executive receive as ‘golden hello’ 
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when they first join the company. The REMCO will be faced with a new task of 
determining an appropriate balance between fixed and performance-related, 
immediate and deferred remuneration.
394
 They should in future set remuneration 
incentives to be compatible with risk policies and systems.
395
 The REMCO should 
consider requiring (a change from should be encouraged) directors to hold shares for a 
period after the vesting or exercised.
396
 Shares granted or other forms of deferred 
remuneration should not vest or be paid or exercised in less than three years and 
longer periods may be appropriate.
397
 The new Corporate Governance Code 2014 will 
still operate on a comply-or-explain rule. 
The ‘Comply-or-Explain’ Rule 
The ‘comply-or-explain rule only applies to listed companies. This rule was first put 
forward in the Cadbury Report Code of Best Practice 1992 as a practical means of 
establishing a single code of corporate governance whilst avoiding an inflexible ‘one 
size fits all’ approach.398 The Yellow Book (predecessor to the Listing Rules)399 
required all listed companies to state in their report and accounts whether they 
complied with the provisions of the code or give reasons for any areas of non-
compliance. The main objective of the rule of comply-or-explain was to allow for 
flexibility in the application of the rules set out in the code. This rule has been 
maintained since Cadbury and makes up one of the listing rules on the London Stock 
Exchange.
400
 Not all companies covered by the code are expected to follow all the 
recommendations of the code. That is, where individual rules do not fit the particular 
company, a deviation from the recommendation is allowed if explained. The UKCGC 
2012 states clearly that: ‘...an alternative to following a provision may be justified in 
particular circumstances if good governance can be achieved by other means which 
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the company should explain clearly and carefully to shareholders...’401  A departure 
from the Code does not automatically mean a breach of the Code.
402
  
Academic studies that have examined the rule demonstrate that companies are not 
adequately explaining the reason for non-compliance or not giving reasons at all. 
Grant Thornton’s403 review of corporate governance found that the recommendation 
on REMCO had one of the highest levels of non-compliance.
404
 Grant Thornton’s 
findings indicated that 6.7% companies of their sample failed to meet up with the 
recommendations on the composition of the REMCO. Fourteen companies still had an 
executive chairman on their REMCO.  While non-compliance is not automatically a 
breach of the code, 82% of the companies failed in their explanation to identify 
whether or not the non-compliance was temporal or would last longer into the future. 
Only 22% of the companies explaining their non-compliance discussed the impact of 
the non-compliance on the shareholders or refer to an action taken to ensure an 
appropriate measure to redress the deviation.
405
 Compliance with the Code on the 
composition of the REMCO is very low in most companies thereby impairing their 
responsibility of setting appropriate pay levels.
406
  
Conclusion 
Corporate Governance has made and revised recommendations on the determination 
of executive remuneration. It is more principle based than rule based offering a degree 
of flexibility with relatively low cost. Despite the various recommendations of 
corporate governance codes on issue of executive remuneration, executive 
remuneration stills remain a hot topic in corporate governance. There are still gaps in 
corporate governance mechanisms that need to be addressed on issues of executive 
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remuneration. The Corporate Governance Code recommends that a significant 
proportion of executive remuneration package be performance based with challenging 
performance criteria. However, the Code does not give guidelines as to what 
performance measures to be used; therefore giving the companies the liberty to 
choose performance measures that they think is satisfactory. As will be discussed in 
chapter 5, companies use a wide array of performance measures and there is very little 
uniformity.  The flexibility of comply or explain rule, still offers some companies safe 
heaven as the code does not punish for less or inadequate explanation. Executive 
remuneration continues to rise as FTSE 100 Chief Executives pay increased on 
average pay package of £4.3 million in 2012, up from £3.9 million in 2011
407
 This 
pay increase justification are neither based on individual nor company performance 
but based  on ‘attracting, motivating and retaining’ qualified executives. The UKCGC 
2012 recommends pay to be tied to individual and corporate performance (discussed 
in chapter 5) as well has recommends the REMCO to offer remuneration that is 
sufficient to attract, motivate and retain quality executives. This points out to the 
flaws in corporate governance that still requires attention. The next chapter will 
discuss the REMCO and their role in the executive pay setting process. 
  
                                                          
407
 High Pay Centre, ‘High Pay Centre Condemns Latest Executive Pay Increase’ 10th June 2013. 
99 
 
Chapter 4: The Remuneration 
Committee 
Introduction  
The UKCGC
408
 recommends that companies should set up a REMCO that will be 
responsible for the determination of executive remuneration. This would involve 
determining the company’s overall remuneration policy, sets the salaries and other 
remuneration components of executives’ pay, and develop short and long term 
incentive schemes for top managements. The purpose of this recommendation was to 
stop executives from determining their own pay thereby encouraging accountability 
and transparency in the executive remuneration setting process.
409
 The REMCO is 
seen as a key agent in the strategic human resource management process of choosing 
a remuneration package and, arranging and making sure it is calibrated in a way that 
incentivises the executives towards taking decisions and actions necessary to improve 
the company’s strategy.410 The recommendation for UK companies’ boards to appoint 
REMCOs was first made by the Cadbury Report in 1992.
411
  To better understand the 
REMCO and executive pay setting process, this chapter will be divided into two parts. 
Part one will examine the REMCO and the pay setting process, and Part two will 
discuss RCONs and their influence on the REMCO’s pay setting process.  
Part 1: The Remuneration Committee 
The REMCO is a subcommittee of the board made up of at least three, or two (in the 
case of smaller companies) independent NEDs who are responsible for setting the pay 
of the executive directors of the company.
412
 This part of the chapter will be divided 
into the following sections. The first section will examine the appointment, 
composition, the role of the REMCO and the sources of information required by the 
REMCO are discussed. Secondly, the independence of the REMCO will be 
considered and its effect on pay setting process will be discussed. Third, the factors 
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that the REMCO take into account when determining pay will be examined. Fourth, 
the theories that influence the REMCO’s decision making process will be discussed. 
Finally, the effect of the REMCO on executive remuneration levels will be 
considered. 
Appointment, Composition and Role of the Remuneration Committee 
Members of the REMCO are suggested by the nomination committee
413
 but the final 
decision lies with the board of directors as it is their responsibility to appoint board 
members.
414
 The UKCGC
415
 recommends that there should be a formal, rigorous and 
transparent procedure for the appointment of new directors to the board, and the 
appointment has to be on the basis of merit, objective criteria, gender, skills, 
knowledge and experience.
416
  
The prime role of the REMCO is to determine and monitor the remuneration of the 
company’s executive directors. The importance of REMCO was echoed by Main and 
Johnson who stated that: 
The complexities of present day remuneration packages demand a degree of 
expert knowledge and specialised information. If pay is to be linked to 
performance then it seems wise to give some attention to this details, and it 
also seem wise that the dominant perspective on such matters comes from 
those who most obviously represent the shareholders, i.e. the Board and the 
non-executive in particular.
417
 
The REMCO’s role is not to reduce executive pay, but to provide a forum within 
which directors will determine the appropriate design of reward structures for senior 
executives and align management with company interest.
418
 This could be achieved 
by designing remuneration packages that will align the interest of the directors with 
that of the company and its members with the success factor central to the company’s 
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business strategy.
419
 Remuneration policies are usually revised annually to confirm 
that the original choices are still consistent with the company’s contemporaneous 
situation and the evolving views of shareholders. This would include the review of 
previous awarded incentive schemes with reference to the company’s performance, to 
be able to design future incentive schemes. REMCO s are expected to judge where to 
position the company relative to other companies, assess the wider pay situation both 
within and without the company, and construct and appropriate remuneration package 
for the executives.
420
 In setting individual remuneration packages, the committee 
should consider all components including base salary, annual bonuses, benefits and 
incentive schemes such as stock options or grant (incentive plan include developing 
criteria for top executive performance-related remuneration). Performance-related 
components should be contingent on achieving performance conditions that are 
geared towards the long term performance of the company.
421
 However, the role of 
the REMCO in determining remuneration packages that aligns the interest of the 
management with that of the company has been criticised and questioned by past 
academic studies. O’Reilly et al’s422 study on executive pay and social comparison 
suggested that the REMCO’s role of aligning management interest with that of the 
company was not effective. They found out that average pay of the committee 
members had a positive effect on CEO pay. This was explained on the basis that some 
of the REMCO were setting executive pay based on the levels of pay they receive in 
the companies where they are executives which in turn push up pay levels. Main et 
al
423
 in their study found that executives tend to take initiative more in terms of 
making new pay arrangements than the REMCO. Although, the management may 
propose new pay arrangements and the REMCO reviews them, it is expected of the 
REMCO to make the proposals and consult the management not the opposite.
424
 The 
REMCO has been criticised to be ineffective in their role and are seen as negotiating 
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pay with the executives rather than critiquing the proposals from the executives.
425
 
The make-up of the REMCO (mostly executives and former executives of other 
companies)
426
 impacts on decision making which tends to favour a negotiation of 
remuneration proposals than a critiquing.
427
 
The REMCO can only do their job effectively if it has access to relevant sources of 
information and advice. Being a sub-committee of the board, they have access to any 
information that is available to the board and so will have access to detailed 
information relating to the company’s finances and directors’ performance. The 
UKCGC
428
 recommends that the REMCO should consult the chairman and/or the 
chief executive about their proposals relating to the remuneration of other executive 
directors. Furthermore, the REMCO should be responsible for appointing any 
consultants in respect of executive director remuneration, and to be cautious when 
executive directors or senior management are involved in advising or supporting the 
REMCO.
429
 
Companies tend to use remuneration advisers such as the RCONs, the company’s 
CEO and chairman, the human resource function and the shareholders and their 
representative bodies, to get information and support on how to set executive pay. 
These advisers provide the REMCO with useful information to enable them to 
determine executive pay packages. The quality of the information they provide to the 
REMCO can determine the appropriateness of the remuneration package.  
The human resource department are invaluable source of information and support to 
the REMCO in the determination of executive remuneration. However, scepticism has 
been expressed by Main et al
430
 of the possibility that the human resource personnel 
might be taking over the pay setting process or acting as agents on behalf of the 
executives. The human resource department of the company has a strong influence on 
the pay setting process because they design, propose and set company policy; and are 
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also involved in setting top executive remuneration policy.
431
 One of the respondents 
in Main’s study said ‘in the past there’s been an unconscious takeover by the human 
resources director in preparing REMCO proposals…we have now shifted it from 
human resources writing and proposing and letting the REMCO approve, to a joint 
recommendation with the REMCO chair steering’.432 In the majority of the sample 
data (8 out of 15 respondents) the human resources department was seen to be taking 
the lead in the proposals on executive pay arrangements.
433
 Furthermore, the human 
resource personnel do have an effective relationship with the managing director of the 
company that is based on high trust relationships.
434
 This places the human resource 
personnel in a difficult situation when they try to mediate between the executives and 
the REMCO. Based on the fact that the human resource personnel appointment to the 
board is largely the responsibility of the board, they may tend to favour the executives 
in pay decisions. 
The independence of the remuneration committee 
The REMCO’s independence is considered a key element in control of executive 
remuneration.
435
 The on-going debate on executive remuneration poses considerable 
problems for the REMCO in the determination of acceptable executive remuneration 
packages. This is because the REMCO is responsible for making sure that pay awards 
are regarded as legitimate. The effective delivering of the REMCO’s role has been 
criticized on the grounds that they are not completely independent from the board, 
consequently affecting their decision in the pay setting process. The REMCO’s 
perceived lack of independence from the board has attracted criticism that they are 
unable to resist the influence of the executives on their decision making.
436
 
In addition to the independent NEDs, the Code also recommends that the chairman of 
the company may also be a member of the REMCO (but not chair) if he was 
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considered independent at the time of his appointment.
437
 However, a study by Main 
et al
438
 found that in most companies the CEO is always present at REMCO’s 
meetings. They argued that it is important for the CEO to be present in REMCO 
meetings because it would be difficult to design acceptable remuneration 
arrangements without engaging with the CEO and hence the executive team.
439
 They 
further pointed out that the CEO withdraws from the meeting when the CEOs pay is 
being discussed.
440
 The UKCGC
441
 recommends that the REMCO should consult the 
chairman and/or the CEO about their proposal relating to the remuneration of other 
executive directors. This implies that the Code recognises the importance and 
encourages the presence of the CEO at some of the REMCO meeting but not when 
their pay is being discussed. A survey conducted by the High Pay Centre
442
 found out 
that out of 96 companies of the FTSE 100, 2012 listing, 33% of FTSE 100 companies 
had a current CEO on the REMCO. The NEDs are expected to bring independent 
judgment and experience to the deliberations of the board on various issues and in 
particular on the determination of executive pay.
443
 The REMCO would need to be 
independent from the company, particularly from the executives to be able to carry 
out their responsibilities objectively. The UKCGC
444
 does not provide a definition for 
‘independence’ but rather gives guidelines for determining independence of NEDs 
which requires members of the REMCO: 
 Not to have been employee of the company or group within the last five years 
 Not to have or has had within the last three years, any material business 
relationship with the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, 
director or senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with the 
company 
 Not to have received or receives additional remuneration from the company 
apart from director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or 
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performance-related pay scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension 
scheme 
 Not to have close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or 
senior employees 
 Not to hold cross-directorship or has significant links with other directors 
through involvement in other companies and bodies 
 Not to represents a significant shareholder; or 
 Not to have served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their 
first election or be over seventy years of age.
445
 
Furthermore, if a NED does not meet any of these criteria, the board should explain 
why it considers the NED independent. The NEDs are legally and commercially seen 
as an important guarantee of integrity and accountability of companies.
446
 It is 
assumed that the interest of those who invest in the company will be safeguarded by 
the presence of NEDs by setting directors’ pay to reflect on the company’s 
performance.
447
  As a means of diluting the number of executives from other 
companies sitting on the REMCO of another company, BIS
448
 suggested more 
diversity in the REMCO members that it should include people from outside the 
traditional corporate sphere (e.g. from academia, public sector etc.) who will lend 
relevant and valuable expertise whilst bringing fresh ideas to the committee.
449
 This 
diversity on the board will also avoid the ‘escalation’ in self-interest of executives 
thereby, causing them to put the interest of the company first. However, the 
discussion paper did not consider how such arrangements could be realised, or the 
legal status of the committee members who are not fully NEDs. To increase diversity 
on the REMCO, companies could recruit knowledgeable individuals from the various 
back grounds only to participate on executive remuneration setting, but they would 
have to be legally responsible to the company for their responsibilities in the same 
magnitude as the NEDs. This would ensure that the committee members act carefully 
when making decisions. Some FTSE 100 companies already have members from a 
                                                          
445
 K Keasey and R, Hudson, ‘Non-executive Directors and the Higgs Consultation Paper – Review of 
the Role and Effectiveness of Non-executive Directors’ (2002) 10(4) JFRC 368-369. 
446
 A Zattoni and F Cuomo, ‘How Independent, Competent and Incentivized should Non-executive 
Directors be? An empirical Investigation of Good Governance Code’ (2010) 21(1) Brit J Manage 63, 
64. 
447
 ibid. 
448
 ibid, 27. 
449
 ibid, 27. 
106 
 
diversified background as demonstrated by the study of High Pay Centre. It revealed 
that out of the 366 NEDs who sit on the REMCO of the FTSE 100 companies, 37 
members did not come from a business or financial intermediation background. Two 
members worked for BBC, 20 were civil servants, 3 were lawyers, 1 was a film 
producer, 4 were academics and 7 were accountants.
450
 However, the effect of this 
diversification is insignificant as most REMCOs are still predominantly made up of 
current executives of other companies. 
Ideally, the REMCO should be made up of independent NEDs who are fully 
conversant with the company and who have a good knowledge of executive 
remuneration practices.
451
 The independence of the NEDs has been criticised firstly, 
on the grounds that the appointments of the NEDs are still largely in the hands of the 
board as a whole even though the nomination committee are supposed to make the 
appointment process more transparent and independent.
452
 Furthermore, the articles of 
many companies (including the Model Articles
453
) allow the board to appoint a 
director, indicating that the board still ultimately appoints the NEDs. In some cases 
NEDs are appointed by the management and this makes them susceptible to 
management as they owe their pay to the executives.
454
 NEDs feel a sense of divided 
loyalty as they attempt to fulfil their fiduciary duty to the company while maintaining 
an amicable relationship with the executives under whose opinion they are appointed 
to the board.
455
 The effect of this on executive pay would be an increase in pay levels 
as the NEDs try to please the executives and protect their position on the board.
456
  
Secondly, NEDs only work part-time for the company devoting about one or two days 
a month to the company whilst the executive directors work full time and are 
responsible for the day-to-day running of the company.
457
 The NEDs are faced with 
limited time and may be unable to grasp fully the intricacies of executive pay setting 
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process and the information upon which performance. is to be judged without 
involving the executive directors.
458
 In large quoted companies, the company’s 
internal resources and financial terms are complex and hard to understand for persons 
who are not actively involved in the day-to-day running of the company. This is one 
beneficial factor for members of the REMCO to be active directors of other 
companies as they understand what it takes to run a company. The NEDs need to 
understand the company and its functioning to be able to adequately design a 
remuneration scheme that will reflect on the performance of the company.
459
 The 
amount of information needed by the NEDs to be able to make informed decisions is 
enormous and requires time and expertise to understand the information given.
460
 This 
is a weakness on the independence of NEDS as the management can manipulate and 
edit the information to favour the executives.
461
 The information could be delayed and 
may reach the NEDs at a stage too late for effective action to be taken.
462
 In most 
cases, company executives’ control (to a large extent) the quality, timing and volume 
of information given to the NEDs.
463
 
Thirdly, UK NEDs do not have sufficient incentives to monitor the executives as their 
fee is such that they may not be sufficiently motivated.
464
 The NEDs fee is 
independent of the company’s performance and is also much less than what they 
might earn as an executive elsewhere.
465
 This leaves the NEDs with little incentive to 
devote time and effort required to fulfil their responsibilities or oppose the policies of 
the executive and top management. Zattoni and Cuomo
466
 argued that if NEDs were 
well paid they would have little incentive to oppose the pay policy of executives, and 
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if they are not well paid NEDs may be insufficiently incentivized to devote time and 
effort to the job. It is therefore unclear what can incentivize NEDs to motivate them to 
do their job effectively taking into account the criteria for independence.
467
 
Fourthly, NEDs frequently have economic and social ties with the management and 
may not be prepared to take decisions contrary to the executive’s wishes.468 This is 
because they themselves are often former executives or executives of other companies 
with some of them sitting on the REMCO s of more than two companies, so they will 
sympathize more with the executives. Their experience as executive in other 
companies gives them the knowledge and skills needed by board members to set 
goals, negotiate pay, and hold executives accountable for their performance. These 
characteristics make the NEDs to identify more with the interest of the executives 
than those of the company and shareholders.
469
 Due to the choice of NEDs to have 
this skill set, there is a tendency of recruiting NEDs from a relatively limited talent 
pool and potentially contribute to the insufficient challenge on remuneration issues by 
the REMCO.
470
 A survey conducted by the High Pay Centre
471
 on 96 companies of 
the FTSE 100 companies in 2012 indicated that: 
 33% of FTSE 100 companies have a current lead (CEO) executive on 
the REMCO. 
 9% of FTSE 100 companies have a current FTSE 100 lead executive 
on the REMCO. 
This result demonstrates the composition of the REMCO of some companies and the 
potential danger it can have on the pay setting process which will be setting less 
challenging performance conditions on performance related elements of the pay 
package contrary to the UKCGC’s recommendation. It is worth re-iterating here that 
the UKCGC operates on a ‘comply or explain’ basis472 which requires the companies 
to disclose their compliance or non-compliance providing explanations where they did 
not comply. Where the company did not comply as demonstrated by the findings 
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above, the shareholder would be expected through the annual general meeting to hold 
the directors to account for the non-compliance. The survey also pointed out that 
some companies’ (e.g. Reckitt Benckiser) REMCO s are made up wholly of current 
and former executives of other companies.
473
 This survey demonstrates that although 
the NEDs might be regarded as independent in their focal company having no direct 
interest on the levels of executive pay, they may be indirectly interested as they are 
executives of other companies.
474
 Being executives in other companies, Sykes
475
 
argues that the NEDs would have a generic interest in high remuneration without 
exerting performance requirements. This is because they are aware that giving the 
executives high remuneration level will reflect back on their pay levels in their own 
company where they are executives through remuneration benchmarking. Given this 
position the NEDs therefore find themselves in a sympathetic position rather than 
assertive and dynamic position.
476
 The High Pay Centre pointed out that because the 
REMCO is made up of NEDs who are often executives in other companies, they are 
part of the high pay culture and what would constitute excessive pay to a majority of 
people might seem reasonable to the REMCO.
477
 The effect of this position would be 
an inability to objectively question excessive executive remuneration.
478
 
Consequently, executive remuneration would continue to increase in a sequence with 
the REMCO of most companies not wanting the executive of their companies to be 
earning less than their counterparts in other companies, thus tending to make 
recommendations that would increase remuneration levels.
479
  
The lack of independence of the NEDs therefore places doubts on the REMCO as an 
effective body in the setting of executive remuneration. Despite the widespread 
adoption of REMCO s by listed companies, this lack of independence is demonstrated 
by the continuous increase in executive pay levels over the past two decades with no 
apparent link to company performance.  
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Theories that affect the decision making process 
Several different theories suggest how individuals on REMCOs set the executive 
remuneration level. A detailed discussion on the various theories that affect the 
REMCO’s decision making is outside the scope of this thesis but four theories would 
be briefly discussed. These theories include social comparison theory, demographic 
characteristics, labour market theory and human capital theory. These theories are 
discussed below. 
Social comparison/identity theory 
The process by which the REMCO deliberate on remuneration setting is subject to 
social psychological processes that affect most group decision making.
480
 They make 
ambiguous decisions such as setting executive remuneration where use of social 
information is highlighted.  
Social identity theory suggests that people classify themselves and others into social 
categories and then identify more with members of their own category than with 
members outside that category.
481
 The presence of the executives of other companies 
on the REMCO of another may exert influence over the remuneration process as 
corporate executives tend to be a relatively homogenous, cohesive collection of 
individuals.
482
 This cohesion may lead to a general propensity to support peer 
executives in board decisions and particularly in remuneration packages.
483
 The gap 
between the executive interest and company’s interest (Agency Theory) is very 
significant such that the REMCO cannot ignore it. Unfortunately, due to social 
identity, the REMCO identifies themselves with the social category of the executives 
rather than the shareholders whose interests they are supposed to promote. The 
REMCO (being executives of other companies) may review and recommend a 
remuneration package that is more consistent with their preference as executives than 
with those of shareholders.
484
 Studies found out that executive remuneration is highly 
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related to the remuneration of NEDs serving on REMCOs. This echoes the 
benchmarking strategy of determining executive pay package
485
 discussed later in this 
chapter. This theory does not take into account individual and company performance 
when setting executive remuneration indicating that the effect of this theory on 
executive remuneration levels would be an increase in executive remuneration levels 
with no corresponding link to company performance. 
Social identity theory also suggests that gender similarity or dissimilarity can be used 
to predict the treatment of others. This means that men and women are more 
comfortable with individuals of the same gender at adulthood. This points out that the 
REMCO could treat executives with whom they feel more comfortably favourably. 
Research on this aspect of gender similarity has yielded mixed results with O’Reilly 
et al
486
, Michael N. Young
487
 supporting the positive effect of gender similarity, while 
Graves et al
488
, found a negative effect of the gender similarity.  
Furthermore, considering the nature of responsibility of the REMCO (and how 
difficult it can be to make decisions on executive remuneration) their experience as 
executives of other companies does have a significant impact upon the decision they 
make. They tend to identify with the problems encountered by other executives. This 
similar experience provides the executives and the REMCO with a shared language 
that facilitates their interaction.
489
 
Demographic characteristics 
Demographic similarities provide an important basis for group membership. 
Similarity in demographic characteristics such as age, gender, tenure, education and 
race has been proven to influence outcomes within executive work teams. Generally 
individuals with the same or similar demographic characteristics seem more inclined 
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to work in favour of each other than those with dissimilar demographic 
characteristic.
490
 These characteristics lead to perceived similarity in attitudes and 
values which tends to lead to interpersonal attraction, then positive treatment of each 
other.
491
 Executives may prefer demographically similar board of directors (e.g. most 
boards are made up of a majority of men than women
492
 and members of the board 
may prefer men to women), and by extension board committees whose members are 
more likely to support management initiatives. Increase in demographic similarity 
between executives and members of the REMCO may be associated with increase in 
executive remuneration and decrease in performance related remuneration.
493
 A study 
by Young and Buchholtz
494
 on the effect of relational demography on the link 
between CEO remuneration and company performance found out that demographic 
similarity (tenure) between the CEO and the REMCO resulted in a weak relationship 
between CEO pay and company performance. This finding suggest that because of 
social cohesion between the executives and the REMCO is likely to result in higher 
guaranteed salaries with less emphasis on performance related pay.  Considering that 
members of the REMCO might also be executives of other companies, the REMCO 
tends to have similar experience and background with the executive of the focal 
company, consequently providing the executive s with very attractive remuneration 
packages.
495
 
Another demographic characteristic that may affect the determination of executive 
pay is the age of the executive. Executive age is important in pay setting process 
because the intellectual capability of the executive is enhanced due to education, 
knowledge and experience gained from the position over the years.
496
 Members of the 
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same age group share a wealth of experience, beliefs and attitude that provides them 
with a common bond. Members of the REMCO who are of the same age as the 
executives tend to treat the executives more favourably regarding remuneration issues 
than those who are either younger or older.
497
 The executives are expected to manifest 
a willingness to accept additional exposure to risk and favour long-term success of the 
company because of the knowledge and experience they have amass over the years in 
the executive job role. On the contrary, remuneration pay levels increase with age but 
company’s performance does not always increase with age. 
Labour Market Theory 
The labour market theory suggest that there is a limited pool of talented individuals 
who have the ability to run large companies successfully and therefore are paid more 
than others.
498
 This implies that the level of executive remuneration could be 
determined by the operation of a competitive executive labour market. This 
competitive nature of the labour market implies that executives could move to better 
rewarded employments should the current company not pay more than other 
companies.
499
 The REMCO use this argument to justify the pay levels awarded to 
executives on the grounds that they are required to offer pay packages that are 
sufficient to attract, retain and motivate executives.
500
 
Human Capital Theory 
The efficiency and productivity of an executive is influenced by his accumulated 
knowledge and skills (otherwise known as human capital). The amount of human 
capital an executive possesses influence his productivity which in turn influences his 
earnings.
501
 A high human capital will be a function of more knowledge (education) 
and/or skills (work experience) an executive has. Education has been found to 
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influence managerial executive remuneration positively.
502
 Furthermore, executives 
with higher human capital tend to be paid more as they are, in theory, perceived to 
perform their job better.
503
  
Factors taken into account when determining executive remuneration 
The factors considered in determining an executive remuneration package are crucial 
to the realisation of a ‘desired’ remuneration package (a desired remuneration package 
which will be closely linked to company performance). The public debate on 
executive remuneration is for pay levels to be linked to company performance and for 
the pay inequality gap between executives and other employees of the company to be 
reduced. The UKCGC makes limited recommendations on the factors that the 
REMCO should consider in determining pay, which is for companies to consider 
individual and corporate performance,
504
 although it does not recommend how 
performance should be measured.  The Code also recommends that pay should be set 
as to attract, retain and motivate the executives.
505
 This principle of the Code is vague, 
therefore leaves the REMCO with significant discretion in setting pay. The CA 2006 
does not make provision on how executive remuneration should be determined. 
Considering the complex nature of executive remuneration packages, the REMCO are 
therefore confronted with the question of what is appropriate in determining executive 
pay.
506
 A number of research studies
507
 have been conducted in this area but none has 
come up with defined criterion on how and what should be the appropriate 
determinants of executive remuneration package. The work of Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman
508
 looked at how, when and what to pay executives as remuneration in 
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which they considered various criteria (such as company size, sector etc.) but did not 
come up with defined criteria to follow by companies when determining executive. A 
study carried out by Bender
509
 examined how companies determine pay, considered 
the effect of market value, industry and the company size on the remuneration 
package, but again did not define the criteria followed in the act of determining 
executive remuneration. 
The lack of uniform rules and criteria on the determination of executive remuneration 
implies that the REMCO needs to exercise value judgments in making their decision. 
The factors taken into account by the REMCO when setting executive remuneration 
are many and complex.  Some of the factors include the company’s business, culture 
and values, stakeholder interest, company performance, and the company’s policy on 
executive pay. 
The company’s business 
The understanding of the company’s business is essential for the REMCO when 
setting executive remuneration packages. This would include understanding the size 
of the company, the company’s sector and the complexity of the company. Each of 
these factors would be discussed in turn. 
Company size 
Company size has an important role in the determination of executive pay with 
numerous studies indicating that executive pay tends to increase with company’s 
size.
510
 The size of the company can affect all aspects of remuneration such as base 
salary, annual bonus design, performance measures and the type of long-term 
incentive plans that are appropriate. The executive’s job in a large company is 
considered to be more complex and has more responsibilities than those in a smaller 
company, thus justifying higher pay. The marginal productivity (the change in 
company performance as a result of executive performance) of an executive varies 
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directly with the size of the company he manages, thus the larger the size, the higher 
the marginal productivity.
511
 This principle however, seems to be applied more to the 
executives than to all the workforce of the company. This is because the percentage 
increase in executive pay levels does not correspond to the percentage increase in the 
wages of average employees of the company.
512
 
Companies develop a hierarchical structure and they tend to pay those at the top more 
than their subordinates.
513
 Larger companies have more hierarchical management 
levels, they also have increased numbers of layers of management and their 
executives may receive a higher remuneration than that of a small company.
514
 
However, not all companies of the same size and sector have same rewards for layer 
of management (e.g. Sainsbury plc and Marks & Spencer plc) are from the same 
sector with almost the same size (size measured by market capitalisation, £6.97bn for 
Marks & Spencer, and £6.3bn for Sainsbury). The pay level for the CEO of Sainsbury 
was far more than that of the CEO of Marks & Spencer. Furthermore, the number of 
management levels increases with company size. Consequently, companies that 
attempt to ensure adequate pay differentials between hierarchical levels are likely to 
pay more. 
Company sector  
A sector could be defined as a collection of companies with similar characteristics. 
Companies in the same sector tend to have some similarities like common 
organisational routines, similar markets and are subject to comparable external 
influences.
515
 The company’s sector has an important factor in the determination of 
executive remuneration as it represents the demarcation of the managerial labour 
market with the relative supply and demand of executives in an industry.
516
 Company 
sector is important in determining executive remuneration as it provides important 
reference for the REMCO in terms of social comparison. Managers tend to compare 
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their remuneration with others and usually the most relevant comparison would be 
with their peers of other companies in the same sector indicating that the sector pay 
practices may be influential in the executive pay setting.
517
 Finkelstein’s518 study on 
the effect of company sector on the executive remuneration discovered that executive 
remuneration is heavily influenced by the company’s sector in which the company 
competes. The REMCO’s understandings of the industry and the position of the 
company within the industry is significant to the setting of executive remuneration 
levels. This is because different industries have different remuneration policies.
519
 
This labour market effects would be unlikely to be sector-based if executive labour 
market operated within such boundaries (within industries). However, this fact has 
been branded by Harris and Helfat
520
 as irrelevant on the basis that some companies 
tend to appoint executives from other companies in completely different industries. 
Finally, in the executive labour market, premiums paid to external successors are 
unaffected by the sector, implying that the demand and supply of executives in an 
industry has little bearing on pay levels.
521
  
Corporate complexity 
Corporate complexity is an important factor taken into account when setting executive 
remuneration because companies with more complex structures tend to pay executives 
more due to the amount of responsibilities they carry out. Basu and Media
522
 defined 
business complexity as the condition of having several interdependent and 
interconnected stakeholders, information technology systems and organizational 
structures. Stakeholders include employees, customers, partners, suppliers, regulators, 
investors, media and competitors. Organizational structures include divisions, 
subsidiaries and joint ventures (e.g. a complex company would include Barclays bank 
that had 1268 subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates of the company by 31
st
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December 2012).
523
 A relatively simple company would include Fresnillo plc with 14 
subsidiaries and associates of the company.
524
 Therefore, complexity of a company is 
the result of growth in the business, new technologies, new regulations, more 
employees to manage, global nature of the business and the interconnection with other 
businesses. Some executives have a more demanding job than others, consequently 
they might demand a higher premium in the managerial labour market because their 
talents are relatively scarce, and the demand for their services is high
525
. A company 
with multinational operations tend to pay their executives more than a company with 
a single operation. Company diversity may signify greater executive discretion and 
higher executive pay.
526
 
Company performance 
Company performance is a vital factor to be considered in the determination of 
executive remuneration, as recommended by the UKCGC.
527
 The Code recommends 
that a significant proportion of the remuneration package should be structured so as to 
link rewards to corporate and individual performance.
528
 The REMCO therefore 
should determine remuneration elements that will boost the company’s performance 
as well as the individual executive’s performance. The REMCO would have to set 
performance targets and performance measures relevant to the company and designed 
to promote the success of the company. There exist a number of performance targets 
and measures that the REMCO can use to set and reward the executive based on 
individual and company performance (discussed in detail in chapter 5).
529
 These 
performance factors are important as every stakeholder would want an executive who 
will guide the company towards success by virtue of his ability, expertise, experience, 
motivation, authority, accountability and then be rewarded accordingly.
530
 The use of 
appropriate performance targets will enable the REMCO to ensure that directors’ 
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remuneration is perceived as appropriate and fair. Performance measures will also 
provide the REMCO with essential underpinning when it comes to determining short 
and long-term incentives. In order to obtain the desired performance from the 
executives, it is crucial that the performance targets and measures are selected 
carefully to promote the success of the company. The REMCO needs to understand 
the past performance record of the company and future prospects of the company to 
be able to set the performance-related pay of the executives. 
Market Forces 
The REMCO need to understand the market and the market data as they are important 
input into their deliberations on the remuneration decisions. Market forces represent 
the economic factors affecting the price of, demand for, and the availability of a 
commodity (in this case the executives)
531
. Market forces are assumed to lead to 
optimal pay levels and structures; remunerating executives for the risks they are 
willing to take to manage the corporation in the interest of the shareholders.
532
 The 
market data defines the parameters of normality and the boundaries of what is 
reasonable remuneration. Executive remuneration cannot deviate significantly from 
what the market deem as appropriate otherwise underpaid executives would likely 
move to competitors companies who are happy to pay at the market rate
533
. The 
REMCO needs to ensure that the executives remain loyal to the company by offering 
levels of pay comparable, or better, to the external labour market. By offering the 
executives’ pay that is at the market rate, executive turnover of a company will be 
reduced.
534
 
Stakeholder interests 
The term stakeholder can refer to any individual or group on which the activities of 
the company have an impact.
535
 This includes shareholders, employees, and providers 
of credit to the company, customers, suppliers, government and the local community. 
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The UKCGC
536
 recommends companies to be sensitive to pay and employment 
conditions elsewhere in the group when determining pay. The law also requires 
quoted companies to include in their remuneration report a statement of how pay and 
employment conditions of employees of the company was taken into consideration 
when determining executive pay.
537
 The REMCO should therefore take into account 
the pay gap between executives and other employees of the company when 
determining executive remuneration, even though this does not seem to be the case 
when determining executive pay. An example would be the pay inequality between 
executives and other employees of the company (e.g. in 2014 CEOs of FTSE 100 
companies were paid 130 times more than their average employee)
538
. Although 
shareholders come under stakeholders of the company, they have a privilege over the 
rest of the stakeholders as they are the recipient of the residual free cash flow after 
creditors are paid. Shareholders would like companies to strive more for the 
enhancement and maintenance of long-term success of the company which will 
maximise shareholder value whilst trying to take into account the wider stakeholder 
interest at the same time.
539
 The wider stakeholder group have their independent 
interests that they want to protect
540
  and the REMCO needs to take into consideration 
this interest in determining executive remuneration. 
Company culture and values 
Every company has distinctive cultures and values which communicate what is 
important, and what behaviour is acceptable in the company. Kelchner and Media
541
 
said:  
The culture refers to the values and attitudes of employees in the business or 
organization. In a business with an unhealthy culture, employees act as 
individuals, performing their duties to meet their own needs, such as a pay 
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check or health benefits. A healthy corporate culture values each employee in 
the organization regardless of his job duties, which results in employees 
working as a team to meet the company’s and their own personal needs. 
Healthy corporate culture improves the performance of a business in a number 
of areas. 
For example, the culture and values of John Lewis Partnership is based on trust which 
is incorporated in their work practice and has gained the partnership a good corporate 
reputation.
542
 These distinctive cultures are established by the founders of the 
company and further affected by the personality and transforming activities of the 
founders inheritors.
543
 Company cultures and values are strongly influenced by the 
characteristics of the sector in which the company operates.
544
 Companies within the 
same sector often share certain cultural elements that are required for the long term 
survival of the company.  
These values are widely shared and reflected in daily practice and relevant to 
company purpose and strategy.
545
 These values and cultures are frequently reflected in 
the sector’s pay practices, which includes types of benefits available or the design of 
incentives (long term or short term incentive). For example, company values that are 
purely profit driven might offer their executives more rewards as they might be likely 
based on short term performance of the company rather than long term success of the 
company. Nash et al’s546 study of the impact of culture on CEO compensation found 
out that cultural factors are significant determinants of CEO compensation. 
Consequently, the REMCO must be familiar with the values and culture of the 
company to be able to determine a remuneration package that will reflect on the 
company’s performance.  
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Current remuneration arrangements 
The REMCO would also have to consider the remuneration report of the company for 
the previous year which will contain (i) information on the compliance with the law 
and corporate governance codes; (ii) the overall remuneration philosophy which 
includes the positioning of the total remuneration relative to the market, long-term and 
short-term incentive arrangement, the benefit policy and any changes planned for the 
current year; (iii) directors contract details including severance arrangements, notice 
period, remuneration for loss of office and any arrangements for changes in control; 
(iv) details of individual director’s remuneration for the past three to five years 
including base salary, long-term incentive plans, bonuses, pensions, share options and 
any special arrangements for individual directors and why they exist, and; (v) the 
RCONs that were used, how they were appointed and the advice they offered. This 
document would provide the REMCO with necessary information for them to make 
informed judgment on future remuneration policy for the company. 
Executive Pay Benchmarking 
The UKCGC recommends that the REMCO should be sensitive to pay and 
employment conditions elsewhere in the group (sector), especially when determining 
annual salary increases.
547
 Most quoted companies set executive pay by comparing 
executive pay levels with executives of other companies. This practice is regarded as 
generating a ratchet effect that leads to continues growth in the level of pay and also 
increases the inequality gap between directors and rank and file employees.
548
 The 
REMCO rely on RCONs on advice on peer benchmarking.
549
 More on executive 
remuneration benchmarking is discussed later in the chapter. 
The effects of the remuneration committee on executive pay  
The adoption of REMCOs reflects the complexity of modern day remuneration 
packages, unlike the simple pay packages in the 1980s that were made up of only base 
salary and bonus as the main components.  
                                                          
547
 FRC, The UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2012) D.1. 
548
 L Goh and A Gupta, ‘Executive Compensation, Compensation Consultants, and Shopping for 
Opinion: Evidence from the UK’ (2011) 25(4) JAAF 608-644. 
549
 Executive remuneration benchmarking is examined in Part II of this chapter. 
123 
 
Evidence on the adoption of REMCOs was provided by the study carried out by 
Conyon
550
 which revealed that, between 1988 and 1993, the percentage of UK quoted 
companies with RCs had risen from 54 per cent to 94 per cent. Conyon and Peck
551
 in 
1998 found out that nine out of ten companies reported REMCOs indicating that most 
companies were using the REMCO to determine executive pay rather than allowing 
the executives to set their own pay.
552
  
The absence of a REMCO within a company would suggest that the executives are 
writing and signing their own contracts. The CA 2006 does not require companies to 
set up a REMCO; it states that if a committee has consider matters relating to 
directors’ remuneration, then members of such committee should be disclosed in the 
remuneration report.
553
 This implies as a strict matter of the law the executives are 
still setting their own pay as they are not required by law to set up a REMCO.  
Despite the justification of having REMCO to determine executive pay, past research 
has provided a mixed results as to the committee’s effectiveness. Early studies on 
REMCO by Main et al.
554
 found out that executives of companies without a REMCO 
were paid 24% more than executives whose board had REMCO. This indicated that 
REMCOs has an important and positive role in controlling boardroom remuneration. 
Conyon
555
 examined the existence of REMCO and directors remuneration and found 
that the presence of the REMCO was associated with lower growth in director 
remuneration thereby supporting the findings of Main et al. There are strong 
theoretical reasons for expecting the REMCO to exert an influence on top executive 
pay for the interest of the company and its stakeholders at large. In their role to act as 
independent arbiters of executive remuneration, they also have to respond 
competitively towards market pressure and design a remuneration contract that 
                                                          
550
 Martin Conyon, ‘Corporate Governance Changes in UK Companies Between 1988 and 1993’ 
(1994) 4(2) CGIR 87-93. 
551
 Martin Conyon and Simon Peck, ‘Board Control, Remuneration Committee, and Top Management 
Remuneration’ (1998) 41(2) AMJ 146-157. 
552
 S, Kovačević, “Remuneration Committees in the Spotlight: Explaining executive pay” (2008) 22nd 
AIRRANZ Conference Melbourne, 
http://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/departments/Strategy%20and%20Human%20Resource%20Manageme
nt/airaanz/proceedings/melbourne2008/ref/S.%20Kovacevic.pdf assessed 18 January 2011. 
553
 Large and Medium-Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulation 2008, Sch. 8. 
Pt. 3, para 22(1)(a). 
554
 BGM, Main, C, O’Reilly, and J, Wade, ‘The CEO, the Board of Directors and Executive 
Remuneration: Economic and Psychological Perspective’ (1995) 4 ICC 293-332. 
555
 Martin Conyon, ‘Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation’ (1997) 15(4) IJIO 493-509. 
124 
 
ensures executive have an incentive to behave consonantly with shareholder 
interest.
556
 Contrary to the findings of Main et al. and Conyon above, Main and 
Johnston
557
, Conyon and Peck
558
, Dalton R. Dan et al
559
 found little evidence to 
support the fact that the REMCO tailored executive pay to produce incentive effects 
that are beneficial to the company and its shareholders. Studies demonstrating the 
ineffectiveness of the REMCO have more evidence than those that demonstrate its 
effectiveness. This is further supported by a study carried out by the High Pay 
Centre
560
 demonstrating that the composition of the REMCO may be part of the 
reasons of its ineffectiveness. The high pay that executives receive due to the presence 
of the REMCO could be attributed to the lack of independence of the REMCO from 
the executives.
561
 Ezzamel and Watson
562
 found that with the presence of the 
REMCO, directors who were underpaid relative to the market had their pay increased, 
but directors who were overpaid received no parallel downward adjustments. They 
suggested that a kind of opportunistic relationship existed between the executive and 
NEDs who sit on each other’s committees and thereby bid up executive earnings.563 
This study was supported by O’Reilly et al564 who suggested that executive pay is 
driven by expectations stemming from social norms in which individuals base their 
judgments on a self-referential point (personal preferences, situation and 
circumstances). Their study suggested that the REMCO perhaps set executive 
remuneration level based initially on their own level
565
  which ends up with higher 
pay levels. They found that the average salary of the REMCO members (in relation to 
their own executive jobs) had a positive effect on executive pay. This means that the 
REMCO is not having the desired effect on the setting of executive remuneration, 
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consequently pushing up pay levels that are not related to company performance. 
Johnston
566
 study which examined the association between market forces and internal 
control on the remuneration contracting process, found out that the appointment of 
executives to the REMCO is not associated with an opportunistic behaviour to set pay 
in their self-interest. The study also found out that the appointment of at least three 
NEDs to the committee was associated with lower levels of CEO remuneration. Their 
findings demonstrate that having executives on the REMCO could still restrain 
excessive executive remuneration. This study was further supported by another study 
by Gregory-Smith
567
 who examined REMCO and CEO influence on the remuneration 
setting process. He found out that the composition of the REMCO did not affect CEO 
remuneration levels. These finding suggested that using REMCOs in setting the 
remuneration of executives did not achieve significant link between executive pay and 
company performance.
568
 
The REMCO is expected to design reward structures with a significant part of it based 
on challenging performance conditions so as to align executive pay with the 
company’s performance (preferably the long term performance of the company).569 
Main and Johnston
570
 analysing the composition of the REMCO and its role in the 
setting of executive pay, found out that the presence of the REMCO was associated 
with higher levels of executive remuneration with no corresponding link to company 
performance. Conyon and Peck’s571 study found out that the independence of the 
REMCO from the executives is associated with higher CEO remuneration levels and 
stronger pay for performance relationship. This study tends to suggest that the lack of 
the REMCO’s independence from the executives may result in a weak link between 
                                                          
566
 James Johnston, ‘Independent Directors, Executive Remuneration and the Governance of the 
Corporation: Some Empirical Evidence from the United Kingdom’ (2007) 3(1-2) RAE 105-122. 
567
 Ian Gregory-Smith, ‘Chief Executive Pay and Non-executive Director Pay in the UK: Optimal 
Contracting vs Rent Extraction’ (2009) NUBS Research Paper Series No 2009-02. Research Paper 
Nottingham University Business School Nottingham 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1345926 assessed 16 June 2014. 
568
 Catherine Daily, Jonathan Johnson, Alan Ellstrand and Dan Dalton, ‘Remuneration Committee 
Composition as a Determinant of CEO Remuneration. (1998) 41(2) AMJ 209-220. 
569
 Martin Conyon and Simon Peck, ‘Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and Top Management 
Remuneration’ (1998) 41(2) AMJ 146-157. 
570
 Brian B.G. Main and James Johnston, ‘Remuneration Committees and Corporate Governance’ 
(1993) 23(91A) Accounting & Business Research 351-362. 
571
 Martin Conyon and Simon Peck, ‘Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and Top Management 
Compensation’ (1998) 41(2) AMJ 146,148. 
126 
 
executive pay and company performance. Benito and Conyon
572
 analysing the 
determinants of directors’ remuneration found weak evidence that the presence of the 
REMCO led to stronger pay for performance relationship. Capezio et al.
573
 examining 
the role of the REMCO of 663 large companies from 1999-2006, found no evidence 
that independent REMCO were associated with better alignment of total CEO 
remuneration to company performance. The relationship between executive pay and 
company performance is one of the crucial outcomes that are expected of the REMCO 
when setting pay. These results demonstrate that the REMCO is ineffective in the 
determination of executive pay.  
The inability of the REMCO to restrain executive pay was further demonstrated by 
Main et al.
574
 They found that first the REMCO felt constrained in their choice of pay 
design by institutional cultures and values particularly with regards to long-term 
incentive schemes. Secondly, the REMCO does not allocate sufficient time to 
calibrate or confirm remuneration plans.  Finally, most of their actions are dominated 
by a perceived need to justify high pay outcomes. Ogden and Watson
575
 examined 
how the REMCO’s decisions on executive pay are influenced by the RCONs. They 
found out that the REMCO are proactive in managing pay policy and ensuring that 
pay is regarded as appropriate and not over generous.
576
 They also found out that the 
REMCO’s understanding of the wider pay environment makes them to increase pay 
so as to avoid losing its executives who may seek for higher pay in other 
companies.
577
 This findings provides more support to the earlier research on the fact 
that the REMCO and not able to restrain executive pay. 
The REMCO as discussed earlier in the chapter is an important committee of the 
board in the determination of executive remuneration. However, it is not effective in 
its role of restraining executive remuneration because they are not completely 
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independent from the board. This ineffectiveness is reflected in the fact that executive 
remuneration continue to increase with seemingly no link to company performance, 
and the gap between executive pay and average employee pay. The next section of 
this chapter will discuss the RCONs, their advice to the REMCO and its effect in the 
determination of executive remuneration. 
Part Two: Executive remuneration consultants 
The determination of the level and structure of an executive pay package is a process 
which is complicated and requires expert knowledge.
578
 A RCON is a person or 
organisation that supplies information and expertise to a separate client organisation 
on matters related to the pay and reward strategy of the top management team.
579
  
The UKCGC recommends that REMCO s could appoint RCONs if needed to provide 
them with advise on remuneration matters.
580
 The REMCO can appoint as many 
RCONs as they deem necessary. With the advent of stronger governance rules as a 
result of exorbitant executive pay the REMCO has turn to rely more on the advice of 
independent consultants.
581
 Past years have seen a widespread use of RCONs in the 
UK. This part on RCONs will be divided into the following sections. First the role of 
the RCON on executive pay setting process would be analysed. Secondly, the reasons 
for their appointment will be examined. Third, the independence of the RCONs will 
be examined. Fifth, the effect of the RCONs’ advice on remuneration levels will be 
discussed. Lastly, the findings of the qualitative research on the methodology of 
executive remuneration benchmarking will be analysed and discussed. 
The Role of Remuneration Consultants 
The REMCOs’ desires to set appropriate remuneration levels, and the need to be 
accountable for the outcome of their decisions, employ the services of RCONs to 
assist with the task of determining executive pay. Consultants use their experience in 
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benchmarking data provide assistance to the company to choose economically 
appropriate remuneration level and structure that efficiently achieves labour market 
objectives and appropriate incentives to executives.
582
 The use of surveys and 
comparing data serves solely as a means of providing more objective information 
regarding the pay levels based on the level of pay from other companies of same size 
and industry.
583
 
Companies may get involved in remuneration benchmarking for the following 
reasons. Firstly, the company’s performance is difficult to define and measure. 
Company performance can be measured in many different ways including accounting 
measures of performance, such as return on equity, return on assets, and this can be 
very difficult to collect an accurate picture of other company’s accounts. The 
difficulty in ascertaining how much of the company’s performance is attributable to 
the executive makes the issue of relative performance evaluation more ambiguous. 
Secondly, companies engage in benchmarking as a result of pay equity theory.
584
 Pay 
equity theory suggests that executives who are underpaid relative to the market would 
demand a greater use of peer benchmarking. Members of the board of directors are 
fully aware of the rise in executive pay without a corresponding rise in the company’s 
performance, so they tend to ignore the usefulness of the information about 
performance from other companies. With this in mind, most companies engage more 
in remuneration benchmarking. 
Thirdly, where a company is facing uncertainty in relation to their pay structures and 
levels, they seek legitimacy in benchmarking. Uncertainty in pay packages results in a 
difficulty in evaluating a manager’s individual performance and accuracy in 
performance measurement. The process of seeking legitimacy is inherently political. 
Companies rely on the logic of ‘competitive’ and ‘market-level’ pay to legitimize 
executive pay. Shareholders demand the internal alignment of pay and performance 
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while managers prefer market-level pay determined by external comparisons with 
peer companies. This difference in preferences underlies the political conflict 
surrounding the board. The REMCO is under pressure to justify their executive pay 
design and also to deal with the demands of executives who use power and position to 
influence the REMCO. With this political tension seeming too much for the REMCO, 
they adopt remuneration benchmarking as an easier solution than relative performance 
evaluation. 
RCONs provide expert advice on trends in executive remuneration, and market data, 
assessment of executive remuneration relative to executive performance, an insight 
and advice on the level and mix of executive pay and benefits.
585
 Also the consultant 
is expected to provide impartial advice thus conferring legitimacy on the REMCO’s 
decision.
586
 There exist no defined rules on how much to pay executive directors and 
thus pay is set in line with a self-defined ‘market’ with reference to a group of peer 
companies chosen with the aid of the RCON.
587
 The REMCO relies on their expertise 
in designing and implementing short-term and long-term incentive arrangements. The 
consultants provide advice on executive issues such as developing peer comparison 
and competitive benchmarking information on industry and market practices;
588
 
designing equity remuneration plans, performance measures and targets; conducting 
surveys and analysing the accounting, legal and tax implications of service 
contracts.
589
 With this advice the REMCO makes decisions on the level and structure 
of executive package. The consultants are expected to respond to the conflicting 
incentives of the executives and act in the interest of the company and its members by 
advocating for efficient levels of remuneration packages that link pay to 
performance.
590
 However, their effect on the pay contract remains ambiguous and 
highly contested.
591
 
                                                          
585
 Ruth  Bender, ‘Paying for Advice: The role of the remuneration consultant in UK listed companies’ 
(2011) 64(2) Vand. L. Rev.  361, 363. 
586
 ibid.  
587
 ibid. 
588K, Murphy and T, Sandino, ‘Executive pay and “Independent” Remuneration Consultants’ (2010) 
49(3) Journal of Accounting and Economics 247, 247. 
589
 Ruth Bender, ‘Paying For Advice: The Role of the Remuneration Consultant in UK Listed 
Companies’ (2011) 64(2) Vand. L. Rev. s 361-398. 
590
 B Cadman, M Carter and S Hillegeist, ‘The incentives of remuneration consultants and CEO pay’ 
(2010) 49(3) Journal of Accounting and Economics 263, 264. 
591
 L Goh and A Gupta, ‘Executive Remuneration, Remuneration Consultants, and Shopping for 
opinion: Evidence from the UK’ (2010) 25(4) JAAF 608, 608. 
130 
 
Remuneration consultants’ independence 
The RCON is naturally external to the company and exists as independent and 
autonomous personnel in his own right. The RCONs have the capacity to influence 
the choice and actions that the REMCO makes in respect of pay-setting strategy.
592
 
However, RCONs have been criticised
593
 as they seem to be assisting company 
executives in achieving excessive remuneration, justifying the pay through the use of 
remuneration surveys and remuneration peer groups. The consultant’s firm may also 
provide other services for the client company which could lead to a conflict of 
interest
594
 e.g. in 2013, Marks & Spencer
595
 plc  used Deloitte LLP to advise the 
company on remuneration matters, tax and consultancy on internal auditing. Potential 
loss of reputation in the market may deter consultants from colluding with 
management and recommending excessive pay package that are not linked to 
company performance.
596
 However, they may have an incentive to award generous 
pay packages in order to acquire repeat business. If they gain a reputation for 
recommending low pay packages executives may not engage them. This gives rise to 
altered incentives
597
 and a possibility of conflict of interest that may compromise their 
independence.
598
 For this reason consultants may not to be as objective as they should 
because they are often part of larger consulting companies and earn large sums of 
money for other consulting services.
599
  
Past studies has considered the effect of the potential conflict of interest faced by the 
RCONs on executive remuneration,
600
 and have provided evidence that the use of 
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RCONs correlates with high executive pay levels.
601
 Consultants tend to focus more 
on the service which provides the best private return. If the other services that they 
provide to the company are paid well they will focus on them at the expense of 
designing a pay contract that is optimal for shareholders. For this reason, the 
consultants are tempted to recommend high executive pay so as to promote those 
other line of businesses that they offer to the company.
602
 This conflict of interest 
could help the executives extract wealth from shareholders through higher 
remuneration and/or lower pay-performance sensitivity as the consultants may make 
more favourable recommendations to the executives.
603
 In most cases, the fees paid to 
consultants for other services are often more than the fees earned from providing 
executive pay services. This is still a very controversial point as some studies do find 
that consultants with other services recommend high executive remuneration
604
 while 
other studies find out that they do not.
605
,  
Remuneration consultants and executive pay 
The wide use of RCONs in advising on executive remuneration in the UK has been 
evidenced by past studies.
606
  Many studies on the determination of executive 
remuneration have analysed factors such as company size
607
, performance
608
, 
industry, human capital
609
 and board structure
610
. Very few papers
611
 have examined 
the role of the RCON in the determination of executive remuneration in the UK. Past 
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studies have capitalised on how executive pay levels and structures differ between 
companies using consultants and those that do not.
612
 Bender
613
 conducted an in-depth 
qualitative study of RCONs analysing twelve UK companies selected from the FTSE 
350. Thirty-five interviews were conducted with CEOs, REMCO chairs, and RCONs 
between 2001 and 2003. Her findings demonstrated consultants act as experts, by 
providing advice and recommendations in executive remuneration; model the 
implications of suggested plans; implement the chosen plans; provide an education in 
remuneration-related matters to committee members; and liaise on their behalf with 
institutional investors. Furthermore, they provide proprietary survey data on pay in 
comparator companies, on which the REMCO can base its decisions. Furthermore, the 
study also found out that consultants provide legitimacy to the decisions made by the 
REMCO.  
The soaring level of executive remuneration has led to the questioning of the role of 
the RCONs and suggesting that they, along with the REMCO, contribute to spiralling 
executive pay.
614
 Prior studies argue that RCONs have strong incentives such as the 
provision of other services to the company, to please the executives.
615
 Companies’ 
REMCO validates high levels of executive remuneration just by citing a RCON as an 
advisor in the pay-setting process.
616
 Companies use survey data produced by RCONs 
to justify high executive pay when the REMCO refers to the use of consultants and 
surveys to explain executive salary allocations.
617
 A company whose executives have 
large base salaries, bonuses justifies this outcome by reference to the role of 
consultants. Another study carried out by  
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It has been noticed from past studies that companies tend to seek recommendations 
from more than one consultant.
618
 Unlike most US companies that use only one 
consultant,
619
 companies in the UK often use more than one consultant.
620
 The use of 
multiple consultants by the REMCO has been regarded as a means of justifying 
excessive pay.
621
 Although having multiple RCONs can enable the REMCO to make 
a more informed judgment as different consultants specialize in different aspects of 
pay e.g. in 2011 Sainsbury plc  used four different RCONs for advice on executive 
remuneration.
622
  
This multiple use of consultants could result in a higher package as the REMCO can 
use the more favourable ones to justify a generous package. Some companies can use 
multiple consultants by splitting the consulting function among various consultants 
thus allowing the company to develop a remuneration package based on 
recommendations from individual consultants. The effect of this method is that the 
REMCO could end up with an overall high executive pay package.
623
 Considering the 
RCONs fight hard to keep their on-going and future relationship with the client 
company, multiple consultants could result in even higher pay because the prospect of 
lucrative business interest incentivized consultants to compete with each other.
624
 
However, past studies by Kabir and Minhat
625
 and Goh and Gupta
626
 found no 
evidence that executives of companies that increase the number of consultants had 
higher changes in remuneration than non-increasing company therefore, indicating 
that multiple consultants may not necessarily be a way of rent extraction. 
However, past studies have failed to investigate the actual process of benchmarking, 
factors considered when selecting comparator group and the effect on the 
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determination of executive remuneration. One study by Bender
627
 examined the 
determinants of executive RCONs’ advice. The study found that RCONs take into 
account the size and ownership of the company, the company’s business and strategy; 
the company’s culture and organisation, the impact of individuals on the process and 
scheme; and the scope of the assignment to be able to advise the REMCO on 
executive pay structure and levels.  
Further to the argument that RCONs are associated with high pay levels, no literature 
has examined the factors that the RCONs consider in choosing appropriate 
comparator companies for executive remuneration benchmarking and the effect it has 
on pay levels. The next section which is the result and discussion from interviews 
conducted with RCONs will examine the general methodology of benchmarking, 
paying particular attention to factors used in choosing peer groups and its effect on 
pay levels. This study provides detailed information on the factors considered in 
choosing appropriate comparator companies as oppose to the determinants of the 
advice as studied by Bender. 
Executive remuneration benchmarking: Interview analysis 
This section will analyse and discuss the interview findings on the methods of 
executive remuneration benchmarking. The RCONs Code of Conduct good practice 
guidelines
628
 recommend that the RCONs should provide objective advice to their 
clients but does not recommend how the RCONs should go about the benchmarking 
process. The results will be discussed in four parts. First, the definition of executive 
remuneration benchmarking will be examined. Second, factors considered when 
selecting appropriate comparator groups will be discussed. Third, the elements of the 
remuneration package considered when benchmarking examined. Fourth, the effect of 
benchmarking on executive remuneration level will be discussed. Last, the 
objectiveness of the RCON’s advice to the REMCO will be assessed.   
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Question 1: What is benchmarking? 
Two respondents did not attempt a definition for benchmarking. The other four 
respondents talked about benchmarking as undertaking a comparison in the 
marketplace with other companies in relation to what they pay their executives. For 
example: 
Executive pay benchmarking is the process of finding appropriate 
comparisons in the market place with organisations that are reasonably similar 
to the focus company that you are benchmarking with, and analysing what 
they pay their executives on a like-for-like basis relative to the pay of the 
focus company. (Consultant 1) 
Benchmarking is taking a cut of the data in the market and comparing against 
executive roles... (Consultant 2) 
Putting together data from comparator [different] company for a particular 
position valuing the total package (salary, bonus, benefits and Long term 
incentive plans) and comparing the clients company against that data. 
(Consultant 4) 
Our concept of benchmarking is to provide an indication at a medium lower 
quartile and high quartile level of the salary and total compensation of 
individuals working in certain financial service jobs. (Consultant 6) 
Their definitions echoed strongly the use of a comparator group as an important factor 
of benchmarking. The identification of a comparator group is crucial in benchmarking 
because, it is only when the appropriate companies are selected that executive 
remuneration data of those companies can be collected and compared with the 
remuneration data of the company they need to advise. Depending on the type of 
companies selected it could significantly influence the executive pay levels of the 
company they need to advise. Furthermore, the factors that consultants consider when 
choosing comparator companies and why are crucial to the process of executive 
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remuneration benchmarking and the pay setting process. The histogram
629
 below 
demonstrates how frequently each of the consultants talked about the use of a 
comparator group. From the graph it can be seen that although all the respondents 
recognised comparator group as important, others emphasised its importance more 
than others. As explained in the methodology chapter, content analysis considers the 
importance of facts by relying on how frequent the respondents talks about it.  
Figure 6: Frequency chart illustrating the use of comparator groups 
 
However, Consultant 1 mentioned that the comparator group will be made up of 
companies that are reasonably similar to the focus company but did not say how they 
would be chosen. The other five respondents did not mention what their comparator 
would be and how they would determine the comparator group. This lack of clarity in 
the definition of benchmarking prompted the second question. 
Question 2: What factors do you consider when benchmarking  
A typical executive pay package is set through a survey of pay practices of other 
companies but the choice of ‘comparable’ company is a complex social and politically 
sensitive issue. From the data collected it emerged that the factors considered by the 
consultants when benchmarking (i.e. when selecting the comparator group) were 
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seven (although not all consultants considered all seven factors), namely (i) company 
size; (ii) company complexity; (iii) company sector; (iv) the geographical operation of 
the company; (v) the company’s remuneration policy; (vi) company’s performance, 
and; (vii) the role of the executive in the company. The company’s performance and 
the role and responsibility of the executives were identified as secondary factors. The 
table below shows how many times (frequency) each consultant talked about these 
factors. 
Table 6: Factors considered in selecting comparator  
Consulta
nt 
Size Sector Geography Company 
performance 
Role of 
the 
executive 
Company 
policy 
Complexity 
1 5 8 3 7 3 5 4 
2 4 8 4 0 0 8 3 
3 7 7 6 0 0 0 0 
4 1 4 2 0 0 5 0 
5 5 6 4 0 0 7 1 
6 4 1 1 0 0 1 0 
From the table above, all the consultants identified three common factors which were 
company size, company sector, and the geographical operations of the company’s 
business. This could mean that these three factors are more important than the others. 
Consultant 1 mentioned in addition to other factors, company performance and the 
role of the executive as factors considered when selecting comparator group.  For 
example, he stated: 
The important factors to consider are the size, complexity, sector and the 
geography of the company... The performance factor is built-in the 
benchmarking...Once the benchmarking data is obtained, the important thing 
here is firstly what the company’s remuneration policy is, where the company 
positions itself in the market...Another important factor which we take into 
consideration but which is secondary is to match the role of the executives. 
(Consultant 1) 
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These seven factors considered in benchmarking will now be looked at in details to 
find out how and why the various consultants use different factors. 
Company Size 
All the respondents recognised size as an important factor in the determination of 
executive benchmarking. Examples include: 
The important factors to consider are the size of the company...The reason 
being that, the size determines how big the job is and the worth of the job is 
determined by the complexity and not the financial performance of the 
company. (Consultant 1) 
...the key factor being the size of the company...size of the company is very 
important as it help us determine the complexity of the job (Consultant 2) 
 ...you will still be looking at the size of the company...The size of the 
company will tell you the data...and the market for which they compete. 
(Consultant 5) 
This implies that larger companies pay more than smaller companies, indicating that 
selecting companies of the same size would prevent executive pay data of smaller 
companies being compared with those of larger companies. From the frequency chart 
below, it could be seen that consultant 3 emphasised more on size than the rest of the 
consultants, with consultant 4 mentioning size just once. This means that size could 
be the predominant factor considered in benchmarking by consultant 3, while size 
constitutes one of many factors for consultant 4. Out of the six consultants 
interviewed, five of them offered remuneration advice to companies from different 
sectors whilst one (consultant 6) offered remuneration advice only to companies from 
the financial sector. Considering that Consultant 6 emphasised the use of size as a 
factor in selecting comparator group suggest that the type of companies and sectors 
the RCONs advice does not influence the factors considered.  
Figure 7: Frequency chart for size as a factor for choosing comparator group 
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The RCONs consider that the bigger the company, the more responsibility the 
executive will have to manage the company and consequently the higher their pay.  
To determine the size of the company, different variables were used by different 
respondents to determine size. Although size was identified as an important factor in 
benchmarking, there no uniformity in the variables that were used to determine 
company size. The following variables were identified from the interview as the 
determinants of company size. They include company turnover (mentioned by 
consultants 3 and 4), market capitalisation (mentioned by consultants 2, 3, 4, and 5), 
total employee heads (mentioned by consultants 1 and 6) and company total revenue 
(mentioned by consultant 1).  These factors will now be discussed. 
The first factor used in determining company size was market capitalisation. The 
market capitalisation of a company is the number of shares publicly traded by that 
company multiplied by the share prices at a particular time – in short the value of the 
company.
630
 Four respondents talked about market capitalisation as a means of 
determining the size of the company, with examples including: 
When constructing benchmarking, we will look at the size of the company in 
terms of market capitalization... (Consultant 2) 
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...but the single most important criteria tends to be the market capitalisation. 
(Consultant 5) 
This indicates that companies of the same size from different sectors and geographical 
locations can be selected as comparator companies. The advantage of this selection 
criterion is that companies will be able to retain their executives as they are paid at the 
market level, meaning they will not regard themselves as underpaid and leave or 
threaten to leave the company. However, the disadvantage of the criteria is that 
executives may be paid higher than they actually should earn because the company is 
trying to pay at the international level for companies that benchmark on a global basis. 
This may pose a potential problem as the pay package may not take into consideration 
the performance conditions of the particular company. The histogram below 
demonstrates how much each consultant emphasised on market capitalisation as an 
important variable for measuring company size. 
Figure 8: Frequency chart for market capitalisation as a factor for company size 
 
From the frequency graph above, consultants 1 and 6 did not consider market 
capitalisation as an important means of determining the company’s size. Their reasons 
for not considering market capitalisation could be due to the lack of best practice on 
the subject the RCON did not consider it as a measure of company size. However, 
consultant 3 placed more emphasis on market capitalization than consultants 4 and 5.  
Using market capitalisation as a variable to determine the size of the company implies 
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that comparator companies could be chosen from any sector/industry so long as the 
company has the same market capitalisation. However, it is worth noting that all the 
consultants recognised company sector as an important factor to consider when 
choosing comparator groups. Different sectors have different pay structures and 
setting, and pay levels might be different in some sectors. For example, executive pay 
levels are higher in financial sectors than executive pay levels in non-financial 
sectors.
631
 It therefore implies that using market capitalisation as a variable for 
company size could result in comparator group from various sectors including the 
financial sector (this point will be examined further under when the company sector as 
a factor is discussed). Consequently, benchmarking executive remuneration with 
companies with higher pay from other sectors would result in high levels of executive 
remuneration packages.  
However, market capitalisation depends on share price at a given period. The 
volatility of share price will therefore influence the market capitalisation by either 
increasing or decreasing at any given period. This volatility in share price would mean 
that the company will constantly be changing comparator group depending on the 
share price as determines the size of the company at every given period in the year. 
This volatility in share price therefore cast doubts on the suitability of market 
capitalisation as a variable for company size. The consultant will have to consider 
other factors if the market capitalisation had been greatly influenced by the share price 
during the particular year. 
If the company has been trading on fairly well, and its turnover or market 
capitalisation has not gone significantly up or down in the prior year, factors 
other than size that will be considered will be the international scope of the 
business and the business sector, apart from which  no other circumstances 
will be taken into consideration. (Consultant 3) 
The second factor used in determining company size is company turnover. A 
company’s turnover is the total income derived by a business in an income year from 
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sales excluding the value of closing stock
632
- or simply the total sales of a company 
over a stated period. Section 474(1) of the CA 2006 defines turnover as the amount 
derived from the provisions of goods and services falling within the company’s 
ordinary activities after deducting trade discounts, value added tax and any other taxes 
based on the amounts derived. The CA 2006 uses turnover as a factor when 
determining whether a company is small, medium or large.
633
 In line with the Act, 
two respondents identified using company turnover to determine company size.  
...The first is the market capitalisation and the second is turnover. (Consultant 
3) 
We would look at the size of the company by reference to their market 
capitalisation and turnover. (Consultant 4) 
Company turnover depends on the amount of sales the company has made in a given 
year, this therefore means that where there has been less sales the company size will 
be less than when there is a boom in the market. Company turnover therefore, may not 
represent an appropriate variable for measuring company size. Apart from these two 
respondents, the rest did not say anything about company turnover. Consultant 3 
talked about company turnover with more emphasis (frequency of 12) than consultant 
4 who emphasised company turnover three times (frequency of 3). From these two 
consultants it appears that the type of industry from which the company is classified 
does not matter, so long as the turnover and the market capitalisation (as they both 
indicate they use market capitalisation too) is within the limit they are looking for. 
This therefore means that companies from the financial sector could be benchmarked 
with companies from the non-financial sector consequently driving executive pay 
levels as explained above. 
The third factor considered as a measure of company size is total employee head. The 
Companies Act 2006 also uses employee numbers as one of the factors (in addition to 
turnover) to determine whether a company is small, medium or large.
634
 Two 
                                                          
632
 Andrew Ross, Peter Williams, Financial Management in Construction Contracting (John Wiley & 
Sons 2012) section 8.3.1 
633
 CA 2006, s465. 
634
 ibid, s465. 
143 
 
respondents identified total employee heads as a factor considered to determine the 
size of the company. Examples include: 
When constructing benchmarking, we will look at the size of the company in 
terms of market capitalization, total revenues and total employee head counts. 
(Consultant 1) 
Considering the size, we look at the number of employees (Consultant 6) 
However, Consultant 6 placed more emphasis on the use of total employee heads in 
determining the size of the company than consultant 1. These consultants believe that 
the number of employees in a company will determine the size of the company. 
However this might not be the case due to the increase in use of technology. Most 
companies are replacing human employees with machineries that can carry out the 
same responsibility. Furthermore, depending on the nature of business carried out by 
the company, some companies generally require more employees than others, e.g. a 
car manufacturing company may require more employee heads than a banking 
company. 
The last factor identified in this study as a measure of company size is total revenue. 
Total revenue is the amount derived from provisions of goods or services falling 
within the company’s ordinary activities before the deduction of any costs or 
expenses. The difference between company turnover and company revenue lies in the 
fact that turnover is the amount realised by the company after deducting all costs and 
expenses, while revenue is the amount realised by the company before any costs and 
expenses are deducted. Two respondents identified company total revenue as a means 
of determining the size of the company. Total revenue measures all sources of a 
company’s income, including its sales for a given period of time. Examples include: 
When constructing benchmarking, we will look at the size of the company in 
terms of market capitalization, total revenues and total employee head counts. 
Consultant 1 
This finding indicates that there is no uniformity on how to measure the size of the 
company. The factor that is considered to measure the size of the company would 
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depend on the consultant, and they influence the selection of comparator groups in 
different ways. As pointed above, depending on the factor used to measure company 
size, comparator companies may be selected from the same sector as the focus 
company or from other sectors.  
Company Sector 
Company sector was identified by all the respondents as an important factor 
considered in benchmarking. Examples include: 
The important factors to consider are the size, complexity, sector and the 
geography of the company (Consultant 1) 
...hence the key factor being the size of the company, complexity, geography 
and sector. (Consultant 2) 
...sector is a factor as well. (Consultant 5) 
Figure 9: Frequency chart for company sector as a factor for choosing comparator 
group 
 
Company sector was identified as an important factor because different sectors have 
different pay setting, structures and levels. The financial sector for example, its 
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executive pay levels are higher than those of non-financial sectors.
635
 Due to these 
sectorial differences, companies should be compared to companies within the same 
sector. From the data obtained two respondents emphasised the importance of 
company sector in benchmarking more than the others. 
Furthermore, the consultants identified that comparator groups could be obtained 
from the same sector as the focus company (the company they will be advising) or 
from different sectors (across sectors). One respondent talked about selecting 
comparator companies from the same sector, two respondents talked about selecting 
comparator companies from different sector, two talked respondent said that they 
would select companies from both the same sector as the focus company and also 
from different sectors, and finally, one respondent did not specify whether companies 
would be selected from the same sector or different sectors as the focus company.  
One consultant identified that only companies from the same sector will be considered 
when choosing comparator companies. 
...we look at sectors, that is, companies from similar sectors. For example, a 
company in the retail sector will definitely look at other companies in the 
same sector (Consultant 1) 
Ideally, by considering only companies from the same sector when selecting 
comparator companies, the differences in pay structure and levels between different 
sectors will be avoided. However, this may not be strictly possible in practice – for 
example, if a RCON decides to choose comparator companies from the same sector to 
benchmark executive pay for company A, one of the companies chosen might be 
benchmarking with other companies from other sectors and consequently, would 
influence the remuneration structures and levels of company A. Other consultants 
were of the opinion that some companies depending on their size and the talent of the 
executives might need comparator companies from different sectors. This may be 
because of the assumption that executive talent pool is limited causing the consultant 
to benchmark across sectors in an attempt to ensure that companies do not lose their 
executives to other companies. Examples include: 
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...you can benchmark across sectors because if you are benchmarking total 
remuneration of FTSE 100 companies, there is an argument that they have got 
transferable skills. (Consultant 2) 
Sometimes there will be companies who have peers that are not necessarily in 
the same sector, so we look at companies in different sectors that operate in 
the same broad base business (Consultant 3) 
Consultant 3 went further to say that: 
...we can get a good handle on how companies of similar size across all sectors 
would pay their senior executives. 
The reasons given for cross-sector comparisons do not seem convincing because even 
though the executives might have transferable skills, different sectors have different 
cultures and values, as well as different pay practices (e.g. the financial sector 
remuneration structures are characterised by excessive risk-taking driven by the quest 
for performance related pay more than non-financial sectors).
636
 Selecting comparator 
companies from different sectors simply on the basis of transferable skills may lead to 
an unmerited ratcheting up of executive pay. It therefore means that although 
company sector is one of the factors considered in choosing comparator groups it is 
not as important as company size. Implying that by choosing comparator companies 
from different sectors benchmarking will cause the executive pay of the companies in 
less paying sector to level up with those of the high paying sector. This practice will 
consequently, cause benchmarking to have a ratcheting-up effect on executive pay as 
supported by prior research
637
. The question that remains unanswered in this study is 
how the consultant would adjust to the different pay practices and how they will 
situate the executive pay of the focus company. 
Geographical operation of the company’s business 
The geographical operation of the company’s business is important to determine 
whether the company is a domestic company (makes and sells its product in the same 
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nation) or global company (does business in/with other nations in making and selling 
its products). Companies with multinational operations may try to match-up pay 
levels with those of the executives in other nations in order to retain their executives. 
The growing internationalisation of the executive labour market with executives using 
their business skills in more than one country may also accounts for increases in 
executive pay packages.
638
 A possible implication of this design is that if the labour 
market is competitive, then the executives will move away from companies that pay 
less to companies that pay more.
639
 Therefore, considering the international operations 
of the company in selecting comparator companies is crucial in executive 
remuneration benchmarking. Using benchmarking to determine the remuneration of 
executives of a global company is bound to result to increase in executive pay levels. 
For example, if a US company pays its executives more than a UK company; the UK 
company’s interaction with the US company may influence the executive 
remuneration practices of UK companies. Executives of UK companies with a US 
exchange listing may receive more remuneration than UK-listed companies because 
the company possesses US operations, facing US competitors, facing exposure to US 
legal environment may have an incentive to align their pay practices with those of US 
companies.
640
 Furthermore, executives of UK companies where either the company’s 
directors or the executive have US board experience tend to receive more cash 
remuneration than companies without similar foreign board experience.
641
  
All the respondents recognised the importance of geographical nature of the 
company’s business as a primary factor to consider when benchmarking, with 
examples including: 
We look at global exposure as it also reflects on the complexity of the 
company and the job. We will then take into account the extent to which they 
have foreign operations and trying to benchmark companies with similar 
levels of foreign operations. (Consultant 2) 
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if a company has a specific and easily identifiable international comparator 
companies, we would look at the remuneration data and how the international 
company would pay their senior executives. (Consultant 3) 
We are a global organisation, so we report on every market in the world 
(Consultant 6) 
Two reasons were identified from the responses as to why the international operations 
of the company would be considered. The first reason is as follows: 
the global operations of the company is important because, the global the 
business is, the more complex the business is and that reflects in the salary, 
also the more domestic the business is the less complicated it is (Consultant 5) 
the international exposure of the company is considered because generally 
international businesses are more sophisticated and difficult to 
manage...therefore perceived as being the reason for the higher remuneration 
paid to executive that manage international businesses... (Consultant 3) 
The second reason identified for considering the international operations of the 
company was based on the fact that international trading companies would require an 
executive with some degree of experience in international trading. This will therefore 
help the company in the calibre of person to recruit: 
Geography matters because it would influence who you recruit on a global 
basis (Consultant 4) 
The consultants believe that by benchmarking executive remuneration based on the 
international activities of the company, it will stop the executives from leaving their 
companies in search of higher pay in other companies in other countries. However, a 
study by the High Pay Centre
642
 found out that only 0.8% of chief executive officers 
were recruited from overseas and 80% were promoted from within the company. This 
finding is suggesting that the justification of high pay in the UK based on executive 
global talent pool is unfounded. By extension, it means that selecting comparator 
companies on a global basis for benchmarking executive remuneration is unjustified 
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and would only lead to high pay. Companies in the United States have been noted in 
paying their executives more than the UK companies. Benchmarking UK companies’ 
executive remuneration with a US company that trade in the same market would mean 
pushing up the UK company’s executive pay to match the US company executive 
pay. As this practice will stop the UK company’s executive from seeking a job with 
the US company for higher pay, this rises up executive pay and the effect will be felt 
by other companies that benchmark with it in the UK. 
Company’s performance 
Only one respondent identified company performance as being an important factor 
considered when benchmarking. However, the consultant admitted that company 
performance was only a secondary factor as oppose to other factors such as company 
size.  
The particular circumstances of the focus company like company’s 
performance, and whether the company is making profit are all secondary 
considerations when considering factors for benchmarking... The performance 
factor is built-in the benchmarking but only to the actual package itself... 
(Consultant 1) 
From the quote above, it implies that company performance is not actually considered 
as a separate factor, but assumed to be built-in in the other factors such as company 
size etc. it is assumed that the size of the company is as a function of the company 
performance and consequently, considering the size of the company, would be 
indirectly considering the performance of the company. This assumption will be true 
if it can be proven that company size is strongly related to company performance. 
Executive remuneration has been proven by past studies to be strongly related to 
company size but a weak or no link has been found between executive remuneration 
and company performance. The UKCGC
643
 recommends that executive remuneration 
should be determined so as to link executive pay to the company’s performance. This 
recommendation makes company performance an important factor that should be 
considered when benchmarking executive remuneration. Despite this 
recommendation, only one out of the six respondents identified company performance 
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as a factor used when benchmarking executive remuneration. REMCO’s devise pay 
packages based on consultants’ advice, but the finding of this study suggests that 
RCONs do not generally take into account the performance of the company when 
benchmarking executive remuneration. This indicates the flaws in the pay 
determination process of executive pay that leads to excessive pay packages that are 
not related to company performance. Furthermore, this may be used to justify the lack 
of link between executive remuneration and company performance found by past 
studies on the investigation of the link between pay and performance (discussed in 
detail in chapter 5). The debate on executive remuneration is still on-going today 
largely because of the lack of link between pay and performance. It would have been 
expected for the RCONs to place company performance as a paramount factor in 
selecting comparator group of which the results of this study demonstrates the 
contrary. 
The important factors to consider are the size of the company...The reason 
being that, the size determines how big the job is and the worth of the job is 
determined by the complexity and not the financial performance of the 
company. Consultant 1 
But what was then considered important was the fact that the executives should be 
seen as paid the same with other companies. This could be noted as a weakness in the 
benchmarking process of executive remuneration considering the fact that executive 
remuneration should be strongly linked to the performance of the company.  The fact 
that five consultants did not regard company performance as an important factor in 
selecting comparator companies for executive remuneration benchmarking indicates 
that executive remuneration is not determined in accordance with the 
recommendations of the UKCGC. The UKCGC recommends that all listed companies 
must comply with its recommendations or explain in situation where they failed to.
644
 
However, none of the twenty-five companies considered in this study disclosed or 
explained the fact that company performance was not considered in the benchmarking 
of executive remuneration likely because they are not aware of the factors that the 
RCONs adopted in selecting the comparator companies. This apparent lack of 
considering company performance in executive remuneration benchmarking could be 
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one of the reasons why past studies have failed to find a strong correlation between 
executive remuneration and company performance. 
Role of the executive 
The executives of a large company have different roles to play in the success of the 
company. These include: CEO who puts together resources to support the company 
and take the company’s product to market for consumers; the general manager who 
makes sure that the company’s operations flow smoothly and economically; the 
marketing manager who markets the products of the company, chief financial 
controller who deals with banking issues of the company; just to name a few. This 
means that different executives would be paid differently from others depending on 
their job role. In general the CEOs of companies are paid more than the rest of the 
executives of that company. The role and responsibility of the executive in the 
company was identified by one respondent as another secondary factor considered 
when selecting comparator companies for executive remuneration benchmarking.  
 Another important factor which we take into consideration but which is 
secondary is to match the role of the executives (Consultant 1) 
This respondent added that where the role of the executives in the focus company and 
the comparator company are not the same, the size of the company will be considered. 
Also, that matching the role could be achieved by considering the job description of 
the executives. 
Matching the role on a like-for-like basis is important in benchmarking. This 
can be done sometimes with the brief role description...[where the roles are not 
similar] we look at the size of the division as an indicator of the size of the job. 
(Consultant 1) 
This therefore indicates that the respondents who do not consider the role of the 
executive as important would benchmark executive pay with others irrespective of the 
job role. This could potentially drive-up executive pay where for instance a 
production manager’s pay is compared with a CEO’s pay. 
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Company policy 
Company remuneration policy was another secondary factor identified by five 
respondents as important in selecting comparator companies. One respondent 
emphasized more on the importance of company policy as a factor than the rest of the 
respondents as demonstrated in the frequency chart below. 
Figure 10: Frequency chart for company policy as a factor for choosing comparator 
group 
 
Examples include: 
...the important thing here is firstly what the company’s remuneration policy 
is, where the company positions itself in the market (Consultant 1) 
...we would do a desktop review in which we look at the remuneration policy, 
its strategies and, what it says about its development. (Consultant 2) 
The important point that can be drawn from the responses is that the company 
remuneration policy is very important as it will say where the company is position in 
the market, which could either be at the top quartile, median or lower quartile. 
Therefore the RCONs need to know this information to be able to present the 
REMCO with appropriate data and information.  
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We would also interview members of the remuneration committee like the 
chairman to get their opinion...on the policy and the position in the market 
(Consultant 2) 
It follows that selecting a comparator company on the basis of the company’s 
remuneration policy would be the most appropriate factor to consider when 
benchmarking executive remuneration. This is because the company’s remuneration 
policy is considered and voted upon by the shareholders in the annual general 
meeting. This would mean that any benchmarking based on this remuneration policy 
would be within the comfortable zone of the shareholders. 
Company complexity 
From the sample size, three respondents identified complexity as a means of 
determining the company’s size.  
 The important factors to consider are the size, complexity, sector and the 
geography of the company. (Consultant 1) 
...the key factor being the size of the company, complexity, geography and 
sector. (Consultant 2) 
However, one of the respondents said: 
In considering complexity, we look at sectors, that is, companies from similar 
sectors (Consultant 1) 
This could mean that for this consultant company complexity is a more important 
factor considered in benchmarking than company sector. However, degree of 
importance of this factor cannot be verified in this study due to the limited number of 
participants, but a good point for further investigation. This is because company 
sector is used in this case as a means of determining the complexity of the company 
even though, not all businesses in the same sector will have the same degree of 
complexity. Furthermore, another respondent said: 
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...we will also look at international exposure which gives us an idea of the 
complexity (Consultant 2) 
This indicates that there is a clear link between complexity and the geographical 
operations of the business. International exposure of the company is used to determine 
the complexity of the company. Therefore, going by these two respondents, company 
complexity is major key factor over international exposure and company sector. It will 
then depend on the individual consultant which secondary factor they would want to 
use to determine complexity, be it sector or international exposure. After discussing 
the various factors that consultants considered important in selecting comparator 
group, it was then necessary to understand what components of the remuneration 
package the consultants use for benchmarking. 
Question 3: Which elements of the pay package do you consider for benchmarking? 
The element of remuneration package considered in benchmarking executive pay is 
important because of its potential effect on remuneration levels. The executive pay 
package is made up of various components as discussed in chapter 2. The variable pay 
of the remuneration package depends on the performance of the company and will 
vary between executives and companies. Consequently, total remuneration or variable 
pay components could be misleading as the performance of the executives and their 
company might not be the same. However, benchmarking executive remuneration 
considering only the fixed elements of the pay package (base salary and benefit) could 
potentially provide appropriate comparisons of executive pay without necessarily 
driving up executive pay levels. This is because these elements of the remuneration 
package are set on the basis of the executive’s experience and skills in the job, his 
responsibilities in the company and the size of the company. 
Figure 11: Frequency chart for remuneration elements considered in benchmarking 
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Two respondents (consultants 2 and 3) said they would benchmark considering only 
the total remuneration package. Quoted companies are required to disclose the 
remuneration of each named executive in a single figure table.
645
 It therefore means 
that this single figure which represents the executive’s remuneration would be 
considered for benchmarking irrespective of how the figure was realised which could 
be misleading and potentially driving executive pay levels up.  
 ...you can benchmark across sectors because if you are benchmarking total 
remuneration of FTSE 100 companies, there is an argument that they have got 
transferable skills. (Consultant 2) 
When we are undertaking benchmarking, there are two things that we do, 
rather than looking at base pay in isolation (elements of pay), we prefer to look 
at total remuneration. (Consultant 5) 
One respondent said they would benchmark only on an element-by-element basis. 
This respondent acknowledged that the variable components of the remuneration 
package are not guaranteed and depends on the performance of the executives and the 
company. This implies that the respondent understood the effect of the variable 
elements of the pay package on remuneration levels, consequently limiting its effect 
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by benchmarking on an element-by-element basis, but applying caution on variable 
pay. 
An important point worth noting here is that fact that elements of executive 
remuneration package are made up of fixed components which is the base 
salary, pension and benefits and variable components...The company is not 
guaranteeing those variable components. Thus their future compensation 
would depend on their performance and the performance of the company. 
(Consultant 1) 
Half of the sample size (i.e. three respondents) said they would consider both element-
by-element and total remuneration package as well. For example: 
When we are undertaking benchmarking, there are two things that we do, 
rather than looking at base pay in isolation (elements of pay), we prefer to look 
at total remuneration. Generally, we provide advice to our clients saying what 
the various elements look like and then adding that up. Looking at the element 
in isolation can be misleading as some companies tend to pay high salaries 
because they do not pay pensions and this hints the greatest danger of looking 
at only one element of pay. (Consultant 5) 
We tend to look at it as a total then we look at it as a spilt. We look at it really 
in three ways which includes as salary, cash bonus, and long term incentives. 
Total compensation is the primary comparator and then would say within that 
you may be under market for salary, and under market for long term 
incentives. But total compensation comes first. (Consultant 6) 
The finding demonstrates inconsistencies in the elements of the remuneration package 
considered in benchmarking. Furthermore, the different elements of the remuneration 
package would have a different influence on the pay levels. For example, the variable 
elements of the remuneration package are based on performance conditions. If this 
element is considered when the executives of the comparator company had made huge 
gains, it may cause the executive pay levels of the focus company to increase. The 
danger in this increase is that it may not be linked to company performance. After 
understanding the factors that are considered in selected comparator group and the 
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elements considered in benchmarking, it was important to understand the effect of 
benchmarking on executive remuneration. 
Question 4: What is the effect of benchmarking on executive remuneration? 
At first sight, it seems that executive remuneration benchmarking is a sensible way of 
setting a total value for a remuneration package. Unfortunately over-reliance on 
competitive pay data has resulted in upward spiral in executive remuneration. Five 
respondents said that the act of benchmarking can affect executive remuneration by 
increasing it. Examples include: 
Benchmarking will generally increase executive remuneration because when 
the executives sign their contract, the contract does not normally allow the 
company to reduce the pay and that does create some inherence or resistance 
to downward pay flexibility (Consultant 1) 
The disadvantage of this is that the position of more information is making 
CEOs compare with their peers and for those who are paid less wanting a pay 
increase (Consultant 4) 
The CA 2006 requires quoted companies to disclose in a remuneration report the 
remuneration policy of the company which includes the amount paid to each named 
executive during each financial year. As identified by these two consultants, the 
availability of this pay data therefore potentially has the effect of increasing executive 
pay levels. Executive pay benchmarking could therefore be considered as one of the 
main upward drivers of executive pay. 
On the other hand one respondent said that the act of benchmarking has the effect of 
reducing executive pay.  For example: 
...we belief in the fact that benchmarking can actually help in driving down 
compensation... (Consultant 6) 
This respondent was of the opinion that if the executive remuneration of the focus 
company is more than the comparator companies, then benchmarking can help reduce 
it. This is because when selecting comparator companies, they would avoid 
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remuneration data of a newly hired executive who are generally paid higher to attract 
them to the post. Consequently, avoiding this data will reduce the level of executive 
remuneration from what it would have been if the data of newly hired executives were 
included. Only this respondent raised this point, meaning that ignoring the influence 
of newly hired executive pay data would consequently drive up pay levels 
considerably. This is because as already pointed out by other respondents, 
benchmarking helps to match up executive pay levels as a means of retaining the 
executives in the company. Furthermore, avoiding the data of newly hired executives 
by this consultant would result in the executives of that company having less 
remuneration package than other executives from other companies. This could 
consequently encourage the executive to seek for jobs in other companies that will 
pay better. 
Two respondents, who said that the act of benchmarking can increase pay, also said 
that the act of benchmarking also brings about transparency in the executive 
remuneration setting process. For example: 
What benchmarking does is make the process of executive pay setting more 
systematic, transparent and more scientific relying on proper data which are 
facts... (Consultant 1) 
Benchmarking puts transparency into a more rigorous form...it is the 
company’s policy and transparency that drives increase in executive pay. 
(Consultant 2) 
These two respondents points out the fact that benchmarking brings transparency into 
the executive remuneration process. It seems rather untrue as the finding from this 
study is pointing to the fact that benchmarking practice lacks uniformity. 
Benchmarking seems to be helping executive justify their pay even when not linked to 
the performance of the company. Benchmarking process will bring transparency to 
the pay setting exercise if there are a set of rule or guideline for every RCON to 
follow. The effect of executive benchmarking on executive pay is influenced by the 
nature of advice that the consultants offer to the REMCO. This prompted the next 
question. 
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Question 5: What is the nature of the advice consultants give to remuneration 
committees after benchmarking? 
The nature of advice (objective or subjective) that the consultants give to the REMCO 
is important as it can have a great impact on the executive remuneration determination 
process. The RCONs are considered to be independent from the company they are 
advising and consequently are expected to provide the REMCO with objective advice 
on executive remuneration benchmarking.  Murphy and Sandino
646
 argues that 
RCON’s potential conflict of interest could result in the RCONs providing subjective 
advise to the REMCO as they seek to retain the other services that they provide to the 
company. All the respondents talked about the type of advice they offer to the 
REMCO in line with their independence from the company that they advise. The 
frequency table and graph below shows how often each of the respondents talked 
about how they advise the REMCO.  
Figure 12: Frequency chart for impartial advice by the RCON 
 
From the frequency chart above, one respondent emphasised more their independence 
and the impartiality of their advice to the REMCO. Examples of nature of advice 
include: 
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...we are very careful to ensure that the advice we give is impartial and 
independent (Consultant 1) 
We provide a fair third party advice... (Consultant 6) 
In my experience, remuneration consultants do provide independent robust 
advice... (Consultant 3) 
However some responses start by making reference to the RCON Code. For example: 
The Remuneration Consultant Code say people must give best advice as they 
see it and behave with integrity at all times... well, totally unbiased... 
(Consultant 5) 
We have a code of conduct (The Remuneration Consultants Code of Conduct) 
that we are signatories to and it requires us to give impartial advice... I am not 
saying that some consultants’ advice is not subjective and have not followed 
the impartiality requirement strictly enough (Consultant 1) 
The RCON’s independence from the company they are advising can impact on the 
nature of advice that they offer to the REMCO as discussed above. This could also 
mean that if the RCON is not independent from the company they are advising, that 
might cause them not to offer objective advice. For example: 
I believe consultants are generally independent... if a consultant has only one 
client then he will not be independent because his entire income would depend 
on that company... having a balance of portfolios of companies is so important 
when it comes to the independence of the consultant (Consultant 2) 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, companies sought out various services from these 
consultancy firms which include benchmarking services. These consultancy firms are 
paid depending on the services that they are offering to the company. Like any other 
business relationship, if the company is not satisfy with any service that the 
consultancy firm is offering, they will end the contract and get a different consultancy 
firm to offer the required services. RCONs as pointed out by consultant 1 and 2, 
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might offer subjective advice to the REMCO in order to keep their contract of other 
services that they offer to the company.  
One other interesting factor that cropped up in one of the transcripts was on the 
character of the RCON. One of the consultants responding to the question on nature 
of advice said: 
Trying to impress the executives to get work is not my experience. I think 
there is slightly more subtle question to ask if a remuneration consultant have 
sufficient strength of character and is he prepared to stand up to confrontation 
because executives are by and large, have strong characters and whether the 
consultant is ready to advise on small pay knowing that they are making the 
executives feel bad (Consultant 5) 
This could therefore mean that, some RCONs would provide advice that would 
increase executive pay simply because they are afraid of a possible outrage from the 
executives. This outrage could be manifested in the form of terminating the 
consultant’s business dealings with the company. Therefore, the consultant’s effort to 
minimise a possible outrage from the executive could encourage them to provide 
advice to the REMCO that is subjective in nature. Executive pay has been a hot issue 
in the UK since the early 1990s and the government are still in the process of finding 
appropriate regulatory methods. Benchmarking being one of the key drivers of 
executive pay, the process of benchmarking is required to be systematic and 
transparent and not dependent on emotions. 
Conclusion 
The REMCO is a subcommittee of the board in charge of determining remuneration 
packages of executives of the company as recommended by the UKCGC. It has great 
potentials to restrain excessive remuneration packages, but due to its lack of 
independence from the board, most past studies suggest that they are ineffective in 
restraining excessive executive pay. They rely on information from various sources to 
enable them make informed judgement in the determination of executive 
remuneration. They rely on RCONs to advise them on executive remuneration 
benchmarking. Executive benchmarking is an important exercise in the process of 
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determining executive remuneration. It has also been identified as one of the key 
drivers of executive remuneration. However, with seemingly no best practice on the 
subject it is difficult to say how the process is carried out, what factors are used and 
why those factors are used. The interview findings have revealed that various 
consultants consider different elements for different reasons when benchmarking 
executive remuneration. Although, it has been identified from the data that the factors 
considered may include company size, company sector, company complexity, 
company’s geographical operations, the role of the executive and the company’s 
policy, it all depends on the individual consultant. The interview population was not 
large enough to enable the researcher draw any conclusions as most commonly used 
factors and why which is the biggest limitation to this work. This work is 
recommended to be used as a basis for further research in this area to determine the 
factors considered in benchmarking. 
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Chapter 5: Pay for Performance 
Introduction  
The UKCGC 2012, principle D.1 recommends that a significant proportion of 
executive directors’ remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to 
corporate and individual performance. Performance-based pay is regarded as the 
process of providing a financial reward to an individual which is linked directly to 
individual, group or organisational performance.
647
 It is a reward given to specific 
employees for their discretionary and special contribution towards the achievement of 
assigned individual and company goals. Over the last two decades, the use of 
performance-related components has increased dramatically. Consequently, executive 
remuneration packages have seen a decrease in the fixed cash pay components (base 
salary and benefits) and an increase in the performance related part of the package. 
Beginning from the mid-90s executive pay has witnessed a decline in the use of share 
options as the main performance related scheme and an increase in use of long term 
incentive plan schemes. This has made performance a principal determinant of 
executive remuneration. Companies use performance related pay to motivate their 
executives and to align the interest of the executives with those of the shareholders.
648
 
Executive performance influences company performance and shareholder value. 
Therefore, the desired result of the performance related pay is to achieve the 
company’s set goals. 
This chapter aims to investigate the compliance of companies with this 
recommendation by investigating the link between executive and CEO remuneration 
with company performance; the link between executive and CEO remuneration with 
company size; and finally the link between company size and company performance. 
The following sections will look at the existing literature on the topic, the rationale for 
pay for performance, the methods used in this study, and the results and conclusion. 
The rationale for pay-for-performance 
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Principle D.1 of the UKCGC states that ‘[a] significant proportion of executive 
directors pay should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual 
performance.’649 This means that some of the pay executives will receive should be 
dependent on their performance both at individual and corporate level. As discussed 
in chapter 1, an executive’s pay package is made up of different components which 
include base salary, benefits, annual bonuses (that could be tied to some financial 
performance of the company) and variable pay (e.g. share options, long term incentive 
plans). One of the reasons for linking executive pay to performance is rooted in 
agency theory. Agency theory identifies the relationship where one party (the 
principal) delegates responsibilities to another party (the agent) to perform some 
services on their behalf. Some of these responsibilities involve delegating decision 
making authority to the agent.
650
 This definition suggests that executives are agents 
and shareholders are the principals. This is because the shareholders have entrusted 
the running and management of their investments in the hands of the executives and 
their pay is structured as to link pay to individual and corporate performance as 
recommended by the UKCGC.  However, under the CA 2006, the company is a 
separate legal entity and thus it is the principal (not the shareholders), with the 
executives being agents of the company. The agent’s principal duty is to act in the 
interest of his principal, with the divergence of interest between principal and agent 
known as the agency cost. This divergence in interest can be limited by establishing 
appropriate incentives for agents and by monitoring the executives.
651
 Linking pay to 
performance is a means of aligning the interest of the executives to that of the 
company
652
 and thereby should reduce agency costs.
653
 The executives are expected to 
perform in the best of their ability in order to earn their reward whilst maximising 
profits for the company. The separation of ownership and control which involves 
placing the management of the company under the responsibility of the executives has 
the potential to increase agency cost.
654
 Consequently, performance related pay is 
being used as a motivational factor for the executives to act in a way that will promote 
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the success of the company for the benefit of its members. An example of this scheme 
is when an executive is promised a number of shares in the company if the company 
share price increases. The executive in his effort to acquire shares in the company will 
work hard towards making decisions that will result in an increase in the company’s 
share price. Therefore in this case, the promised shares act as a motivating factor for 
the executive to promote the success of the company by making decisions that will go 
to increase the share price of the company.  
Executives are believed to perform to the best of their ability and have a greater 
chance at succeeding if they have some motivation in place
655
 (e.g. the company can 
motivate the executives to perform better by promising them shares in the company or 
a percentage rise in their salary if the company makes more profit). Motivation is 
defined as the psychological forces that determine the direction of a person’s 
behaviour in an organisation, a person’s level of effort and a person’s level of 
persistence.
656
 Motivation can be intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic motivation refers to 
motivation that comes from inside an individual, for example the pleasure one gets 
from the task itself or from the sense of satisfaction in completing or even working on 
a task.
657
 Extrinsic motivation refers to motivation that comes from outside an 
individual.  
In relation to performance-related pay, the motivating factors are external, in this 
study the external factor being the reward either in cash or in shares that the 
executives receive. Performance related pay serves as an extrinsic motivation for 
executives to act in a way that will promote the success of the company and benefit its 
members. Extrinsic motivation has been proven by various theories of motivation
658
 
to be driving employees to the attainment of higher performance levels and corporate 
goals.  
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implementing extrinsic motivation by using performance related pay as the motivating 
factor executives may be encouraged to work hard towards achieving the company’s 
goals and consequently maximising shareholder value, and in return to get their 
reward. This is based on the fact that motivation influences performance. 
Furthermore, companies use performance related pay because it is a current market 
practice in which other companies are actively involved. By so doing they remain 
competitive and are seen as legitimate in the eyes of their stakeholders, and 
consequently gaining support from the stakeholders.
659
 Also, performance related pay 
makes it possible to recognise and reward performance. This is when executives take 
difficult and risky decisions in a situation they would rather have abandoned it and 
succeeds.
660
 Recognition is a vital aspect of motivation and linking pay to 
performance is an important motivational tool for executives.
661
 
Performance related pay helps in the recruitment of executives, as top performing 
executives would consider performance-related pay as valuable, attractive and as a 
chance to prove their capability. Performance related pay helps the company to 
identify the executives who could consistently deliver satisfactory performance in the 
most cost-effective manner.
662
 It is a major tool to differentiate between the 
performers and the non-performers. Otherwise, the performers will lose their 
commitment, effort and dedication towards the company’s goals if their performance 
is not recognised.  
However, some past studies have shown that extrinsic rewards can damage the 
intrinsic job interest of the executives.
663
 That is, executives lose focus on the needs of 
the job at hand as there are being distracted by the promised rewards.
664
 For example, 
the executive has the responsibility of promoting the success of the company most 
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preferably with long-term consequences, the executive might decide to make decision 
that yield desired results and earn him the promised reward. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that performance related pay works more in creating a temporary compliance 
than a sustained improvement for the company.
665
  Individual executives could 
struggle to meet a target alone for the reward promised when the target is meant for a 
team work.
666
 The risk associated with performance related pay is that it might lead to 
short-termism when what is desired by most companies is a longer-term 
perspective.
667
 Short-termism is a situation in which company display a preference for 
business strategies that generates an early pay-off relative to strategies that would 
have added much more value, but at a significantly later time.
668
 Performance-related 
pay encourages short-termism when payments on performance-related incentives such 
as long-term incentive plans and share options are linked to short term performance 
(e.g. three to twelve months). Another driver of short-termism in companies is the 
investors’ attitude. For example, institutional investors and managers of investments 
funds are preoccupied with short term earnings of the companies in their portfolios 
rather than the long-term indicators which are desirable for the companies. These 
investors put significant pressure on corporate bodies and executives to deliver short-
term gains in stock price consequently, making short-term behaviour inevitable.
669
 
Executive performance cannot be fully measured because the actions and strategies 
implemented by the executives are not directly observable. The results of their actions 
and decisions are sometimes influenced by events that are beyond the executive’s 
control, for example, economic recession.
670
 At such a time the company profitability 
might drop or remain the same which does not necessarily mean that the executives 
are not performing well. Linking pay to performance can give rise to dysfunctional 
behavioural responses where directors pay attention only to those aspects of 
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performance that are rewarded.
671
 The structure of the incentive scheme is very 
important because incentives that are intended to achieve a particular outcome could 
have potentially harmful unintended consequences if inadequately designed. Different 
forms of incentive-based pay come with different levels of risk and uncertainty for 
which the remuneration committee have to consider when setting the targets.  
One of the challenges faced by linking pay to performance is the difficulty in 
selecting appropriate performance measures.
672
 Performance can be measured in 
many different ways, yielding different results and conclusions.
673
 The challenge is 
more difficult if performance measures chosen are subject to volatility of share 
price/market or if there is limited correlation between different performance 
measures.
674
 Performance can only be adequately rewarded if measured in a 
consistent manner with clear objective and verifiable measures. Performance 
measures cannot be effectively set because performance cannot be known perfectly 
until after the task is completed. This is because some of the performances are not 
observable or measurable either quantitatively or qualitatively.
675
 Thus performance 
measures will always be imperfect representations of actual performance. It is also not 
all aspects of managerial performance that can be measured. The next section below 
will discuss performance target and performance measure. 
Literature review 
This section will provide a brief account of the existing literature on pay for 
performance in the UK. Past studies on this area in the UK have yielded inconsistent 
results due to different and ambiguous remuneration measures adopted by the 
researchers. This section intends to point out what studies that have been done on the 
topic, their findings, their limitations and the reason why this study is important. Over 
the past two decades linking executive pay to performance has become a growing 
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practice amongst companies due to the perceived lack of link between executive pay 
and company performance. This area of study has witnessed large amount of literature 
in the United States, but with limited literature in the United Kingdom. Studies on 
pay-for-performance beginning with the work done by Jensen and Murphy
676
 found 
that there was a very weak relationship between CEO pay (using the cash component 
of the remuneration package) and company performance (using shareholder wealth 
also known as shareholder return as the performance measure). Gregg et al
677
 studied 
300 large UK companies over the 1980s and early 1990s and found out that growth of 
directors' remuneration was very high over this time period but very weakly linked to 
corporate performance.
678
 Furthermore, they also found out that pay-performance 
relationship had weakened between the periods 1983-1991.
679
 
Early studies on pay for performance in the UK mainly focussed on the cash elements 
of compensation (i.e. salary and bonus), largely because at the time only the cash 
elements were disclosed in the annual report and accounts. This made it difficult for 
early researchers to obtain remuneration figures for share options and long-term 
incentive schemes; they relied on cash measurement of remuneration which took no 
account of long term incentive plans and share options. Excluding an estimation of 
these additional components underestimated the actual level of pay and could lead to 
an inaccurate result in the estimation of the levels of executive pay and company 
performance.
680
 It was not until 1997 when disclosure rules prompted by the 
Greenbury Report 1995 came into effect recommending the detailed disclosure of 
each director’s remuneration which included base salary, benefits, annual bonuses, 
share options and long-term incentive schemes pay.
681
 Main et al
682
 was one of the 
first studies to be completed in the UK that incorporated the values of executive 
option grants. They found out that there was a significant variation in total pay but 
that this was weakly related to changes in shareholder return. Total shareholder return 
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(TSR) is the total return on investment achieved for shareholders during the review 
period.
683
 They also found out that the inclusion of share option value increased the 
pay-performance elasticity (this refers to the degree to which executive remuneration 
changes in levels in response to change in company performance) for total board 
remuneration but reduced for the highest paid director. This indicated that the pay of 
other executives of the company was more tied to company performance than the pay 
of the highest paid director. Conyon and Murphy
684
 on the other hand, shifted from 
looking at stock options and used performance based incentives such as long-term 
incentive plans to analyse the difference in CEO pay and incentives in the US and the 
UK for the year 1997 and using shareholder wealth as the measure for company 
performance. Their study found out that pay-performance elasticity of the largest 510 
companies of FTSE All Share index was just 0.12 meaning that the relationship 
between pay and performance was weak because for every ten percent increase in 
executive pay there is only a corresponding 0.12 percent increase in company 
performance. Their findings also showed that after controlling for the determinants of 
CEO pay, CEO pay in the US was 200% higher than the CEO pay in the UK on their 
sample for the fiscal year 1997. Although, their findings highlighted the fact that 
executives in the US are paid more than the executives in the UK, the important fact 
still remains that on either sides of the country the link between executive pay and 
company performance was weak. However, the study was limited to the fact that only 
one year’s data was analysed. Buck et al685 argued that the inclusion of long-term 
incentive plans is essential when determining the link between pay and performance, 
but recognised that by including long-term incentive plans and share options, the pay-
performance relationship will be strengthened. This is because long term incentive 
plans and share options are performance related and would give a better link between 
pay and performance than cash pay. Cash pay includes base salary and benefits which 
are not performance contingent. Gregg
686
 et al in 2005 using cash compensation (this 
includes base salary plus annual bonus) as the main performance measure examined 
the relationship between executive pay and company’s performance for a sample of 
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large UK companies over the period 1994-2002. They showed a weak link between 
CEO pay and firm performance using total shareholder return as the main 
performance measure. Other performance measures that the study used included 
earnings per share, return on assets and growth in sales, but their results do not 
specifically point out to what was the result for each of these performance measures. 
The study also found out that the link between pay and performance was high when 
stock returns were relative high, but that pay was less sensitive to performance when 
the stock returns were low. This suggests that the executive pay increase was linked 
only to stock price cycles and not to the performance of the company. This suggested 
that over the period 1994-2002 and across companies, executive pay continued to 
increase irrespective of whether the company was profitable or not, implying that 
during that period executive pay had little or no relationship with company 
performance. Their study indicated that the relationship between pay and performance 
appeared to have become stronger after the stock market crash of March 2000. The 
study showed that executive pay rose greatly between the period of 1994-2002 but 
with little relationship between pay and performance. It was also found out that the 
link between pay and performance for cash remuneration varies across companies, 
industries, company size and board size. This finding indicates that individual and 
corporate performance are not the only elements that effect levels of executive pay as 
other factors such as company size, board size, industry also have an effect on the 
levels of executive pay.  
Gregg et al
687
 examined individual pay-performance sensitivity in and across 
companies as opposed to an average across all companies and found out that pay 
varied across directors and companies due to different company strategies and 
policies. Their findings suggested that there was a weak relationship between CEO 
total pay and company performance using total shareholder return, earnings per share 
and sales revenue as the performance measures. Furthermore, they noticed companies 
with stronger corporate governance structures (such as more NEDs on their board) 
had high pay-performance sensitivity (i.e. pay being more closely related to 
performance) with board pay and not with the highest paid director.  A study by 
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Girma et al
688
 studying 992 companies over the periods 1981-1996 using cash 
components and ignoring equity-based components, found out that the relationship 
between pay and performance (using profit and sales as their performance measure) 
remained weak. One possible weakness of this study as with many others
689
 is the use 
of cash compensation as the main measure of executive compensation ignoring 
equity-based components of compensation package.
690
 Eichholtz et al’s study691 
suggested weak evidence of pay-for-performance (using total shareholder return, 
earnings per share and market value as their performance measure) sensitivity using 
both cash and long-term components of remuneration package. Ozkan
692
 examining 
the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the level of CEO pay on a 
sample of 414 UK companies for the year 2003, found that there was no significant 
relationship between company performance (using stock return and return on asset as 
their performance measure) and CEO pay for period 2003/2004. Although, this study 
included the cash components and equity-based components of compensation, its 
major limitation was that the data was just for a year and limited to CEO pay and 
cannot be used conclusively to judge what happens over the years. Ozkan
693
 based on 
hand collected data set from 390 non-financial sector UK companies over the period 
1999-2005 found that there was a positive significant relationship between company 
performance (using stock return and return on asset as their performance measure) 
and CEO cash pay but with a positive weak relationship with CEO total pay. The 
findings also indicated that the average pay-performance elasticity was 0.075 for CEO 
cash compensation, meaning that for every ten percent increase in CEO cash 
remuneration there was only a corresponding 0.075 percent in total shareholder return 
indicating a weak relationship between pay and performance.
694
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Dever et al.
695
 and Farmer
696
 examining the existing literature on pay for performance 
in the UK are of the opinion that there is no consistency in the results so far due to the 
different measures and ambiguous remuneration measures adopted by the researcher. 
In all fairness to the researchers, companies use these ambiguous performance 
measures to determine pay, which makes it difficult for the researchers. They 
recommended a more theoretical guidance in future research on the subject in 
particular with the choice of performance measures, timeframes, samples, methods 
and variables.  
Consequently the aim of this study is to shed new light on the link between 
executive/CEO remuneration and company performance for UK companies. In this 
study, both cash and equity-based components of executive/ CEO remuneration 
packages for a number of large UK companies for the period 1996-2011
697
 will be 
analysed. The relationship of cash pay (which will include base salary and benefits), 
and performance related pay (which will include annual bonuses, LTIPs and share 
options) of both executive and CEO remuneration and company performance will be 
established. Other factors considered by past studies include the effect of firm size on 
executive pay.
698
 Firm size has been proven by past research (and as also discussed in 
chapter 4) as an important determinant of the level of executive remuneration as 
executive pay tends to increase with firm size.
699
 The size of the firm affects all the 
components of executive pay. Eichholtz et al’s700 findings showed that executive 
shareholdings provide a stronger link between pay and performance. Their findings 
also indicated that company size was the most important variable for the 
determination of pay levels in large UK companies. The literature discussed above 
overwhelmingly indicates that the link between pay and performance is weak even 
though very few found a significant link. The hypothesis is formulated what is 
expected of a ‘desirable’ executive remuneration package as:  
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H1: It is hypothesised that there is a significant positive relationship between 
executive/CEO remuneration and company performance. 
H2: It is hypothesised that there is a significant positive relationship between 
executive/CEO remuneration and company size. 
H3: It is hypothesised that there is a significant positive relationship between 
company size and company performance. 
Before testing the validity of these hypotheses, performance targets and performance 
measures will be explained. 
Performance targets and performance measures 
It is important to discuss performance targets and performance measure because of its 
wide use in determination and measurement of performance-related pay. Performance 
targets are defined as ‘the objects or aims of managerial action or as borderlines that 
differentiate success from failure’.701 For example, the performance targets for Severn 
Trent plc for 2011 were as follows: 
Table 7: Performance target for Severn Trent plc 2011 
 
Source: Severn Trent plc Annual Reports and Accounts 2011, pg 48 
For performance targets to be effective, they must be perceived as being reliable, fair, 
achievable, agreed, and understood by the executives.
702
  Performance targets need to 
be reviewed periodically to take into account the environmental and competitive 
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nature of the market. The effectiveness of performance targets can be compromised if 
mainly based on past performance as it could sometimes result in making the targets 
even harder each time. If targets are perceived to be too high, it de-motivates the 
executives leading to non-achievement and, if perceived to be too low it can result in 
payment for poor performance.  
Performance measures are used to assess the success of companies. Selecting the 
appropriate measures that will take into account the environmental and competitive 
nature of the market is an important decision the remuneration committee must make. 
It must be informative to help the company determine whether the targets were met or 
not. It is based on this information that any rewards can be made to the executives. 
Performance measures need to be perceived as objective and relatively small (e.g. one 
or two measures) as to keep the executives focused. This is because some companies 
use too many performance measures (to guide against external factors like economy 
that may affect some of the performance measures) making it difficult to understand 
what the priorities are and where attention should be focused. For example, in 2011 J 
Sainsbury plc had seven performance measures (earnings per share, profit, sales, 
return on capital employed, cash flow, total shareholder return and market share).
703
 
However, the report did not specify which of them was of prime importance leaving 
the executives with the struggle of which to focus on more. The report stated that 
‘share-based awards will be made to participants subject to performance against a 
basket of key strategic measures...’ the word ‘basket’ in the sentence means many 
performance measures and it would be difficult for the executives to remain focused 
with many performance measures. The logical reasoning for having a basket of 
indicators is to prevent the indicators from being effected by external forces (e.g. the 
economy) or easily manipulated by the executives. Performance measures can be 
financial or non-financial. Financial performance measures include profitability (e.g. 
return on equity, return on assets, return on capital employed etc.), liquidity, gearing 
ratios, other investor ratios (for example earnings per share) and shareholder values 
(for example total shareholder return). Non-financial measures include the number of 
employees and the number of products. 
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Furthermore, financial performance measures can also be classified as accounting 
related performance measures. It aims at maximising shareholder wealth which is the 
main objective of the company. Shareholders are generally concerned about their 
present and future earnings, dividends and the risk of their investment in the company 
– all of which are driven by financial measures. It also causes management to focus 
on short term results rather than long term growth in order to increase their 
remuneration in the short term.
704
 Focusing on short term investment may inhibit 
investment in research and development, which is important for the future growth of 
the company in certain sectors (e.g. the pharmaceutical sector).
705
 Most companies are 
linked to short-term financial measures of corporate performance such as earnings per 
share and share price movement. This encourages executives to focus on short 
termism and the need for quick returns, and thus companies failing to link 
performance to the long term success of the company.
706
 Also, investors, business and 
related press tend to focus on share price as an indicator of the success or failure of 
the company thus building pressure on the executives which then encourages 
executives to focus on short-term success of the company. According to the 
Companies Act 2006
707
 requires the long-term success of the company is a factor that 
must be taken into account when promoting the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members, which implies that in all decision making, the directors should 
consider its long-term consequence a priority. Non-financial measures are considered 
to be more long term focus and reflect on different dimension of managerial 
performance.
708
 The UKCGC recommends that executive remuneration should be 
related to individual and company performance. However, the Code does not 
recommend which performance measure(s) companies should use. The Large and 
Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008
709
 
requires quoted companies to explain the performance conditions, how they are being 
assessed and why those performance conditions and measures were chosen in relation 
                                                          
704
 SLC Tan and CM Lau, ‘The Impact of Performance Measures on Employee Fairness Perceptions, 
Job Satisfaction and Organisational Commitment’ (2012) 10 JAMAR 57, 57. 
705
 Pim Van Gijsel ‘The Importance of Non-Financial Performance Measures During the Economic 
Crisis’ (2012) Master Thesis http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=127357 assessed 7 October 2013. 
706
 ‘British Business at risk unless executive rewards linked to long term performance’ (2013) High Pay 
Centre January 14
th
. 
707
 Companies Act 2006, s 172. 
708
 SLC Tan and CM Lau, ‘The Impact of Performance Measures on Employee Fairness Perceptions, 
Job Satisfaction and Organisational Commitment’ (2012) 10 JAMAR 57, 57. 
709
 The Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008, 
Sch. 8, part 2, reg. 3(2). 
177 
 
to executive’s share options or long term scheme entitlement. The REMCO are 
required to include in their remuneration report a graph of total shareholder return 
(TSR) of the company with those of its peers.
710
 It could be deduced from this 
provision of the law that total shareholder return is therefore an important 
performance measure that companies should adopt in assessing performance 
conditions. The CA 2006
711
 states that the business review must use financial KPIs 
and, where appropriate, other measures such as environmental or employee matters. 
The Act provided the meaning of key performance indicator as factors by reference to 
which the company’s performance can be measured effectively. The law does not go 
further to state which performance measures companies should adopt. For the 
purposes of this chapter, all of the financial performance measures used by the 
nineteen companies under study will be discussed, beginning with return on assets 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
ROA is a financial performance measure which takes into account assets used to 
support the business activities of the company. It shows the percentage of profit that a 
company earns in relation to its overall resources (total assets).
712
 This value can be 
calculated by dividing a company's net income or annual income by its total assets, 
and is displayed as a percentage. For example, Morrisons plc for the year 2011 had an 
annual net income of £658 million, and total assets of £5,420 million. Therefore its 
ROA will be: 
ROA = annual net income/total assets 
ROA for Morrison 2011 =  
                 
                                  
 x 100 
658m/5420m x 100%  
   
          
 x 100 
  ROA = 7.19% 
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Annual net income is the profit that the company makes once interest, taxes and other 
expenses are deducted. Total assets are anything tangible or intangible owned by the 
company that has economic value. All these figures can be obtained from the 
company’s income statement and balance sheet of the annual report and financial 
statement of the company.  
Unlike other profitability ratios, such as return on equity (discussed next), ROA 
measurements include all of a business’s assets. This includes assets which arise out 
of liabilities to creditors as well capital paid in by investors. ROA is usually of less 
interest to shareholders than some other financial ratios such as shareholder return 
because shareholders are more interested in the return they receive on their 
investment. This makes ROA more important to the management than the 
shareholders. ROA is used internally by companies to track asset-use over time, to 
monitor the company's performance in light of industry performance, and to look at 
different operations or divisions by comparing them one to the other. ROA can signal 
both effective uses of assets as well as under-capitalization.
713
 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
Return on equity (ROE) is another profitability performance measure which assesses 
the rate of return on the ownership interest or shareholders' equity of the common 
stock. It is a measure that shows how much profit a company has made from the 
money shareholders invested in the company.
714
 ROE focuses on return to the 
shareholders and the company. It is commonly used as a target for executive 
compensation because it gives management an incentive to perform better. For 
example, the net income of Tesco plc for the year 2011 was £1,870 million, non-
current assets of £35,337 million and current assets of £11,438 million. ROE can be 
calculated using the formula below: 
 ROE = net income/ book value of shareholders’ equity x 100% 
  ROE = 
    
           
 x 100 
                                                          
713
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  ROE = 3.99% 
Net income as discussed above can be obtained from the company’s income statement 
contained in the annual report and financial statement of the company. The book 
value of shareholders’ equity represents the actual worth of the company which will 
be the total assets of the company minus any debt owed by the company. However, 
ROE is sensitive to leverage.
715
 Leverage
716
 is the ratio of the company’s debt to the 
value of its ordinary shares. The greater the ratio of the company’s debt to the value of 
its ordinary shares, the smaller the value of ROE, consequently creating more risk for 
the company in hard economic times.  This simply means that the more a company is 
in debt, the less profit it makes. ROE and total shareholder return (discussed next) 
align shareholder interest with company performance better than most other 
indicators. ROE depends on net income that does vary and could be affected by 
accounting practices. As a result ROE alone cannot be used to judge the performance 
of a company, but it can be used in conjunction with other measures to do so. 
Total Shareholder Return (TSR) 
TSR is the total return on investment achieved for shareholders during the review 
period.
717
 This is the net stock price change plus the dividends paid during a particular 
period. It measures share price growth and dividends. Stock price represents the cost 
of one share of the company. For example if Sainsbury plc wants to calculate TSR for 
the year 2011, the stock price at start of period would be the price that one share in the 
company costs at the beginning of January 2011. The stock price at the end of period 
would be the price that one share in the company cost at the end of December 2011. 
The dividends paid would be the dividend that the company has paid to one 
shareholder during that year. TSR can be calculated using the formula below: 
Total shareholder return = (stock price at end of period − Stock price at start of 
period                    + dividends paid) ÷ stock price at start of period 
                                                          
715
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TSR for Sainsbury 2011 = (3.51 – 3.32 + 0.15) ÷ 3.32 
TSR = 0.10 
TSR aligns the interest of executives and shareholders by linking reward to returns 
shareholders make on their investment in the company.
718
 TSR represents a readily 
understood figure of the overall financial benefits generated for shareholders. Most 
investors in a company prefer TSR because indicates the profits that shareholders 
have made on their investment in a company at a particular period. The figure can be 
interpreted as a measure of how the market evaluates the overall performance of a 
company over a specified period. Given that TSR is expressed in percentage terms, 
the figures are readily comparable between companies in the same sector. Quoted 
companies are required to include in remuneration report a graph of TSR of the 
company with those of its peers. Most companies are therefore using TSR for 
comparing company performance and ranking.
719
 For this reason shareholders and 
investors want executives to only be fully rewarded for their performance if they 
achieve at least 75-100% of their target (upper quartile) or partially rewarded if they 
achieved at least 50% of their target (median quartile). 
However, TSR targets need to be supported by secondary targets (e.g. ROA targets) 
which will be company specific because TSR is market driven. TSR reflects the past 
overall return to shareholders, with no consideration of future returns. TSR is 
externally focused in that it reflects the market’s perception of performance. It could, 
therefore, be adversely impacted should a share price of a fundamentally strong 
company suffer excessively in the short term. For example, if company A’s share 
price at the start of the period is £3.50, its share price at the end of the period is £2, 
and there is a dividend of £0.15 per share. This shows that the share price has dropped 
by £1.50, consequently its TSR will be -0.1. Therefore, it can be hard getting an 
appropriate comparator group for a company using TSR as it will depend on the share 
price at the particular time.
720
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Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
EPS is earnings available to the shareholder (excluding preference shareholders as 
they often receive fixed dividend amounts) divided by the number of ordinary shares 
outstanding (this represents the shares of the company that has been issued and are in 
the hands of the public).
721
 The values for EPS are usually disclosed in the profit and 
loss accounts of the company. EPS can be basic or diluted. Basic EPS is the total 
earnings per share based on the number of shares outstanding at the time,
722
 whereas 
diluted EPS represents the earnings per share a business would have generated 
considering all dilutive securities (e.g. share options and convertible debt). For 
example, company A has 200 outstanding common shares for 9 months and 240 
outstanding common shares for 3 months. The weights of 9 months and 3 months 
would be 0.75 and 0.25 respectively. These figures (0.75 and 0.25) represent 3/4 of a 
year and 1/4 of a year. Therefore to obtain the diluted EPS for this company, it would 
be 0.75(200) + 0.25(240), which would equal a weighted average of 210 common 
shares for the entire year. It is the universally accepted and most crucial measurement 
and indicator of financial performance of a company as EPS normally drives the share 
price (the higher the EPS of a company the higher its share price).
723
 Growth in EPS 
is an important measure of management performance as it shows how much money 
the company is making for its shareholders although it is usually an annual 
measurement, thus encouraging short-termism.
724
 It is a measure that executives can 
easily relate to and directly influenced by the performance of the management. 
EPS says very little about long term issues of the company meanwhile long term 
sustainability of earnings is a key issue for shareholders.
725
 Setting company specific 
performance targets based purely on EPS can be difficult considering that executives 
are rewarded according to their company and not their peers. Investors fear that EPS 
is open to manipulation by the executives as they can be distorted by mergers and 
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acquisitions and, can also be affected by changes in company’s accounting policy. For 
example, The US company Diamond Food’s then-chief financial officer fraudulently 
underreported money paid to walnut growers by delaying the recording of payments 
into later fiscal periods.  By manipulating walnut costs, Diamond correspondingly 
reported higher net income and inflated earnings to exceed analysts’ estimates for 
fiscal quarters in 2010 and 2011.  After Diamond restated its financial results in 
November 2012 to reflect the true costs of acquiring walnuts, the company’s stock 
price slid to just $17 per share from a high of $90 per share in 2011. Former CEO 
Michael Mendes should have known that Diamond’s reported walnut costs were 
incorrect at the time he certified the company’s financial statements.  Diamond Foods 
misled investors to believe that the company was consistently beating earnings 
estimates on Wall Street.
726
 This example shows how the executives can manipulate 
EPS, therefore indicating that EPS might not be a good variable for measuring 
company performance. 
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) 
ROCE indicates what profits the company has made on the resources available to it. It 
is the ratio of net operating profit of a company to its capital employed and it 
measures the profitability of a company.
727
  For example, WM Morrisons plc for the 
year 2011, current assets was £1,138 million, non-current assets was £8,011 million, 
and operating profit was £904 million. ROCE is calculated using this formula: 
ROCE (%) = operating profit/capital employed x 100 
ROCE for Morrisons = 
   
         
 x 100 
 ROCE = 9.88% 
Operating profit is the gross profit the company has made before deduction of taxes 
and expenses. Capital employed is the capital investment necessary for a business to 
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function. This would include share capital (assets) and non-current liabilities (long 
term debt e.g. loans) these figures can be obtained from the balance sheet of the 
company’s annual report and financial statement. ROCE enables comparisons to be 
made between companies of different sizes.
728
 ROCE is a good measure of company 
profitability however, it may not provide an accurate reflection of performance for 
large cash reserves companies. ROCE does not always state the accurate amount of 
capital employed because intangible assets (assets that cannot be physically touched) 
such as brands and trademarks are not counted as capital employed.  
Return on invested capital (ROIC) 
The ROIC indicates how well a company is using its money to generate returns. It is 
the net profit after taxes plus interest paid on long-term debt.
729
 It tells the investors 
how good a company is at turning its capital into profits. Unlike ROA and ROE, 
ROIC does not consider the debt of the company which can make highly indebted 
companies look profitable.
730
 For example, the ROIC of Scottish and Southern Energy 
(SSE) plc  for the year 2011 was based on net operating profit £2,367.8 million, 
income tax of £607.2 million, long-term debt £4,133.4 million, and shareholder equity 
of £2951.3 million. ROIC is calculated therefore as follows: 
 ROIC = 
                                
                                  
  
 ROIC for SSE = 
             
              
 
 ROIC for SSE = 0.25 or 25% 
Market share 
This is the percentage of the market that a company controls in relation to a particular 
product or service. It is a measure used by the company to determine consumer 
preferences for a product in relation to other products of similar kinds. A high market 
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share will indicate greater sales meaning that the company is likely profitable. 
Investors look at market share as it indicates how well the company is performing in 
the market as well as how competitive the company is in relation to other companies. 
Companies with high market share are generally more successful than those with low 
market shares. For a company that is a conglomerate or is trading in different national 
markets, a high market share brings greater recognition for the company, makes 
potential customers aware of the company and its products.  
Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 
EBIT represent all the profits that the company has made before interest and tax are 
deducted.
731
 EBIT is also known as the operating income of a company. Pre-tax 
operating income measures both the profits the company has made and the expenses. 
For example, the EBIT for Marks & Spencer plc in 2011 was £782.7 million. This 
figure can be obtained from the company’s annual report and accounts (particularly in 
the income statement). These are all financial performance measures that indicate how 
well a company can use its resources to generate income over a period of time. 
Investors use these measures to be able to determine whether the company is doing 
well or not financially. 
Share price 
Share price is the price of a particular company’s shares at a particular time.732 
Investors use share price as a performance measure to assess a company’s 
performance over a period of time by examining the share price performance in the 
share market which will indicate how well the company is doing. However, it is worth 
noting here that increase in share price does not always reflect on the performance of 
the company because some shares prices are affected by the ups and downs of the of 
the economy (known as cyclical stock). The improvement in the company’s 
performance is reflected by an increase in the share price in the stock market. The 
more the company performance increases the more the share price increases and the 
more the stock market will be expecting from the company and consequently, the 
more the company is urged on to keep up the performance which could encourage 
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executives to focus on short-termism.
733
 This indicates that the limitation for using 
share price as a performance measure for performance-related pay is the fact that it 
will encourage short-termism. 
Revenue 
Revenue is the money that a company receives before any deductions (tax, interest, 
and expenses) are made over a period of time from its activities.
734
 Revenue is used as 
a performance measure because a growth in revenue usually indicates improvements 
in company performance. However, revenues might increase but performance might 
worse. Example, oil company A earns £300 m in 2011 and £400 million in 2012. This 
would seem to be an improvement in performance. However, if the price of oil was 
double in 2012, it would mean that the number of barrels sold was considerably less. 
It is a poor measure of performance if the costs of production are not taken into 
account. 
Cash flow 
Cash flow simply refers to the money that goes in and out of a company.
735
 For 
example, the cash flow for Scottish and Southern Energy plc for the year 2014 was 
£212.7 million indicating money going into the company after discounting for money 
that the company paid out.
736
 Investors use cash flow to determine the performance of 
a company because a constant increase in cash flow indicates that the company is 
performing well.
737
 Free cash flow represents that money left to the company after 
deducting money needed for expanding the business and buying of assets. Free cash 
flow is important to investors as it indicates that the company has got money to take 
up opportunities that can enhance shareholder value.   
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Return on Regulatory Capital Value (RoRCV) 
RoRCV is the return on the net worth of a company defined according to the rules of 
a regulatory body (such as OFWAT which is a regulatory body for the water industry 
in the UK). It is a regulatory constraint for companies to have adequate capital for 
their business and to remain capitally adequate. Companies focus on economic capital 
as they believe it provides an accurate assessment of performance, but economic 
capital will only work as a good performance measure if the company has more than 
enough regulatory capital.
738
 
Following the discussion on performance measures above, the table below represent 
the performance measures used by the nineteen companies under study. As seen from 
the table, different companies use different performance measures for pay purposes. 
The table represents only the financial performance measures and does not include 
non-financial performance measures used by the companies. For companies that have 
more than one financial performance measure, it is not stated in their remuneration 
reports whether or not all the performance measures be satisfied. Furthermore, some 
of the companies attribute different percentages of rewards to be awarded to the 
executives on different performance measures. For example, Marks and Spencer plc 
reward scheme for executive and company performance is 20% for ROCE, 50% for 
EPS and 30% for revenue. 
Table 8: Companies and performance measures used 
Company Performance measure 
Barclays Bank plc  ROE 
Legal and General plc  TSR, EPS 
Cairn plc  TSR 
HSBC Bank plc  ROE 
ICAP plc  EPS 
Sainsbury plc  ROCE, TSR, EPS, market Share, profit, 
cash flow, sales 
Johnson Matthey plc  EPS 
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Kingfisher plc  EPS, TSR 
Lonmin plc  Relative TSR, EBIT, share price 
Marks and Spencer plc  EPS, ROCE, revenue 
National Gird plc  Adjusted EPS, TSR 
Prudential plc  TSR, company cash flow, IFRS operating 
income, pre-tax operating income 
Southern and Scottish Energy plc  EPS, TSR 
Severn Trent plc  RoRCV, Relative TSR 
Shire plc  ROIC, share price 
Smith and Nephew plc  Relative TSR, free cash flow 
Tesco plc  ROCE, EPS, TSR 
United Utility plc  TSR, operational performance measures 
Morrisons plc  EPS, market price 
Results and discussion of the quantitative study 
This section will describe the results for each research objective. It will also provide 
the interpretation of major findings and demonstrate how the findings correspond or 
differs with published studies. The results will be discussed in the following sections 
first, the link between executive/CEO remuneration and company performance. In this 
section the relationship between executive/CEO total remuneration, performance-
related pay and total cash pay with TSR, ROA and EPS will be discussed. The 
separation of this analysis will help to build up the understanding on the pay for 
performance relationship. Second, the link between executive total remuneration and 
company size will be discussed. Last, the relationship between company size and 
company performance will be discussed. 
The link between executive/CEO remuneration and company 
performance 
A positive strong relationship is expected according to hypothesis one because 
executive/CEO increase in remuneration levels will depend on the performance of the 
company. The following results will demonstrate the results obtained from the 
correlations between executive/CEO remuneration and company performance to 
either reject or confirm the hypothesis. 
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The links between total remuneration and company performance using TSR 
Total shareholder return is the performance measure that is most preferred by 
investors as it indicates what the investors gain from investing in the company. It is 
considered to be the ultimate measure of company performance because it indicates 
the profits that the shareholders get from company after all expenses have been made, 
which directly links executive incentives with those of the shareholders. The 
correlation calculations were carried out separately for executives and the CEOs 
because CEOs are in most cases the highest earning individuals in the company and 
possibly with more incentives than the rest of the executives. 
Executive total remuneration and company performance Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient (explained in chapter 2) yielded the following results. Five out of nineteen 
companies demonstrated a positive relationship between executive total remuneration 
and total shareholder return indicating that executive pay increases as company 
performance increases. However, the relationship was not significant because one out 
of the five companies, Marks and Spencer showed a moderately positive relationship 
with a correlation coefficient of r=0.34; and four out of the five companies 
demonstrated a positive weak relationship, for example, Kingfisher with a correlation 
coefficient of r=0.23. This result mean that executive total remuneration is moderately 
linked to company performance in the case of Marks & Spencer plc , and weakly 
linked to company performance in the rest four companies that demonstrated a 
positive relationship. Even though, there is a moderate and weak relationship between 
executive total remuneration and company performance, a strong relationship is what 
is expected to justify the high level of pay executives receive. This result therefore 
rejects hypothesis 1. This finding is similar to the findings of Eichholtz et al
739
 and 
Main et al
740
 which suggested that there was a weak relationship between executive 
total remuneration and company performance using TSR as the performance measure. 
Fourteen out of nineteen companies showed a negative relationship between executive 
total remuneration and total shareholder return. This suggests that executives are 
being paid for no/poor performance contrary to the recommendations of the UKCGC. 
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Thirteen out of the fourteen companies demonstrated a weak negative relationship, for 
example, Shire with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.06, indicating a negative weak 
relationship between executive total remuneration and company performance. HSBC 
Bank showed a moderately negative relationship with correlation coefficient of r=-
0.33. Lonmin showed a significant strong negative relationship with a correlation 
coefficient of r=-0.62 indicating that executive remuneration increases even more 
when the company’s performance decreases. The differences in the correlations could 
be related to the size of the companies. Company size and sector are some of the 
factors (as identified by past studies and the interviews in chapter 4) that are 
considered when determining executive pay. The variation could be due to the size of 
the company as the larger the company the higher the executive pay.
741
 However, the 
results have demonstrated trend that could reflect different sector practices. This 
finding suggests that the setting of executive total remuneration does not depend on 
the performance of the company because the results indicate that most of the 
companies executive remuneration’ pay still continues to increase even when the 
company is under-performance.  
CEO total remuneration and company performance Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
yielded the following results. Six out of the 19 companies demonstrated positive 
coefficient between CEO total remuneration and company performance, indicating 
that CEO total remuneration increased as the company performance increases. 
However, the positive relationship was not significant. Three out of the six companies 
demonstrated a weak positive coefficient, for example, Lonmin with correlation 
coefficient of r=0.09; and the rest three companies demonstrated a moderately 
positive coefficient, for example, Kingfisher with a correlation coefficient of r=0.39. 
The finding shows that more (six) companies demonstrated a positive relationship 
between CEO total remuneration and company performance than executive total 
remuneration (five companies) and company performance. However, the difference is 
not significant and indicating that CEOs pay is not significantly more than the pay of 
other executive in the company. Although, the difference is not much, it suggests that 
CEO total remuneration is more closely related to company performance than 
executive total remuneration. Furthermore, this result also rejects hypothesis 1, 
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suggesting that CEO total remuneration is not strongly related to company 
performance. 
Thirteen out of 19 companies demonstrated a negative coefficient with CEO total 
remuneration indicating that as CEO total remuneration is increasing, whilst company 
performance using TSR as the performance measure is decreasing. Nine out of the 
thirteen companies showed a negative weak coefficient, for example, HSBC had a 
correlation coefficient of r=-0.14 indicating a negative weak relationship between 
CEO total remuneration and company performance. Of the thirteen companies that 
displayed a negative coefficient, the remaining four showed a negative moderate 
coefficient, (e.g. Barclays Bank with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.35. This 
suggests that CEOs total remuneration is not determined depending on the company’s 
performance. 
The results for both executives and CEO, indicates that using TSR as the performance 
measure to determine the relationship between total remuneration and company 
performance, different companies yield different results. Out of the 19 companies 
analysed in this study, 11 companies use TSR as the only financial performance 
measure or in conjunction with other financial performance measures and non-
financial measures. With five out of the nineteen companies (for executives) and six 
out of nineteen companies (for CEO) demonstrating a positive relationship with total 
remuneration and TSR indicates that executive/CEO remuneration is not related to 
company performance. However, the lack of a positive relationship between 
executive/CEO total remuneration and TSR for the rest of the companies could also 
be due to the limitations of using TSR as a performance measure. These include the 
fact that TSR is determined independently by the market and hugely relies on share 
price. Share prices may vary for reasons that are unconnected to the company or the 
executive/CEO’s performance. The results obtained for both executive and CEO total 
remuneration generally suggest that there is no strong relationship between pay and 
performance therefore rejecting hypothesis 1 which suggest that there is a strong 
relationship between pay and performance. 
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The links between total remuneration and company performance using ROA 
Return on asset is a performance measure that is the least used measure in 
determining the relationship between pay and performance. Rather than the 
management focusing on the shareholder return, return on assets forces the 
management to focus on the assets that the company needs to run the business. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between executive total remuneration 
and ROA yielded the following results. Six out of nineteen companies demonstrated a 
positive relationship between executive total remuneration and ROA indicating that 
executive remuneration increases with increase in company performance. Two out of 
the six companies, for example, Marks and Spencer showed a moderately positive 
relationship with a correlation coefficient of r=0.35. The rest four companies 
demonstrated a weak positive relationship, for example, Smith and Nephew with 
correlation coefficient of r=0.12 indicating that although executive pay increases with 
increase in company performance, the strength of the relationship is weak. This 
finding follows the same trend as findings for executive total remuneration and TSR 
which rejects hypothesis 1. 
Thirteen out of nineteen companies demonstrated a negative relationship between 
executive total remuneration and ROA indicating that executive remuneration 
increases whilst company performance using ROA as the performance measure 
decreases. Five out of the thirteen companies showed a weak negative association, for 
example, Cairn Energy with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.14 indicating that 
executive remuneration slightly increases with decrease in company performance. Six 
out of the thirteen companies demonstrated a moderately negative association, for 
example, Severn Trent with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.38. Two out of the 
thirteen companies demonstrated a significantly strong negative relationship, for 
example, ICAP with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.51 indicating that executive 
remuneration increase even more with the decrease in company performance. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between CEO total remuneration and 
ROA yielded the following results. Five out of the nineteen companies demonstrated 
a positive coefficient between CEO total remuneration and ROA indicating that 
executive remuneration increases with increase in company performance using ROA 
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as the performance measure. None of the five companies demonstrated a strong 
positive relationship between CEO total remuneration and ROA indicating therefore 
rejecting hypothesis 1. Three out of the five companies showed a weak positive 
relationship, for example, Sainsbury with correlation coefficient of r=0.05 meaning 
that executive remuneration only increases slightly with increase in company 
performance. Two out of the five demonstrated a moderately positive association 
between CEO total remuneration and ROA, for example, Legal & General with 
correlation coefficient of r=0.45.  
Fourteen out of nineteen companies demonstrated a negative Pearson’s coefficient 
between CEO total remuneration and ROA indicating that executive remuneration 
increasing whilst company performance using ROA as the performance measure 
decreases. Eight out of the fourteen companies demonstrated a negative weak 
coefficient between CEO total remuneration and ROA, for example, Cairn Energy 
with correlation coefficient of r=-0.17 indicating that executive remuneration 
increases slightly when company performance decreases. Three out of the fourteen 
companies demonstrated a moderately negative association between CEO total 
remuneration and ROA, for example, Johnson Matthey with correlation coefficient of 
r=-0.48. Furthermore, 3 out of the 14 companies demonstrated a strong negative 
relationship between CEO total remuneration and ROA, for example, Barclays Bank 
with correlation coefficient of r=-0.59 indicating that executive remuneration 
increases so much with the decrease of company performance.  
These results indicate that for most of the companies there is a negative relationship 
between executive/CEO total remuneration and company performance using ROA as 
the performance measure indicating executives and CEOs remuneration are not 
related to the company’s performance. As mentioned earlier, ROA is the least used 
performance measure and none of the 19 companies under study used it as a 
performance measure. Considering that ROA does not suffer the setbacks that TSR 
suffers and yielding results that are almost similar to that of TSR, executive/CEO total 
remuneration is therefore not related to company performance for a majority of the 
companies and weakly related to very few of them. On the contrary a few of the 
companies have demonstrated a significant negative relationship between executive 
remuneration and company performance, supporting the fact that executive 
193 
 
remuneration is not related to company performance. Consequently, the findings 
rejects hypothesis 1 which suggest that there is a strong relationship between pay and 
performance. 
The links between total remuneration and company performance using EPS 
EPS is another performance measure that is widely used to measure pay and 
performance in the UK. EPS is a performance measure that can be directly influenced 
by the performance of the executives. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between executive total remuneration 
and EPS yielded the following results. Fourteen out of nineteen companies 
demonstrated a positive relationship between executive total remuneration and EPS 
indicating that executive remuneration increases as company performance increases 
using EPS as the performance measure. The results suggest that executives can get 
more pay when they appease the short-term interest of their shareholders. This may 
encourage executives to rely on short-term performance of the company rather than 
the long-term performance of the company resulting in ‘short-termism’. Six out of the 
fourteen companies showed a significantly strong positive relationship, for example, 
Johnson Matthey with a correlation coefficient of p=0.86 indicating that executive 
remuneration significantly increases with significant increase in company 
performance. These six companies confirmed hypothesis 1 to the effect that there is a 
significant relationship between executive remuneration and company performance. 
The other eight companies demonstrated a moderate and weak relationship between 
executive remuneration and company performance thereby rejecting hypothesis 1. 
Three out of the fourteen companies showed a moderate positive association, for 
example, HSBC with a correlation coefficient of r=0.35. Five out of the fourteen 
companies demonstrated a weak positive relationship, for example, Kingfisher with a 
correlation coefficient of r=0.002 indicating that executive remuneration increases 
slightly with increase in company performance. This finding indicates that on a 
general note there is a relationship between executive remuneration and company 
performance. Furthermore, most of the company demonstrate a weak relationship 
between executive remuneration and company performance. 
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Four out of the nineteen companies demonstrated a negative relationship between 
executive total remuneration and EPS indicating that executive remuneration 
increases whilst company performance decreases. Three out of the four companies 
showed a weak negative relationship, for example, Cairn Energy with correlation 
coefficient of r=-0.10 meaning that executive remuneration increases slightly with 
decrease in company performance. Shire showed a moderately negative relationship 
with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.30. The study found out that one company, 
Severn Trent, demonstrated no relationship between executive total remuneration and 
EPS, as the correlation between the two variables was r=0.00 indicating that executive 
remuneration increases and decreases independently of the company’s performance. 
For this company, there appears to be no link at all between pay and performance. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between CEO total remuneration and 
EPS yielded the following results. Fifteen out of nineteen companies showed a 
positive Pearson’s correlation coefficient between CEO total remuneration and EPS. 
This indicates that CEO total remuneration is positively related to company 
performance using EPS as the performance measure. Contrary to the findings of 
Eichholtz et al
742
 which suggested a weak relationship between executive total 
remuneration and company performance using TSR, EPS and market value as the 
performance measures, 5 out of the 15 companies demonstrated a significant 
association with CEO total remuneration and company performance using EPS as the 
performance measure (e.g. ICAP with a correlation coefficient of r=0.88). These five 
companies confirms hypothesis 1 to the effect that executive remuneration is 
significantly related to company performance. The remaining ten companies 
demonstrated a moderate or weak relationship between executive remuneration and 
company performance thereby rejecting hypothesis 1. Four out of the fifteen 
companies demonstrated a moderately positive relationship, for example, HSBC Bank 
with correlation coefficient of r=0.41. Six out of the fifteen companies demonstrated a 
weak positive relationship, for example, Barclays Bank with a correlation coefficient 
of r=0.03. However, four out of nineteen companies demonstrated a negative weak 
association between CEO total remuneration and EPS, for example, Cairn Energy 
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with correlation coefficient of r=-0.16 indicating that CEO remuneration only slightly 
increased with the decrease of company performance. 
EPS is a more short term based performance measure than TSR and ROA. This 
findings support the argument that executive remuneration encourages short termism 
in companies, where executives tend to focus on short term achievement rather on the 
long term success of the business. The shareholders of the company and investors are 
interested in the returns they can obtain from their investment consequently mounting 
pressure on the executives to management the investment and make profits. In order 
to appease the shareholders, the executives are seen to rely on short-term performance 
measures like EPS. This is because more than half of the companies in the study 
sample have demonstrated a strong significant relationship with EPS which is a short 
term performance measure as oppose to ROA and TSR which are a more long term 
performance measure. Executive pay packages across the FTSE 100 are found to be 
linked to short-term financial measures of corporate performance such as earnings and 
share price movement.
743
 Out of the nineteen companies studied, nine of the 
companies in the sample under study used EPS either as the only financial 
performance measure or in conjunction with other performance measure. 
Considering the different performance measures used, this study suggests that 
different companies yield different results with different performance measures. This 
means that different companies would yield results depending on the performance 
measure used to determine the link between executive remuneration and company 
performance. For example, most companies demonstrated a positive relationship 
between executive remuneration and company performance using EPS and a negative 
relationship using ROA and TSR. However, Legal & General plc that only uses TSR 
as their financial performance measure demonstrated a positive relationship between 
executive remuneration and company performance using all three performance 
measure.  
Considering that there is no best practice as to which financial performance 
measure(s) companies should adopt the results suggest in general that there exist a 
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weak relationship between executive remuneration and company performance 
rejecting hypothesis 1. From a general point of view, for CEO total remuneration, 
eighteen companies have demonstrated a positive relationship with at least one of the 
performance measures used in this study (TRS, EPS or ROA). For executive total 
remuneration seventeen companies demonstrated a positive relationship between 
executive remuneration and company performance.  There is a relationship (weak) 
between executive pay and company performance but hypothesis 1 is rejected because 
a strong significant relationship between executive pay and company performance is 
required to justify the level of pay executives receive. 
The table below represents Pearson correlation coefficients for CEO/executive total 
remuneration with company performance for the sample under study. 
Table 9: Correlation coefficient for CEO/executive total remuneration and company 
performance 
  Correlation coefficients for CEO  Correlation coefficients for executives 
 company TSR ROA EPS  TSR ROA EPS 
1 Barclays 
Bank plc  
-0.35 -0.59 0.02  -0.18 -0.69 0.44 
2 Legal and 
Generalplc  
0.32 0.45 0.20  0.13 0.39 0.11 
3 Cairn plc  0.10 -0.17 -0.16  -0.03 -0.14 -0.09 
4 HSBC Bank 
plc  
-0.14 -0.03 0.41  -0.33 -0.43 0.35 
5 ICAP plc  -0.18 -0.51 0.86  -0.15 -0.51 0.75 
6 Sainsbury 
plc  
0.02 0.05 0.34  0.06 0.003 0.25 
7 Johnson 
Matthey plc  
-0.10 -0.48 0.63  -0.09 -0.38 0.86 
8 Kingfisher 
plc  
0.39 -0.06 -0.49  0.23 0.12 0.002 
9 Lonmin plc  0.09 -0.01 0.04  -0.62 -0.44 -0.29 
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10 Marks and 
Spencer plc  
0.38 0.33 0.43  0.35 0.35 0.49 
11 National 
Grid plc  
-0.14 -0.31 0.23  -0.16 -0.29 0.23 
12 Prudential 
plc  
-0.36 -0.30 0.01  -0.10 -0.29 0.22 
13 Southern and 
Scottish 
Energy plc  
-0.17 -0.25 0.54  -0.05 -0.18 0.64 
14 Severn Trent 
plc  
-0.14 -0.35 -0.24  -0.16 -0.38 0.000 
15 Shire plc  -0.32 0.19 -0.21  -0.06 0.08 -0.30 
16 Smith and 
Nephew plc  
-0.25 0.11 0.35  -0.29 0.12 0.77 
17 Tesco plc  -0.32 -0.65 0.93  -0.22 -0.47 0.93 
18 United 
Utility plc  
-0.06 -0.20 0.18  0.05 -0.29 -0.14 
19 Morrisons 
plc  
-0.15 -0.10 0.62  -0.08 -0.37 0.64 
The link between performance related pay and company performance using TSR 
Principle D.1 of the UKCGC 2012 recommends the REMCO to sets executive 
remuneration in such a way that a significant proportion of the pay package be linked 
to corporate and individual performance. This means that the performance-related 
components should not account for only a small percentage of the total remuneration. 
In theory a significant positive correlation is expected between performance related 
pay and company performance. The main purpose of performance related pay is to 
align the interest of the executives with that of the company and a positive 
relationship will mean that the objective is achieved.  
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between executive performance-related 
pay and TSR yielded the following results. Six out of nineteen companies 
demonstrated a positive relationship between executive performance-related pay and 
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total shareholder return indicating that executive remuneration increases with increase 
in company performance. However, only one company Marks and Spencer plc, 
demonstrated a strong significant relationship with a correlation coefficient of r=0.48 
indicating that executive remuneration significantly increased with increase in 
company performance. This one company confirmed hypothesis 1 to the effect that 
there is a significant relationship between executive remuneration and company 
performance.  The other five companies demonstrate a weak relationship thereby 
rejecting hypothesis 1 (e.g. United Utilities with a correlation coefficient of r=0.23 
indicating that executive remuneration slightly increased with increase in company 
performance). 
Thirteen out of nineteen companies demonstrated a negative relationship between 
executive performance-related pay and TSR indicating that executive remuneration 
increases whilst company performance decreased using TSR as a performance 
measure. Eleven out of the thirteen companies demonstrated a weak negative 
relationship, for example, Southern and Scottish Energy with a correlation coefficient 
of r=-0.04 indicating that executive remuneration slightly increased with decrease in 
company performance. Two out of the thirteen companies showed a moderately 
negative relationship, for example, Lonmin with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.44. 
These thirteen companies rejects hypothesis 1, and suggest company performance is 
not considered when determining executive variable pay. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between CEO performance-related pay 
and TSR yielded the following results. Seven out of 19 companies showed a positive 
relationship between CEO performance-related pay and total shareholder return 
indicating that CEO remuneration increases with increases in company performance. 
In line with the findings of Main et al,
744
 3 out of the 7 companies demonstrated a 
strong significant positive relationship between CEO performance related pay and 
TSR and confirming hypothesis 1, e.g. Marks and Spencer with a correlation 
coefficient of r=0.73. The reasons why these companies demonstrated a strong 
positive relationship between CEO performance related pay and company 
performance could be that, they use mainly long term performance measure for their 
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performance related pay such as TSR and ROCE. Their main objectives for 
performance related pay are to incentivise executives to achieve superior returns to 
shareholders; to align interest of executive and shareholders through building a 
shareholding; and to retain key executives over the performance period. Their targets 
and performance measures are reviewed annually. These characteristics are all 
possessed by the rest of the companies in the sample. Therefore the reason for their 
strong significant relationship with TSR has not been identified by this study. One 
reason may be the slightly stable nature of their dividend pay-out, and share price over 
the period under study which in turn affects TSR ratio. However, these three 
companies are a minority of the data sample as the majority of the companies 
demonstrate a weak negative or weak positive relationship. The other four companies 
demonstrated weak positive relationship thereby rejecting hypothesis 1, e.g. Sainsbury 
with a correlation coefficient of r=0.02 indicating that CEO performance related pay 
slightly increases with increase in company performance..  
Twelve out of nineteen companies demonstrated a negative association between CEO 
performance-related pay and total shareholder return indicating CEO performance 
related pay increases whilst company performance decreases. Eight out of the twelve 
companies showed a weak negative association, for example, ICAP with a correlation 
coefficient of r=-0.10 indicating that CEO performance related pay slightly increases 
with decrease in company performance. Four out of the twelve companies 
demonstrated a moderately negative relationship, for example, Prudential with a 
correlation coefficient of r=-0.36. 
The results obtained for correlating executive/CEO total remuneration and 
executive/CEO performance related pay with TSR are almost similar but some of the 
companies demonstrated a significantly strong relationship with TSR. Although the 
findings points out to the fact that executive/CEO performance related pay are weakly 
related to company performance, the limitations of TSR discussed above cannot be 
ignored. The results obtained for both executive and CEO total remuneration 
generally suggest that there is no strong relationship between pay and performance 
therefore rejecting hypothesis 1. 
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The link between performance related pay and company performance using ROA 
Return on asset as mentioned above, encourages the management to focus on the asset 
that the company needs to run the business. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between executive performance-related 
pay and ROA yielded the following results. Six out of nineteen companies 
demonstrated a positive relationship between executive performance-related pay and 
ROA indicating that executive performance related pay increases with increase in 
company performance using ROA as the performance measure. One out of the six 
companies, demonstrated a strong positive relationship thereby confirming hypothesis 
1, e.g. Legal and General with a correlation coefficient of r=0.52 indicating that 
executive performance related pay significantly increases with increase in company 
performance. The rest five companies showed a weak positive relationship thereby 
rejecting hypothesis 1, e.g. Kingfisher with a correlation coefficient of r=0.15 
indicating that executive performance related pay slightly increases with increase in 
company performance. 
Thirteen out of nineteen companies showed a negative association between executive 
performance-related pay and ROA indicating that executive performance related pay 
increases whilst company performance decreases. Seven out of the thirteen companies 
showed a weak negative relationship, for example, Cairn Energy with a correlation 
coefficient of r=-0.25 indicating that executive performance related pay slightly 
increases with decrease in company performance. Five out of the thirteen companies 
showed a moderately negative relationship, for example, National Gird with a 
correlation coefficient of r=-0.32. One out of the thirteen companies, Barclays Bank 
demonstrated a significantly strong negative relationship with a correlation coefficient 
of r=-0.72 indicating that executive performance related pay significantly increases 
with decrease in company performance. This means that executive performance 
related pay are not be tied to challenging performance as recommended by the 
UKCGC, consequently rewarding executives for failure.  
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between CEO performance-related pay 
and ROA yielded the following results. Seven out of nineteen companies 
demonstrated a positive relationship between CEO performance-related pay and 
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ROA. One out of the seven companies being Legal & General showed a strong 
positive significant relationship between CEO performance related pay and ROA, 
with a correlation coefficient of r=0.62. ROA is used by companies to monitor the 
company’s performance with that of the industry performance. Six out of the seven 
companies showed a positive weak relationship, for example, Sainsbury with a 
correlation coefficient of r=0.12 indicating that CEO performance-related pay was 
weakly related to company performance using ROA as the performance measure. 
Twelve out of nineteen companies demonstrated a negative relationship between CEO 
performance-related pay and ROA indicating that CEO performance related pay 
increases whilst company performance decreases. Seven out of the twelve companies 
showed a negative weak relationship, for example, Cairn Energy with a correlation 
coefficient of r=-0.25 indicating that CEO performance-related pay slightly increased 
with decrease in company performance. Three out of the twelve company showed a 
moderately negative relationship, for example, ICAP with correlation coefficient of 
r=-0.43. Two out of the twelve companies demonstrated a significantly strong 
negative relationship, for example, Barclays bank with a correlation coefficient of r=-
0.53 indicating that CEO performance-related pay significantly increases with 
decrease in company performance. The results obtained for both executive and CEO 
total remuneration generally suggest that there is no strong relationship between pay 
and performance therefore rejecting hypothesis 1 which suggest that there is a strong 
relationship between pay and performance. 
The link between performance-related pay and company performance using EPS 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between executive performance-related 
pay and EPS yielded the following results. Fourteen out of nineteen companies 
demonstrated a positive relationship between executive performance-related pay and 
EPS indicating that executive performance related pay increases with increase in 
company performance. Six out of the fourteen companies showed a significantly 
strong positive relationship thereby confirming hypothesis 1, e.g. Tesco with 
correlation coefficient of r=0.85 indicating that executive performance related pay 
increases significantly with increase in company performance. Three out of the 
fourteen demonstrated a moderately positive relationship, for example, HSBC Bank 
with a correlation coefficient of r=0.42. the rest five companies showed a weak 
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positive relationship, for example, Severn Trent with a correlation coefficient of 
r=0.02 indicating that executive performance related pay weakly increases with 
increase in company performance. 
Five out of the nineteen companies demonstrated a negative relationship between 
executive performance-related pay and company performance. Four out of the five 
companies demonstrated a weak negative relationship, for example, Cairn Energy 
with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.25 indicating that executive performance related 
pay weakly increases with decrease in company performance. One out of the five 
companies, Lonmin demonstrated a moderately negative relationship with a 
correlation coefficient of r=-0.30. This suggest that for these few companies executive 
performance related pay is not linked to company performance as pay and 
performance seem to go in opposite direction of each other. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between CEO performance-related pay 
and EPS yielded the following results. Fifteen out of nineteen companies showed a 
positive association between CEO performance-related pay and EPS indicating that 
CEO performance related pay increases with increase in company performance. Three 
out of the fifteen companies demonstrated a significantly strong positive relationship 
between CEO performance-related pay and EPS. For example, Tesco with a 
correlation coefficient of r=0.92 indicating that CEO performance related pay 
significantly increases with increase in company performance. These three companies 
use predominantly EPS as their financial performance measure. Therefore, even 
though these companies did not demonstrate a positive significant relationship with 
neither TSR nor ROA, the CEO of the company met his performance target. 
Consequently, the pay of the CEO performance related pay correlates with company 
performance based on EPS. Four out of the fifteen companies showed a moderately 
positive relationship, for example, Sainsbury with correlation coefficient of r=0.38. 
Eight out of thirteen companies showed a weak positive relationship, for example, 
National Grid with a correlation coefficient of r=0.26 indicating that CEO 
performance related pay only weakly increased with increase in company 
performance. Furthermore, four out of nineteen companies showed a negative weak 
relationship between CEO performance related pay and EPS, for example, Severn 
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Trent with correlation coefficient of r=-0.11 indicating that CEO performance related 
pay increased weakly with the decrease in company performance.  
This findings support the fact that linking pay to performance depends on the 
performance target and measure used. Since there is no recommendation or regulation 
stating what performance targets and performance measures for companies to use, 
different companies use different performance targets and performance measures. All 
performance measures have got its limitations but some measures are more long-term 
based than others. The discretion for companies to choose performance measures may 
be demanded by the fact that no measure is infallible. However, for the long-term 
success of the company more long-term performance measures should be used by 
companies as opposed to the short-term performance measures. In the meantime, to 
accurately determine whether there is a link between pay and company performance, 
each company would have to be treated individually considering the performance 
targets and performance measures used by the particular company to be able to make 
informed judgments on its pay for performance link. The results of these findings 
show that, considering the nineteen companies in the sample in general using TSR, 
ROA and EPS; it cannot be generalised that there is a positive strong significant 
relationship between executive/CEO pay and performance based on these 
performance measures. However, considering the companies individually and what 
performance measures that were used by the companies, there seems to be the strong 
positive significant link between pay and company performance. The results obtained 
for both executive and CEO total remuneration generally suggest that there is weak 
relationship between pay and performance therefore rejecting hypothesis 1. 
Furthermore, eighteen companies demonstrated a positive relationship between 
CEO/executive performance-related pay and company performance using one or more 
of the performance measures used (TRS, EPS or ROA) 
The table below represents the Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between 
CEO/executive performance-related pay and company performance for the sample 
under study.  
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Table 10: Correlation coefficient for CEO/executive performance-related pay and 
company performance 
  Correlation coefficients for CEO  Correlation coefficient for executives 
 company TSR ROA EPS  TSR ROA EPS 
1 Barclays 
Bank plc  
-0.39 -0.59 -0.07  -0.39 -0.72 0.32 
2 Legal and 
General plc  
0.25 0.44 0.28  0.26 0.52 -0.03 
3 Cairn plc  0.09 -0.24 -0.24  0.05 -0.25 -0.25 
4 HSBC Bank 
plc  
0.02 -0.13 0.18  -0.17 -0.25 0.42 
5 ICAP plc  -0.10 -0.43 0.79  -0.003 -0.43 0.67 
6 Sainsbury 
plc  
-0.01 0.22 0.47  0.04 0.07 0.29 
7 Johnson 
Matthey plc  
-0.41 -0.25 0.25  -0.08 -0.36 0.77 
8 Kingfisher 
plc  
0.49 0.03 0.04  0.21 0.15 0.02 
9 Lonmin plc  0.15 0.07 0.13  -0.44 -0.28 -0.30 
10 Marks and 
Spencer plc  
0.15 0.27 0.09  0.48 0.29 0.39 
11 National 
Grid plc  
0.24 -0.24 0.04  -0.13 -0.32 0.22 
12 Prudential 
plc  
-0.38 -0.20 0.08  -0.12 -0.28 0.23 
13 Southern 
and Scottish 
Energy plc  
-0.10 -0.20 0.77  -0.04 -0.11 0.53 
14 Severn 
Trent plc  
0.15 -0.01 -0.04  -0.02 -0.35 0.02 
15 Shire plc  -0.34 0.12 -0.13  -0.06 0.10 -0.29 
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16 Smith and 
Nephew plc  
0.01 -0.08 -0.16  -0.28 0.09 0.72 
17 Tesco plc  -0.31 -0.62 0.87  -0.06 -0.31 0.85 
18 United 
Utility plc  
0.09 -0.24 0.05  0.23 -0.19 -0.14 
19 Morrisons 
plc  
0.30 0.26 -0.02  -0.12 -0.14 0.79 
The link between total cash pays and company performance using TSR  
Total cash pay are not related either to individual or corporate performance. However, 
these elements are revised annual to take into account various factors that affects the 
business, one of which is the performance of the company. Considering that cash pay 
is not related to performance, a correlation is not expected between the two and if 
there is a correlation it will be due to other reasons. Executive base salary is agreed 
upon when the executive is appointed, which may also include a yearly increment 
depending on the terms of the contract of service. This increment may depend on the 
general performance of the company or not. For example, Johnson Matthey plc base 
their cash pay (base salary) increments on the financial, environmental, social and 
governance performance of the individual CEO.
745
 This therefore means that if the 
company has been performing well and making profits, the base salary would be 
increased. In which a little fraction of their cash pay is tied to company performance 
and a link may exist. It is worth noting that in this case the base salary could remain 
the same if the company is not performing well but not decreased as would be 
expected in a performance-related pay. Consequently, some positive relationship 
could be expected between total cash pay and company performance as performance 
impacts on base salary. Executive base salary has been constantly on the rise since the 
early 1990s and given the time period over which this study covers, it would be 
relevant to consider whether cash pay has any relationship with company 
performance. 
                                                          
745
 For example Johnson Matthey Plc. 
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Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between executive total cash pay and 
TSR yielded the following results. In line with previous studies
746
 using only cash pay 
in determining the pay for performance relationship however; six out of nineteen 
companies demonstrated a positive relationship between executive total cash pay and 
total shareholder return. One out of the six companies, Barclays Bank, showed a 
moderately positive relationship with a correlation coefficient of r=0.40. Five out of 
the six companies demonstrated a weak positive relationship, for example, Shire with 
a correlation coefficient of r=0.12. However, the difference between past studies in 
this area of studies with this study is the fact that annual bonus was considered as cash 
payment, meanwhile this study has considered annual bonus as a performance related 
pay because it is only awarded after the performance targets have been met. The 
findings obtained therefore, confirm the fact that executive cash pay is not determined 
based neither on the executives’ individual performance nor the company’s 
performance. This is further confirmed with thirteen out of nineteen companies 
demonstrated a negative relationship between executive total cash pay and total 
shareholder return. Nine out of the thirteen companies showed a weak negative 
relationship, for example, United Utilities with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.14. 
two out of the thirteen companies demonstrated a moderately negative association, for 
example, Cairn Energy with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.40. two out of thirteen 
companies showed a strong negative relationship, for example, HSBC Bank with a 
correlation coefficient of r=-0.66. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between CEO total cash pay and TSR 
yielded the following results. Three out of nineteen companies demonstrated a 
positive weak relationship between CEO total cash pay and total shareholder return, 
for example, Marks and Spencer with a correlation coefficient of r=0.02. This is 
further confirmed with sixteen out of nineteen companies demonstrated a negative 
relationship between CEO total cash pay and total shareholder return. Eleven out of 
the sixteen companies demonstrated a weak negative relationship, for example, 
Prudential with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.28. four out of the sixteen companies 
showed a moderately negative relationship, for example, Barclays Bank with a 
correlation coefficient of r=-0.34. One out of the sixteen companies being HSBC 
                                                          
746
 For example M Jensen and K Murphy, ‘Performance Pay and Top-management Incentives’ (1990) 
98(2) Journal of Political Economics 225-264. 
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Bank demonstrated a strong negative relationship with a correlation coefficient of r=-
0.55. Based on this finding, CEO cash pay is not related to company performance as 
expected. 
The link between total cash pays and company performance using ROA 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between executive total cash pay and 
ROA yielded the following results. Three out of nineteen companies demonstrated a 
positive relationship between executive total cash pay and ROA. One out of the three 
companies, Cairn Energy, demonstrated a strong positive relationship with a 
correlation coefficient of r=0.59. Two out of the three companies showed a weak 
positive association, for example, Marks and Spencer with correlation coefficient of 
r=0.28. Sixteen out of nineteen companies demonstrated a negative association 
between executive total cash pay and ROA. Six out of the sixteen companies showed 
a weak negative association, for example, Barclays Bank with a correlation coefficient 
of r=-0.17. eight out of the sixteen companies showed moderately negative 
relationship, for example, Lonmin with correlation coefficient of r=-0.44. Two out of 
the sixteen companies showed a strong negative relationship, for example, Morrison 
with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.63. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between CEO total cash pay and ROA 
yielded the following results. Similar to the findings obtained with TSR, four out of 
nineteen companies demonstrated a positive relationship between CEO total cash pay 
and ROA indicating that there is a relationship between CEO total cash pay and 
company performance. Three out of the four companies showed a positive moderate 
association between CEO total cash pay and ROA, for example, Smith and Nephew 
with a correlation coefficient of r=0.41. One out of the four companies being Marks 
and Spencer showed a weak positive relationship, for example, with a correlation 
coefficient of r=0.27 indicating that CEO total cash pay is weakly related to company 
performance. Fifteen out of nineteen companies demonstrated a negative association 
between CEO total cash pay and ROA indicating that CEO total cash pay tends to 
increase with the decrease in company performance. Five out of the fifteen companies 
showed a negative weak relationship, for example, United Utilities with a correlation 
coefficient of r=-0.26 indicating that CEO total cash remuneration will slightly 
increase with decrease in company performance. Six out of the fifteen companies 
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showed negative moderate relationship, for example, National Grid with correlation 
coefficient of r=-0.23. Four out of the fifteen companies showed a significantly strong 
negative relationship between CEO total cash pay and ROA, for example, Johnson 
Matthey with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.51 indicating that CEO total cash pay 
tends to increase significantly with the decrease in company performance.  
Based on the finding from TSR and ROA, it can be confirmed that cash pay is not 
related to company performance, therefore the positive obtained from some 
companies relationship could be due to the company making more profits. Also it has 
been shown that executive pay has been on the constant rise, meaning if these 
companies have been making constant profit as well, it will account for the 
relationship. 
The link between total cash pays and company performance using EPS  
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between executive total cash pay and 
EPS yielded the following results. Fourteen out of nineteen companies demonstrated a 
positive relationship between executive total cash pay and EPS indicating that 
executive total cash pay is linked to company performance using EPS as the 
performance measure. Five out of the fourteen companies showed a strong positive 
relationship, for example, Tesco with a correlation coefficient of r=0.97 indicating 
that executive total cash pay increases significantly with increase in company 
performance. Three out of the fourteen companies, for example, Marks and Spencer 
showed a moderately positive relationship with a correlation coefficient of r=0.42. Six 
out of the fourteen companies demonstrated a weak positive relationship, for example, 
Severn Trent with a correlation coefficient of r=0.13 indicating that executive total 
cash pay increases slightly with increase in company performance. Five out of 
nineteen companies demonstrated a weak negative relationship between executive 
total cash pay and EPS, for example, Shire with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.24 
indicating that executive total cash pay increases slightly with decrease in company 
performance using EPS as the performance measure.  
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between CEO total cash pay and EPS 
yielded the following results. Fourteen out of nineteen companies demonstrated a 
positive relationship between CEO total cash pay and EPS indicating that CEO total 
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cash pay is positively linked to company performance using EPS as the performance 
measure. Six out of the fourteen showed a significantly strong positive relationship, 
for example, Smith and Nephew with a correlation coefficient of r=0.67 indicating 
that CEO total cash pay significantly increases with increase in company 
performance. Two out of the fourteen companies, for example, Marks and Spencer 
demonstrated a moderately positive relationship with a correlation coefficient of 
r=0.45. Six out of fourteen companies demonstrated a weak positive relationship, for 
example, United Utilities with a correlation coefficient of r=0.11 indicating that CEO 
total cash pay increases slightly with increase in company performance.  
Five out of nineteen companies demonstrated a weak negative relationship between 
CEO total cash pay and EPS indicating that CEO total cash pay increased when 
company performance decreases. Four out of the five companies demonstrated a weak 
negative relationship, for example, Sainsbury with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.04 
indicating that CEO total cash pay increased slightly with decrease in company 
performance. One out of the companies, being Kingfisher, demonstrated a moderately 
negative relationship with a correlation coefficient of r-0.43.  
As explained above, the positive relationships could be due to the fact that the 
companies witnessed some increase in their profitability. The results above 
demonstrate that there is not relationship between CEO cash pay and company 
performance which is what is expected as cash pay is not tied to performance. The 
limited positive relationship demonstrated by the results could be due to constant 
increase in cash pay over the years and not as a result of the company’s performance. 
This is therefore confirming the fact that executive/CEO cash pay is not performance-
based related. Companies like Legal and General plc, Kingfisher plc and Marks and 
Spencer plc that have shown to perform better, did not experience more increase in 
cash pay than the rest of the companies. For example, below is a comparison graph 
between Legal and General plc and Barclays Bank plc CEO Base salaries from 1996-
2011.   
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Figure 13: A comparison graph between Legal & General plc and Barclays Bank plc 
CEO Base salaries from 1996-2011 
 
Barclays bank demonstrated a weak relationship between CEO related pay and 
company performance using TSR and ROA as a performance measure. However, 
Barclays has over the years experienced more rise in base salary than Legal and 
General plc that demonstrated a strong significant relationship between CEO 
performance-related pay and company performance using TSR and ROA as 
performance measures. This supports the fact that, even though some companies for 
example Barclays show a strong relationship between CEO cash pay and company 
performance, it is not because cash pay is related to company performance but due to 
the fact that cash pay has been on the increase across the board for all FTSE 100 
companies. 
The links between total remuneration and company size using market 
capitalisation, total revenue and total assets as measures for company 
size 
Market capitalisation is the market value of all of a company’s outstanding shares. It 
is used as a determinant of the company’s size. Company size has been proven by past 
studies to be one of the variables that are highly correlated with executive pay. 
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Hallock
747
 commented that it does not matter whether company size is measured as 
total asset, sales, market value or number of employees, there will be a strong 
correlation between size and executive pay. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the link between executive total remuneration 
and company size using market capitalisation, total revenue and total assets yielded 
the following results.  
Seventeen out of nineteen companies showed positive relationship between executive 
total remuneration and market capitalisation. Eight out of the seventeen companies 
showed a significantly strong positive relationship confirming hypothesis 2 which is 
to the effect that there exist a strong relationship between executive remuneration and 
company size, e.g. Cairn Energy with a correlation coefficient of r=0.86. The findings 
of these eight companies support past studies
748
 to the effect that executive 
remuneration is significantly related to company size. However, the other nine 
companies demonstrated a moderate positive/negative or weak positive/negative 
relationships between executive remuneration and company size thereby not 
confirming or rejecting hypothesis 2. Five out of seventeen companies demonstrated a 
moderately positive relationship, for example, Barclays Bank with correlation 
coefficient of r=0.39. Marks and Spencer showed a moderately positive relationship 
with correlation coefficient of r=0.44. Four out of seventeen companies showed a 
weak positive relationship, for example, Kingfisher with a correlation coefficient of 
r=0.24. Two out of nineteen companies demonstrated a negative relationship between 
executive total remuneration and market capitalisation. Sainsbury and Marks and 
Spencer demonstrated a weak r=-0.11 and moderately r=-0.40 negative relationship 
respectively. In general, eleven companies did not demonstrate a strong relationship 
between executive pay and company size rejecting hypothesis 2. Nine companies 
have demonstrated a relationship suggesting that executive remuneration cannot be 
justified on company size alone, but indicating that it is a factor that influences pay 
(as discussed in chapter 4). 
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 Kevin F Hallock, ‘The Relationship between Company Size and CEO Pay’ (2011) 02 Workspan 
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/ICS/InsightsAndConvenings/upload/02-11-Research-for-the-real-world.pdf 
assessed 24 June 2013. 
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 Peter Kostiuk, ‘Firm Size and Executive Compensation’ (1990) 25(1) JHR 90-105; Brain Main, 
Charles O’Reilly III and James Wade, ‘Top Executive Pay: Tournament or Teamwork?’ (1993) 11(4) 
Journal of Labor Economics 606-628. 
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All the nineteen companies demonstrated a positive relationship between executive 
total remuneration and total revenue indicating that executive remuneration is linked 
to company performance as executive remuneration increases with increase in 
company size using revenue as the measure for company size. With fourteen out of 
nineteen companies showed a significantly strong positive relationship thereby 
confirming hypothesis 2, e.g. Johnson Matthey with a correlation coefficient of 
r=0.84. Four out of nineteen companies demonstrated a weak positive association, for 
example, Shire with correlation coefficient of r=0.09. Therefore, using total revenue 
as the variable for company size, it can be generalised that executive remuneration is 
significantly related to company size and therefore confirming hypothesis two. 
Fifteen out of nineteen companies demonstrated a positive relationship between 
executive total remuneration and total asset indicating that executive remuneration is 
linked to company size using total assets as the measure for company size. Ten out of 
fifteen companies showed a significantly strong association and thereby confirming 
hypothesis 2, e.g. Severn Trent with correlation coefficient of r=0.87. The rest of the 
nine companies did not demonstrate a significant relationship between executive 
remuneration and company size thereby rejecting hypothesis 2. Five out of fifteen 
companies demonstrated weak positive relationship, for example, Barclays Bank with 
a correlation coefficient of r=0.01. Four out of nineteen companies demonstrated a 
negative relationship between executive total remuneration and total asset. Three out 
of four companies showed a weak negative relationship, for example, Legal and 
General with correlation coefficient of r=-0.04. Marks and Spencer showed a 
significantly strong negative relationship with a correlation coefficient of r=-0.52. 
However, more than half of the companies demonstrated a significant relationship 
between executive remuneration and company size generally confirming hypothesis 2 
and also supporting the findings of past research. 
Considering company size using the variables total revenue and total assets, the 
results indicates that executive total remuneration is significantly related to company 
size confirming hypothesis 2 and supporting past studies. However, using market 
capitalisation as the variable for company size, the findings rejects hypothesis 2 to the 
effect that executive remuneration is not significantly related to company size. The 
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table below sets out the correlation coefficient of the relationship between executive 
total remuneration and company size. 
Table 11: correlation coefficient of executive total remuneration and company size 
 Company Market 
capitalisation 
Total revenue Total assets 
1 Barclays bank 
plc  
0.07 0.61 0.45 
2 Legal & 
General plc  
0.18 0.13 0.32 
3 Cairn plc  0.86 0.59 -0.05 
4 HSBC Bank 
plc  
0.62 0.44 0.28 
5 ICAP plc  0.70 0.68 0.58 
6 Sainsbury plc  -0.07 0.71 0.21 
7 Johnson 
Matthey plc  
0.63 0.74 0.77 
8 Kingfisher plc  0.08 0.61 0.49 
9 Lonmin plc  0.83 0.35 0.20 
10 Marks and 
Spencer plc  
-0.12 0.36 -0.40 
11 National Grid 
plc  
0.75 0.95 0.96 
12 Prudential plc  0.02 0.23 0.74 
13 Southern and 
Scottish Energy 
plc  
0.44 0.57 0.63 
14 Severn Trent 
plc  
0.01 0.43 0.28 
15 Shire plc  0.21 0.42 0.22 
16 Smith and 
Nephew plc  
0.62 0.11 0.31 
17 Tesco plc  0.81 0.93 0.92 
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18 United Utility 
plc  
0.30 -0.07 0.63 
19 Morrisons plc  0.67 0.66 0.62 
The link between company size and company performance 
As explained above and in chapter 2 company size and company performance play a 
significant role in the determination of executive remuneration. If the growth in 
company size and growth in company performance justifies increase in executive 
remuneration levels, then a significant relationship would be expected between 
company size and company performance. Determining the relationship between 
company size and company performance yielded different results. Fourteen out of the 
nineteen companies demonstrated a strong positive relationship between company 
size (using market capitalisation, total revenue or total assets) and company 
performance (using, TSR, ROA or EPS) confirming hypothesis 3 which suggest that 
company size is strongly related with company performance. This finding indicates 
that increase in executive remuneration could be justified based on the increase in 
company size and company performance. But most importantly, it confirms the fact 
that company performance and company size and factors considered when 
determining pay. Ten companies demonstrated a significant relationship using EPS, 
three companies using ROA, and one company using TSR. The table below sets out 
the companies and only the strong positive or negative relationships indicated. 
Table 12: relationship between company size and company performance 
company Strong positive relationship 
HSBC Bank plc  Total assets with ROA 
Sainsbury plc  Market capitalisation with TSR 
Lonmin plc  No strong relationship 
Tesco plc   Market capitalisation with EPS 
 Total revenue with EPS 
 Total assets with EPS 
Smith and Nephew plc   Market capitalisation with EPS 
 Total revenue with EPS 
 Total assets with EPS 
Kingfisher plc  No strong relationship 
Barclays Bank plc   Market capitalisation with EPS 
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 Total revenue with EPS 
ICAP plc   Market capitalisation with EPS 
 Total revenue with EPS 
 Total assets with EPS 
National Gird plc  No strong relationship 
Marks and Spencer plc  Total revenue with EPS 
Cairn plc   Total assets with EPS 
 Total assets with ROA 
United Utility plc  No strong relationship 
Prudential plc  No strong relationship 
Legal and General plc  Market capitalisation with EPS 
Johnson Matthey plc   Market capitalisation with EPS 
 Total revenue with EPS 
 Total assets with EPS 
Scottish and Southern Energy plc   Market capitalisation with EPS 
 Total revenue with EPS 
 Total assets with EPS 
Shire plc  Market capitalisation with ROA 
Total revenue with ROA 
Morrisons plc  Market capitalisation with EPS 
Severn Trent plc  No strong relationship 
Out of the three variables that determine company size, market capitalisation is the 
variable that gave ten positive relationships with EPS. This could be due to the fact 
that market capitalisation is influenced by the number of shares in the company and 
the share price which are the same factors that influence EPS. Because these two 
variables (market capitalisation and EPS) are influenced by the same factor (share 
price) they demonstrate a strong significant relationship with each other. Furthermore, 
total revenue and total assets also demonstrated a strong relationship with EPS. 
According to this finding executive remuneration increases could be justified on the 
basis of increases in company size corresponding to good company performance.  
The significant relationship found between executive remuneration and company size; 
company size and company performance; and the weak relationship between 
executive remuneration and company performance suggest that there are more factors 
that influence the executive remuneration package that maybe more important than 
company performance. This could be justified by the elements that drive executive 
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remuneration level high which are not necessarily linked to company performance, 
e.g. executive remuneration benchmarking, globalisation etc. discussed in chapter 1. 
Conclusion 
This chapter was set out to examine the pay for performance paradigm. Past studies in 
the area have identified no significant relationship between executive pay and 
company performance. Most of the studies were based on cash pay and considering 
annual cash bonus as cash payment. Very few studies considered variable pay with 
limitations of study period. In this chapter cash pay, variable pay and total pay were 
used to determine the relationship between pay and performance. Two long term 
performance measures TSR and ROA were used and one short term performance 
measure EPS used. On a general note, the result obtained suggest that there exist a 
weak relationship between executive/CEO pay and company performance using TSR, 
EPS and ROA as performance measure. On the other hand, the findings suggest that 
there exist more positive relationship between executive/CEO pay and company 
performance using EPS as the performance measure. These results suggest that 
companies are more involved in the short term achievement of the company (EPS 
results) than the long term success of the company (TSR and ROA results). The 
diversity of performance measures used by individual companies makes it difficult to 
determine the link between pay and performance a group of companies. Also, 
different companies use different time periods over which performance is measured 
and delivered and studying many companies together could face the problem of 
balancing time perspectives. Therefore looking at the findings on an individual 
company basis there exist a significant relationship between pay and performance for 
most of the companies depending on the performance measure used. The findings also 
suggest that company size is a strong determinant of executive remuneration which is 
consistent with all past researches on the subject. 
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Chapter 6: The Role of the Law 
Introduction  
The law does not make provisions on how executive remuneration should determine. 
The UKCGC has made a set of recommendations on how executive remuneration 
should be determined (discussed in chapter 4). Despite this, the law does have strong 
role to play by acting as a corrective instrument in instances where remuneration 
levels or structure are deemed inappropriate or excessive. Company law and corporate 
governance highlight the shareholders as the key players in controlling executive pay 
levels.
749
. 
The UK legislature’s interest in executive remuneration began in the early 1990s 
when the level of executive pay was rapidly increasing with tenuous links between 
pay and performance. In late 1994, the 70% pay rise given to the then CEO (Mr 
Cedric Brown) of British Gas plc  generated public outcry and made headlines in the 
press such as ‘Fat Cat in the Dock’750 and ‘Derailing the Gravy Train’.751 Mr Brown’s 
large pay rise was criticized as at the time the company was implementing voluntary 
redundancies in relation to its employees. Parliament having previously argued that 
executive remuneration was a matter for the market and the shareholders
752
 required 
Mr Brown to defend his pay increase to the House of Commons Employment 
Committee.  
The role of the law on the determination of executive remuneration can be seen to 
operate in three stages: firstly to provide the shareholders with detailed information on 
executive remuneration (through its disclosure requirements) to enable the 
shareholder make informed judgment in the annual general meeting; secondly, the law 
vests the shareholders with voting powers to enable them influence the pay setting 
process (through voting rights) and; thirdly by granting the shareholders a remedy 
(through common law and statutory remedies). The objective of the role of the law is 
not to regulate the amount of remuneration given to the executives, but rather to make 
sufficient information available to shareholders to assess the appropriateness of the 
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company’s remuneration policy.753 In addition to the disclosure requirements, the law 
mandates binding and advisory votes on the remuneration report by the shareholders 
of quoted companies.  
To better analyse the role of the law in the determination of executive remuneration, 
this chapter will be split into four parts. First, director’s entitlement to executive 
remuneration will be considered. Second, the disclosure requirements and their effect 
on executive remuneration as well as their weaknesses will be discussed. The third 
part will consider the mandatory shareholder binding and non-binding voting power 
on the remuneration report, its effect and possible problems. Fourth, and finally, the 
chapter will discuss shareholder remedies in cases of excessive executive 
remuneration. 
Director’s entitlement to remuneration 
By default, directors’ have no lawful entitlement to remuneration as was decided in 
the case of Hutton v West Cork Railway Co
754
, unless otherwise than stated in the 
company’s articles of association or in a separate contract.755 The articles of 
association or the service contract (usually the latter) will make clear provisions and 
detail the appropriate decision making process for the determination of director’s 
remuneration. Once there is a provision for remuneration, it is payable whether the 
company makes profit or not
756
 and the director will be ranked as an ordinary creditor 
in the case of the company winding up.
757
  
The directors’ of a company have no authority to pay themselves or anyone else the 
company’s money unless authorised by the company’s constitution or an approval of 
its members.
758
 In the case of Guiness plc v Saunders
759
 the House of Lords decided 
that payments made to a director were void if not decided upon by the whole board 
according to the company’s articles of association. If the director of a company pays 
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himself remuneration out of the company’s fund, he could be compelled to restore it, 
even though he believed it was permissible.
760
 However, the courts can make its own 
determination of director’s remuneration if the company’s articles of association fail 
to provide how remuneration was determined.
761
 The law has been reluctant to impose 
restrictions on executive remuneration thereby giving powers to the board through the 
company’s articles of association to decide on executive remuneration. This is 
because the law considers that the managements of companies have the expertise in 
the job and are in the best position to make informed decisions on the determination 
of executive remuneration.  
As indicated above the law does not make provisions on how executive remuneration 
should be set, however, it adopts rather a corrective measure on the setting of 
executive pay where executive pay is regarded as excessive. The corrective measures 
includes, the requirement for all quoted companies to disclose information relating to 
executive remuneration setting process, empowering the shareholders with voting 
rights on remuneration policy as a means of influencing the remuneration setting 
process. The next section of this chapter will discuss executive remuneration 
disclosure requirements, its aims and effectiveness as a means of informing 
shareholders (and others) on pay issues and to make the payment of directors more 
transparent. 
Remuneration Disclosure Requirements 
The purpose of disclosing information on executive remuneration is to bring 
transparency and accountability to the pay setting process. Generally, disclosure also 
aims to prevent fraud and protect investors and potential investors by enabling them 
to make accurate decisions.
762
 Based on remuneration issues, it aims to enrich the 
shareholder with relevant information on executive remuneration policy that will 
enable them to influence the determination process of executive remuneration. CA 
2006 also aims to enhance shareholder engagement in making decisions that will 
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promote the long-term success of the company.
763
 The directors of the company are 
responsible for the disclosure of this information.
764
 Before the CA 2006, disclosure 
requirements under CA 1985 were limited. Section 232 merely required the directors 
to disclose the emoluments of the highest paid directors and chairman, the aggregate 
emoluments of all directors, and loss of office payments. The information did not 
have to specify who the highest paid director was, or the remuneration of individual 
directors. The Act did not provide a method of disclosure and also the remuneration 
for the highest paid director was not broken down to the various components of the 
remuneration package. Consequently, monitoring executive remuneration was a 
difficult task as the information available to the shareholders was limited.
765
 Due to 
the limitations in the CA 1985, the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 
(DRRR 2002) inserted several new provisions into the CA 1985, which were later 
largely transplanted into the CA 2006 (CA 2006). Further disclosure requirements 
have been introduced into the CA 2006 by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013. These greater disclosure requirements have been placed on the directors in 
relation to their remuneration as a means to create an open and effective framework to 
increase transparency and accountability in the pay setting process and the quality of 
information disclosed.
766
 The shareholders having access to information on executive 
remuneration will enable them to make informed judgements when voting on the 
remuneration report at a general meeting. If the remuneration report is rejected by the 
shareholders, the company will be bound to re-consider how the remuneration 
package was determined. This process backs up the fact that the role of the law in the 
determination of executive remuneration is corrective.  
Companies are required to disclose in their annual accounts aggregate directors’ 
remuneration
767. The rules relating to the disclosure of director’s remuneration are 
contained in the CA 2006, the Small Companies and Groups (Accounts and Director’s 
                                                          
763
 Charlotte Villiers, ‘Narrative Reporting and Enlightened Shareholder Value Under the Companies 
Act 2006’ in Keay A and Loughrey J (eds), Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Litigation in the Wake 
of the Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 97. 
764
 Charlotte Villiers, Corporate Reporting and Company Law (Cambridge University Press 2006) 15. 
765
 Lee Roach, ‘The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 and the Disclosure of Executive 
Remuneration’ (2004) 25(5) Co. Law. 141. 
766
 F Ferri and D Maber, ‘Say on Pay Vote and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK’ (2010) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1420394 at 1. 
767
 CA 2006, s 412. 
221 
 
Report) Regulations 2008
768
 (for unquoted companies), and the Large and Medium-
sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008
769
 (for quoted 
companies). Companies are required to disclose the highest paid director’s 
emoluments and other benefits, excess retirement benefits of past directors and 
payment for loss of office. 
Quoted companies (companies listed on the London Stock Exchange) are required to 
disclosure more information on executive remuneration than unquoted companies. 
Quoted companies are required to produce a remuneration report
770
 which will be 
included in the company’s annual accounts and reports and subject to shareholder 
approval in the annual general meeting.
771
 The directors’ remuneration report applies 
to all companies incorporated in the UK that are listed on major UK or foreign stock 
exchanges, and therefore does not apply to UK companies trading on the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM), nor foreign firms listed in the UK.
772
 Quoted companies 
are required to disclose under the remuneration report, all the information that is 
subject to audit (which include the single figure table, share options, long-term 
incentive schemes, excess retirement benefits, payments for loss of office and 
pension) and information not subject to audit (which includes composition of the 
remuneration committee and advisers, statement on director’s remuneration policy, 
performance graph, service contract and compensation for past directors). This study 
will focus on quoted companies, particularly on FTSE 100 companies’ disclosure 
requirements. 
Quoted companies are required to produce a remuneration report that is split into three 
distinct sections, namely (i) a statement from the chair of remuneration committee; (ii) 
the policy report, and; (iii) the implementation report. The statement from the chair of 
the remuneration committee will summarise the major decisions on directors’ 
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remuneration, any major changes made during the year on directors’ remuneration, 
and the context in which those decisions were made.
773
  
The policy report
774
 section sets out the proposed future remuneration policy which 
must be approved by a shareholder binding vote at least once every three years (this 
vote discussed in detail later in this chapter). The objective of the policy report is to 
provide shareholders with adequate information, in order to get involved in the 
remuneration setting process. However, the policy sets out the terms on which 
executives will be paid and not the actual amount (specific figure) that may be paid to 
an executive in any particular circumstances. For example the purpose of the 
termination policy is ensure that directors who are leaving the company for poor 
performance do not receive large pay, as this denotes payment for failure. However, 
setting out golden goodbyes may not have the desired effect of stopping payment for 
failure because the company only reveals the amount paid to the departing director in 
its implementation report which is only subject to an advisory vote. 
The implementation report of the remuneration report will provide a detailed 
explanation on how the existing remuneration policy was implemented in the relevant 
financial year – the implementation report must be put to an annual non-binding 
shareholder vote
775
 (meaning that the company is not compelled to act upon it). This 
implementation report aims to provide the shareholders with an understanding of 
whether the remuneration policy was followed in the determination of executive 
remuneration, and whether it reflects the remuneration policy. Even though, this part 
of the remuneration report is only subject to a shareholder non-binding vote, it does 
enable the shareholders to compare the past remuneration policy and its outcome in 
relation to remuneration levels and the future remuneration policy which, as was 
discussed, is subject to a binding vote. 
Quoted companies are required to divide disclosure information into two parts, which 
is audit related information related to payments actually made to executives in the 
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financial year
776
 and non-audit related information relating to the company’s 
remuneration policy.
777
 Failure to disclose the required information is a criminal 
offence. The disclosure requirements will now be discussed under two sub-headings, 
which are information subject to audit
778
 and information not subject to audit.  The 
audited information is information which an independent body from the company has 
inspected to check its accuracy and relevance. Non-audited information is therefore 
information that has not been checked by an independent body for its accuracy. 
Information subject to audit 
It is information that is subject to independent third party verification. It relates to 
remuneration figures that were paid to the executives in the year.  
The single total figure remuneration table 
Before the coming into force of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, there 
was no uniformity in disclosure of executive remuneration information in the UK. 
The CA 2006 had failed to set out how the companies should disclose the 
information. This therefore implied that each company disclosed information in the 
way that they deemed appropriate and thus creating a variety in disclosure patterns 
amongst companies. Consequently, it became very difficult to understand some of the 
information that was disclosed in the remuneration report and comparison with other 
companies was difficult as they all disclosed in different ways. This weakness in the 
law threatened to defeat the purpose of the law which was to give the shareholder 
access to more information and increase accountability in the pay setting process. It is 
worth noting here that outside of the single figure remuneration table, there still exists 
no uniformity in the disclosure of remuneration information.
779
 The technical and 
complex nature of remuneration packages together with the extensive disclosure 
requirements left the shareholders with too much information, which many found 
difficult to understand due to lack of the necessary expertise. This lack of uniformity 
in disclosure requirement may likely discourage shareholders from monitoring pay 
and voting on the issue. 
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The requirement of disclosing a single total figure
780
 of pay for each director is 
probably the biggest change to the Large and Medium-Sized Companies and Groups 
(Accounts and Reports) Regulation 2008, as this will probably attract the interest of 
the public and the media. The aim of the single figure table is to provide shareholders 
with clear and simple figures on each director’s remuneration. The change was 
introduced because executive remuneration disclosure was not uniform, whilst most 
of the companies disclosed only base salary, bonus and benefits on a table, leaving the 
shareholders to work out the pay for share options and long-term incentive plans. It 
was very difficult for shareholders to work out how much an executive was paid 
because the complexity of share options and long-term incentive scheme required 
time and expertise for the shareholders to calculate. The provision of a single table 
figure means that the shareholder can get the required information at a glance and 
make comparisons easily. The amount disclosed on the single figure table, will enable 
the shareholder to judge whether or not the remuneration policy on the determination 
of executive pay was followed or not. The single figure table acts to the shareholders 
as a translation of the remuneration policy that was provided to them in words to be 
voted upon. If shareholders are dissatisfied with the single figure table, it may make 
them start to consider more what the remuneration policy means, if there are words or 
jargon that were not understood, and how to better tackle the next remuneration policy 
that would be needing their votes on. The remuneration report is required to show a 
single total figure of remuneration for each director
781
, broken down into its various 
components (including base salary, taxable benefit, pension, bonuses, long-term 
incentive schemes and share options, denoted by the letters a-e in the table below)
782
 
and reported on a table format provided by the regulation. The form of the table
783
 
required is: 
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Figure 14: A template of a single figure remuneration table 
 
Below is an example of an actual table of United Utilities plc that implemented the 
single figure table in its annual accounts and report 2013.  
Figure 15: An example of a single figure table from United Utilities plc 
 
Source: United Utilities plc Annual Reports and Accounts 2013, pg 64 
The single figure table aims to provide the shareholders with remuneration figures 
that will indicate the remuneration levels of each director of the company. If the level 
of pay is not closely linked to company performance, the shareholders can make 
informed judgment by voting on the future remuneration policy. The single figure 
table does not really provide the shareholders with enough information to determine 
whether or not pay is closely linked to company performance as it only shows what 
was paid out and not about the appropriateness of the performance conditions used.
784
 
However, the shareholders, investors, public and the media will have to treat the 
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single total figure carefully due to its volatility that may be caused by the inclusion of 
the long-term incentive schemes and share options. The constant change in number of 
share awards, the number of exercised share options, and the share price at a 
particular time may influence how much money a director can make. Furthermore, the 
achievement of performance conditions for long-term incentive schemes and share 
options at a particular time also determines how much the director will receive. This 
volatility in share price and long-term incentive plans can therefore influence the 
amount disclosed on the single figure table at any given time.  
Share option awards stretches through many years to mature at a particular time and a 
single figure table may not be enough to provide detailed information on how the 
figure was arrived at. Therefore the disclosure of share options on a separate table in 
addition to the single figure table would provide detailed information and enable 
shareholders to better understand the share option figure in the single figure table. In 
the US, companies are required to disclose the grant of plan-based awards on a 
separate table in addition to a single figure table. This helps to explain more the 
amount the executives might have had under share options. SEC rules also require the 
following to be disclosed on separate tables in the remuneration report. These are: a 
table for options exercised and stock vested a table for outstanding equity awards at 
fiscal year-end, a table for nonqualified deferred compensation, a table for pension 
grants, and a summary compensation table which contains compensation of all the 
executives in the company in the last three years. The disclosure of all this 
information on a table makes it very easy for the shareholders to read and compare 
how executive remuneration has been changing over the years. This part of disclosure 
requirement is still lacking in the UK and it would be useful if the UK companies 
were required to disclose share option information in a defined way like the system 
used in the US.  
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Disclosing share options
785
and long-term incentive plans
786
 
Quoted companies are required to disclose information on share options in a tabular 
form for each person that served as a director at any time in the year covered by the 
report. Information such as number of directors subject to share options, shares 
exercised, granted, expired, performance conditions, the lowest and highest price of 
share during the financial year. The disclosure of this information together with the 
single figure table requirement aims to enable the shareholders to compare how much 
the executives are having in shares. The CA 2006 failed to include the disclosure of 
cost of each director’s share options. This is because share options are granted to 
directors at a cost to the company. Thus, it would be very important that the company 
reports the expected value of the grant as this will enable the shareholders to monitor 
the fluctuations in value.
787
 The lack of disclosure on the cost of grant share option 
makes it very difficult to calculate the total executive remuneration package in 
reference to the company’s profit.  
The 25 companies under study have clearly demonstrated this weakness in the law 
before the coming into force of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2013. The 
Table below gives some of the inconsistencies in the way the companies disclose 
information in the annual reports in relation to share options and LTIPs. 
Table 13: Some Disclosure Differences amongst the 25 Companies under study 
 Company Disclosing all financial figures on 
remuneration on a table (including 
share options and long-term 
incentive plans) 
1.  Antofagasta plc plc  X 
2.  AstraZeneca plc plc  X 
3.  Barclays plc plc   
4.  BHP Billiton plc plc   
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5.  Cairn plc plc  X 
6.  GlaxoSmithKline plc  X 
7.  HSBC plc  X 
8.  ICAP plc   
9.  J. Sainsbury plc   
10.  Johnson Matthey plc  X 
11.  Kingfisher plc  X 
12.  Legal and General plc  X 
13.  Lonmin plc  X 
14.  Mark and Spencer plc  X 
15.  National Grid plc   
16.  Prudential plc  X 
17.  Rio Tinto plc   
18.  Scottish and Southern Energy 
plc  
X 
19.  Severn Trent plc  X 
20.  Shire plc  X 
21.  Smith and Nephew plc  X 
22.  Tesco plc   
23.  United Utilities plc   
24.  Morrison plc  X 
25.  Xstrata plc  X 
Reading through the annual reports of the 25 companies under study, only eight 
companies disclosed remuneration figures that included share options and long-term 
incentive plans. From these annual reports, it was found that companies that disclose 
their information on tables rather than in plain words are more explicit and easy to 
understand. Disclosing the information on a table also makes it very easy to compare 
remuneration policies with other peer companies, while it is very difficult trying to 
read those that are not tabulated to pick up the relevant information and then compare 
with others. This difficulty will now be overcome by the single figure table disclosure 
requirement.  
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Eight companies in the sample population disclosed financial elements of the 
remuneration package for each director on a single table which also included share 
option awards and long-term incentive schemes, while the remaining seventeen 
companies disclosed only base salary, bonus and benefit on one table and the figures 
for share options and long-term incentive schemes separately. For those companies 
that disclosed their financial information in different sections, it meant that readers of 
the annual report must read through the whole report thoroughly to find out what the 
executives were rewarded as share options and long-term incentive plans. 
Furthermore, some of the companies (e.g. Scottish and Southern Energy plc) 
disclosed the amount received by the executives as share option and long-term 
incentive plans as notes to the tables containing information on share options 
(explaining how many shares granted, exercised, lapsed, share price). However, some 
companies disclosed information in a way that is similar to the new disclosure 
requirement - to demonstrate this change in disclosure method it is worth comparing 
the remuneration tables of two different companies. Legal & General’s remuneration 
table provides an example of how companies were disclosing remuneration figures 
before the single figure remuneration table was introduced. 
Figure 16: Legal & General plc executive remuneration table 2011 
Legal & General plc annual report and accounts 2011, pg 38 
The table below is that of United Utilities plc which, as noted above, has already 
implemented the single remuneration figure table. 
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Figure 17: The single figure remuneration table of United Utilities plc 2013 
 
United Utilities plc Annual Reports and Accounts 2013, pg 64 
The second table above gives a good example of a tabulated and easy to read 
disclosure pattern. The names of all the executives are listed, together with all the 
remuneration they have received for the current and past year. The table also include 
all the components of an executive remuneration package. As regards companies that 
do not disclose in this tabulated manner, readers of their remuneration reports will be 
required to go through the entire remuneration report to be able to come out with the 
information that could easily have been obtainable if the information were disclosed 
on a table as above. 
From the two examples above, the single-figure table by United Utilities plc  makes it 
easy to understand how much individual directors where paid under the various 
components and the total remuneration of the year. It is also easy to make a 
comparison of the pay increases from the previous year thereby facilitating its 
comparisons with company performance. However, the remuneration table by Legal 
& General plc only provides part of the information on directors’ remuneration. This 
therefore means that the shareholders would have to go through the rest of the 
remuneration report to find out what the individual directors were paid under long 
term incentive plans and share options. The single figure table is therefore a positive 
change towards clarity in executive remuneration disclosure. 
231 
 
Information not subject to audit 
Information not subject to audit refers to the non-financial information on executive 
remuneration which includes the remuneration policy. The law does not require 
companies to set up a REMCO however; it states that if executive remuneration was 
set by a committee, then members of such committee should be disclosed.
788
 This 
disclosure requirement is important as the REMCO has been criticised to be 
associated with higher remuneration levels.
789
 A study by the High Pay Centre reveals 
that the REMCO is associated with executive pay increases as the committee is 
mostly made up of executives and former executives of other companies.
790
 The law 
does not require companies to set up a REMCO however; it states that if executive 
remuneration was set by a committee, then members of such committee should be 
disclosed.
791
  
The UKCGC’s792 recommendation on the disclosure of RCONs has been adopted by 
the CA 2006 under the Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts 
and Reports) Regulations 2008. Quoted companies are required to disclose any person 
who provided the REMCO with advice and show how they judged the advice from 
the remuneration advisers to be objective and independent.
793
  This would include a 
director of the company who was not a member of the committee, and if the director 
was from the company, the report should state whether he was appointed by the 
committee and the nature of any other services provided to the company during that 
financial year. As a result of other services that the remuneration adviser’s 
consultancy firm offers to the company, their remuneration advice may not be 
objective as they seek to keep their business dealing with the company.
794
 This is 
provision is intended to provide transparency in the pay setting process as 
                                                          
788
 Large and Medium-Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulation 2008, Sch. 8. 
Pt. 3, reg 22(1)(a). 
789
 C. Vince, Association of British Insurers Conference, June 2011 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/news/speeches/vince-cable-association-british-insurers-2011 assessed on the 
21st of January 2012. 
790
 High Pay Centre, The New Closed Shop: Who’s Deciding on Pay? The Make Up of Remuneration 
Committees (High Pay Centre 2013) 9. 
791
 Large and Medium-Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulation 2008, Sch. 8. 
Pt. 3, reg 22(1)(a). 
792
 FRC, The UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2012) D.2.1 
793
 Large and Medium-Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008, Sch 8, 
para 22(1)(c)(iii). 
794
 Ruth Bender, ‘Paying For Advice: The Role of the Remuneration Consultant in UK Listed 
Companies’ (2011) 64 Vand. L. Rev. 361, 388. 
232 
 
remuneration advisers have been deemed to favour executives in their remuneration 
advice consequently resulting in high pay (discussed in detail in chapter 4). This 
disclosure requirement identifies all the individuals that took part in the remuneration 
setting process. The shareholders can use this information to assess the objectiveness 
of the members of the REMCO as well as the objectiveness of the advisers. This is 
because, if a company is using its CEO as the remuneration adviser for his own pay, 
the advice he will give will probably favour him as he will be faced with conflict of 
interest. Furthermore, if the adviser was external and also provided the company with 
other services, he may want to give advice that will favour the executives, so as to 
continue providing his other services to the company, which can amount to a clear 
conflict of interest.  
Considering that the law does not require companies to set up a REMCO it means that 
as a strict matter of law, executives could set their own pay
795
 and disclose their 
names in the remuneration report. The law in this aspect, does not require independent 
and subjective oversight of the executive remuneration, rather it simply wants the 
REMCO to disclose whether they chose their advisors themselves or some other 
persons chose for them or make the decision themselves. There are no legal rules and 
requirements on who should appoint an adviser and who could be appointed as an 
adviser to the REMCO. The absence of these rules could mean that the executives 
could appoint advisers who will be sympathetic and thus affect their independent and 
the impartial advice to the REMCO. The limitation of the law in this respect therefore 
does not cover all the existing areas of the executive remuneration setting process 
consequently, not providing the shareholder with the appropriate information to 
enable them make informed judgement on the remuneration setting process. 
Disclosing future remuneration policy 
The future remuneration policy sets out the terms on which the executives will be 
paid. The future remuneration policy is required to be disclosed in a tabular form 
describing each component of the remuneration package for directors of the 
company.
796
 The policy should include for each director, a detailed summary of 
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performance conditions to which the director is subject to, in respect of his 
entitlements to share options or under long-term incentive scheme.
797
 The disclosure 
of remuneration policy in a table is intended to make information easy and clear to 
understand. This requirement was introduced because the complex nature of the 
remuneration reports made it difficult for shareholders to read and understand the 
remuneration policy. An example of how companies used to disclose their 
remuneration policy is from Scottish & Southern plc. 
Figure 18: Remuneration policy disclosure of Scottish & Southern plc 2013  
 
Scottish & Southern plc 2013 annual report and accounts, pg 94  
An example of how remuneration policy should now be disclosed is from HSBC plc. 
The difference between the two examples is that HBOS’s remuneration policy table is 
clear and easy to read, while Legal & General’s is not and thus will require more time 
and understanding. 
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Figure 19: The Remuneration Report of HSBC plc 2013 
 
HSBC Annual Report 2013, pg 381 
The way the policy is set out on the table is clear regarding what component of the 
remuneration package is being considered, how it will be paid, the policy on that 
element whether performance measures are attached to it, if so, how it will be 
evaluated, the purpose of that element in the remuneration package and the timing. 
What has been included on a table covering only a single sheet of paper could take 
several pages to write it out. 
In cases of performance related pay, the directors need to disclose which performance 
measure that was used, details of performance period, amounts that may be paid and 
why they chose the particular performance conditions and the methods of assessing 
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the performance.
798
 Disclosing past performance conditions and how they were assess 
would give the shareholders an understanding on how performance targets are set and 
assessed, enabling them to better make informed voting decision on the future policy 
report of the remuneration report. Depending on the performance achievement of that 
year, the shareholders will be able to judge whether the targets were achievable and 
whether the executives are performing at their best ability. An explanation should be 
given as to why any remuneration component other than salary, fees, benefit and 
pension is not subject to performance measures.
799
 The implication of this provision is 
that executives could still be granted share options or long-term incentive plans 
without any performance conditions attached to it so long as the company explains 
why. Where the performance is measured with reference to an index or a peer 
company, the index or peer company must be identified in the report. Any significant 
changes to a director’s terms and conditions for the entitlement to share options or 
long-term incentives scheme must be described and explained. 
Out of the sample under study, 12 of the 25 companies disclosed their remuneration 
policy in a table. The remuneration policy was clear, simple and short, making it very 
easy to read and understand as opposed to three to four pages of the same information. 
The remuneration policy for each component of the pay packages and the 
performance target for those elements that are performance related all disclosed on a 
table. One company (Antofagasta plc) of the did not disclose information on share 
options or long-term incentive plans under the remuneration report, but rather under 
the directors’ report notes to the company’s financial statement. Although, it could be 
argued that the information was disclosed, the company failed to comply with the 
provisions of the CA 2006 which required the company to disclose such information 
under the remuneration report. However, following the coming into force of the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, all quoted companies are required to 
disclose their remuneration policy in a tabular form.  
The 2008 Regulations
800
 requires companies to disclose information that will show 
the percentage change in the CEO’s salary, fees, taxable benefit and annual bonuses 
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with the change in employee pay as a whole. The gap in the increase of executive 
remuneration and the remuneration of other employees of the same company has been 
greatly criticised.
801
 The law aims to bring transparency and accountability through 
disclosing the percentage change between executive pay and other employees. In 
2011, the average pay package for the CEO of a FTSE 100 company was 
approximately 140 times the income of the average UK worker. Within FTSE 100 
companies, CEO pay has gone from being around 40 times that of the average 
employee in 1998, to 140 times in 2011.
802
 FTSE 100 CEOs have seen a pay rise of 
about 480% whilst the average worker has seen a pay rise of about 15%.
803
 Disclosing 
this information might start to make the executives to have a rethink about their pay 
and that of the other employees of the company. It is obvious that the executives have 
more responsibilities to the company than the other employees. However, it does not 
seem right for executive remuneration to increase significantly in a year whilst the pay 
of rank-and-file employees remains the same or increases slightly. No specific format 
is indicated although it has to be in a form that enables comparisons.  
Disclosing the company’s total shareholder return graph 
Quoted companies are required to provide a TSR performance line graph.
804
 The 
company needs to come up with a table that will show the CEO’s total remuneration 
and the percentage of his bonus or incentives that vested for the short and long-term 
incentive plans. This new graph or table will show the total pay for all employees 
compared to total dividends and share buyback and companies can choose to add 
more measures if they so desire. The name of the index selected and the reason for 
selecting that index should be stated. Due to the lack of guidelines or best practice on 
choosing comparator groups, a company could chose an index that would portray its 
company as performing well using total shareholder return. Going through the 25 
companies used in this study, nine companies had already been disclosing their 
comparator groups. One of which is BHP Billiton plc. BHP Billiton has used the 
following companies since 2004 to 2010 as comparator groups. 
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Table 14: BHP Billiton comparator group between the periods 2003-2011 
company 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Alcan X X X X      
Alcoa X X X X X X X X x 
Alumina X X X X      
Anglo 
America 
X X X X X X X X x 
Apache     X X X  X 
BG Group  X X X X X X X X 
BP  X X X     X 
Cameco  X X X X X X X x 
ConocoPhillips X X X X   X   
Devon Energy     X X   x 
Exxon Mobil  X X X     x 
Falconbridge  X X X      
Freepost 
McMoRan 
X X X X X X X X x 
Impala   X X X      
Inco X X X X      
Marathon Oil X X X X      
Newmont 
Mining 
X X X X      
Norilsk  X X X X X X X x 
Peabody 
Energy 
    X X X X x 
Phelps Dodge X X X X      
Rio Tinto X X X X X X X X X 
Shell  X X X     X 
Southern 
Copper 
    X X X X X 
Teck Cominco     X X X  X 
Total  X X X      
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Vale X X X X X X X X X 
Woodside 
Petroleum 
X X X X X X X X X 
Xstrata X X X X X X X X X 
Comparator companies in executive remuneration benchmarking are an important 
determinant of executive remuneration. The choice of comparator group that a 
company uses could have a significant effect on the pay levels of that company.
805
 
Although the CA 2006 requires companies to provide a TSR graph in reference to a 
named index (equity market index) giving reasons for selecting the index, it does not 
explicitly require companies to list the companies in their comparator group. This 
could be regarded as a limitation in the law due to the fact that executive remuneration 
benchmarking is an important determinant of executive remuneration level. There 
exists no best practice on the benchmarking of executive remuneration. This leaves 
companies with the choice to choose any company they deem appropriate as their 
comparator consequently, companies could chose comparator groups that will result 
in an increase in their remuneration levels. The determination of executive 
remuneration through the act of benchmarking has become very common as almost all 
the companies are engaged in remuneration benchmarking and disclosing this 
information will give the shareholder an increased chance of understanding the 
remuneration report. Disclosing this information can also enable the shareholder to 
notice any changes made in the list of comparator groups and enquire as to why such 
changes were made. The CA 2006 simply requiring a disclosure of TSR against any 
named index without requiring the companies to disclose their comparator group 
therefore fails to make provision for one of the most important determinants of 
executive remuneration- executive remuneration benchmarking. 
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Figure 20: The Total Shareholder Return Graph for Prudential plc 2012 
 
Source: Prudential Annual Report and Accounts 2012, pg 127 
The performance graph above shows that Prudential was doing very well in terms of 
their TSR as oppose to their peer group. The question requiring investigation here is 
how they selected the peer groups since they are not required to disclose this 
information.
806
 However, the effect of lack of best practice on choosing comparator 
groups may cause some companies to choose comparators groups that will portray 
how well the company is performing. 
The performance graph does not include values of share options. The performance 
graph is meant to enable the shareholders to assess the performance of the company, 
and therefore the performance of the executives. Share options are a component of 
executive remuneration package and expected to be linked to shareholder return, 
therefore for share options not to be included in the performance graph because the 
comparator groups are different, will be holding back vital information that can enable 
the shareholders to effectively assess the company’s performance which also means 
assessing the performance of the executives. 
Disclosing performance measures and targets
807
 
The Act requires quoted companies to disclose the performance targets and measures 
used as basis for their performance-related pay. Performance targets and measures are 
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very important tools in linking executive remuneration to company performance. The 
right performance target and measure can have a significant effect on the link between 
pay and performance (discussed in detail in chapter 5). The remuneration policy is 
required to contain details of the performance measures for the future, its weighting, 
and the specific performance targets set. The amount disclosed in the single total 
figure table would include; 
 amounts from performance targets set at the beginning of the period and the 
corresponding value of the award achievable, 
 details of actual performance relative to targets set and measured over the 
relevant period, and the resulting level of award; and 
 in cases where discretion has been exercised in respect of the award, how 
discretion was exercised and how the resulting level of award was determined 
This disclosure will enable shareholders when voting on the remuneration policy to 
consider whether the performance targets and measures set by the company favours 
the long-term or short-term interest of the company. This is because some 
performance measures can encourage directors to rely on the short term achievements 
of the company.
808
 The limitation of this requirement is the fact that companies might 
take advantage of the exemption that the information required is ‘commercially 
sensitive’ (information used in business which if disclosed to competitors is can affect 
the company significantly, and the company wished to limit the dissemination of this 
information)
809. For instance, a company’s performance-related scheme may include 
measures such as operating cash flow and operating profits with targets drawn from 
the company’s budget, the disclosure will reveal whether or not certain budgeted 
amounts were achieved. However, companies who will not disclose the required 
information under the exemption clause of ‘commercially sensitive information’ will 
need to explain the reasons for omission and give an indication of when (if at all) they 
will make the information available to the shareholders. 
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Disclosing recruitment policy
810
 
Companies are required to disclose the principles they will use in recruiting an 
executive and agreeing on the executive remuneration package. This would include 
the pay components to be included and how each would be determined. The 
maximum potential salary, expressed as a percentage of the salary of the highest paid 
director, as shown on the single figure remuneration table. This disclosure 
requirement would limit the value of golden hellos that executives receive when being 
hired as shareholders will be able to react on the information by either rejecting or 
confirming the value of the golden hello. However, if the company sets a maximum 
salary that exceeds the highest paid director’s salary in order to be flexible, the 
incumbent executive may feel undervalued or the market may feel the board believes 
that there is a better executive out there. As a result, new hired executives might end 
up with higher salary limit than what they actually worth. Also, if the company sets a 
salary level that is the same as the current highest paid director, they might not be able 
to hire someone that could perform even better with a little more pay. This disclosure 
requirement might also have the effect of limiting the REMCO in negotiating new 
hires which does not reflect the intention of the requirement. 
The general effect of disclosure requirements 
The main objective of the disclosure requirements is to bring transparency in the 
remuneration setting process. Disclosure also makes available information to the 
shareholders to be able to understand the remuneration policies of the company and to 
judge whether such arrangement is appropriately tailored to the company’s objectives. 
The disclosure of executive remuneration information can have a significant influence 
on the levels of executive remuneration. Disclosure of information would mean that 
the REMCO will have to justify their choices publicly, causing them to be cautious in 
decision making particularly in circumstances where there is a potential conflict of 
interest. This therefore acts as a disciplinary tool for the REMCO as shareholders can 
in the AGM vote against the re-election of the directors who are members of the 
REMCO.  
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Disclosure of executive remuneration information lowers shareholder monitoring 
costs thereby encouraging shareholder activism.
811
 Before disclosure requirements 
were made mandatory in the UK, shareholders found it difficult to obtain the 
information that they needed to be able to make informed decisions on whether or not 
the executive remuneration levels were appropriate or not. Shareholders had to spend 
time and money to be able to obtain the information they needed from the company’s 
board. With disclosure of this information becoming mandatory for all quoted 
companies means that shareholders can freely access this information without 
expending money and significant amounts of time. The disclosed information is aim 
to enable shareholders to make informed judgment on executive remuneration by 
voting. Depending on the outcome of the voting the REMCO may have to react 
accordingly which may include revising the remuneration policy or improving on 
disclosed information as the case may be.
812
 The shareholder being interested in 
making sure that executive remuneration is linked to company performance may 
increase pressure on the directors to adopt pay packages that are more sensitive to 
company performance.
813
  
Disclosure requirements can also cause the directors to be concerned about potential 
liabilities arising from erroneous statements, thus making the directors to think very 
well about what they are disclosing and how they are disclosing it. Section 463 of the 
CA 2006 imposes liability on directors to compensate the company for loss suffered 
by it as a result of any untrue or misleading statements in the directors’ remuneration 
report. The liability arises only if the directors knew that the statement was untrue or 
misleading or was reckless as to whether it was true or not. Under the provisions of 
s463 the law seems inadequate as liability will arise only in deceit or negligence, and 
only to the company, and only for a loss suffered as a result of the statement.
814
 The 
shareholders may also claim they suffer a loss as a consequence of the director’s 
deceit or negligence, in which case they may seek redress on behalf of the company 
through shareholder remedies discussed later in the chapter. This section acts as a safe 
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harbour for defaulted executives as it is difficult for liability to arise in deceit; the loss 
suffered in this case will be difficult to identify.  
On a general note, the effect of disclosure is hoped to better align directors’ interests 
with that of the company through the strengthening of the link between executive 
remuneration and company performance. The undesired effect of remuneration 
disclosure has been to increase pay levels rather than decrease them.
815
 Clarke et 
al’s816 study of 342 company chairmen on listed companies of all sizes found out that 
half of the chairmen of UK companies were of the opinion that pay disclosure had 
resulted in an increase in pay levels. This is because the executives had used the 
availability of remuneration data through disclosure requirements from other 
companies to compare their pay levels of those of their peers. Executives may tend to 
demand for more pay in cases where they were paid less than their peers, or threaten 
to leave the company to other company that would offer a better pay level and 
structure than his current company. 
The law intends to give the shareholder information on the remuneration policy to 
enable the shareholders to act on in the annual general meeting. The shareholders can 
exercise this power by voting on the remuneration policy or voting against the re-
election of the directors. This chapter will now tend to the voting powers of the 
shareholder. 
Shareholder vote on remuneration report 
The second method in which the law influences executive remuneration pay 
determination is by giving the members the opportunity to vote on the remuneration 
report. The objective for giving members of the company voting rights on 
remuneration issues is for members to be able to hold the directors to account over the 
structure and levels of executive remuneration. It also invests members with more 
powers to prevent reward for failure and make sure pay is more closely linked to 
company performance. Members vote on executive remuneration may also increase 
transparency in remuneration reporting as it indicates what directors are earning and 
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how it is linked to the company’s strategy and performance. It is also intended to 
encourage a better relationship between the company and its members as voting may 
cause the executives to communicate more with the shareholders when determining 
pay to avoid a vote against the remuneration report. If the shareholders vote against 
the remuneration report, the REMCO would have to redress the situation by re-
considering how the remuneration package was set. In this way the role of the law 
would be influencing the remuneration setting process without necessarily providing 
for what should and should not be the appropriate determination process. Before the 
introduction of shareholder binding vote shareholders were given only a non-binding 
vote on executive remuneration report to which we now turn. 
Shareholder vote before the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 
Under s 439 of the CA 2006, shareholders were only entitled to a non-binding vote on 
the remuneration report. This meant that if the shareholders voted down the 
remuneration policy of a company that company was not compelled to act on it. An 
example was the case of Lonmin plc where in 2005, the shareholders voted down the 
remuneration report on the ground that the ex-gratia bonus payment of £500,000 
given to a retiring NED was too generous. Although the remuneration policy was 
voted down, the company did not act on the vote. Similarly, in Grainger plc, the 
shareholders also voted down the company’s 2010 remuneration policy on the 
account that a £2.9 million payoff offered to the former CEO of the company was too 
generous, but the company did not reduce the payoff. Even though, companies were 
not compelled to act on the non-binding votes, many companies did react to the 
shareholders votes against the remuneration report to correct the point of 
disagreement. This was the case because members of the company can reject the 
remuneration report if they so desire, and also pass the ordinary resolution needed to 
remove the directors.
817
 
The table below gives examples of companies whose remuneration reports were voted 
down by the shareholders and the reaction of the company to that effect. The table 
also details the principal issue that caused the remuneration report to be voted down, 
and the changes the company made to the remuneration policy (if any changes were 
made). 
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Table 15: Voted down remuneration reports from 2003-2013 
Company  Year Principal issue Reaction  
GlaxoSmithKline 2003 £22 million severance 
payment to the then 
CEO 
The remuneration 
committee was 
replaced and the CEO 
termination provisions 
reduced. 
Aegis Group 2004 24 months service 
contract 
CEO resigned, and the 
contract term reduced 
United Business 
Media 
 
 
2005 
 
 
 
£250,000 retirement 
bonus 
 
 
Money voluntarily 
handed back to the 
company by the CEO 
 
Goshawk Insurance 2005 £100,000 payment 
made to the CEO 
None 
MFI Furniture 
Group 
2005 A parachute clause of 
18 months liquidated 
damages 
Provision removed 
from the remuneration 
policy 
Lonmin 2005 £500,000 ex-gratia 
bonus to a retiring non-
executive 
None 
Croda International 2006 CEO’s contract 
provided for 
termination payment in 
excess of one year’s 
salary and benefit 
CEO’s contract 
reviewed 
Bellway 2008 Bonuses paid despite 
not meeting targets set 
More objective future 
arrangements made 
although the 
remuneration 
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committee still have 
some discretion over it 
RBS 2009 Large pension for 
outgoing CEO while 
the company was 
experiencing a £40 
billion loss 
Pension payment re-
negotiated and 
resulted in a lump sum 
payment 
Shell 2009 Awarding bonuses as 
part of LTI despite 
missing performance 
targets 
Additional 
performance measures 
introduced in the 
remuneration policy 
Provident Financial  2009 High base salary 
increase for its 
executives and 
introduction of deferred 
bonuses 
None 
Punch Taverns 2009 Increased pension 
contributions and 9 
times basic salary as 
payoff to departing 
directors 
Increased 
communication with 
shareholders 
Grainger 2010 £2.9 million payoff to 
former CEO 
None 
SIG 2010 Increase in CEO’s basic 
salary 
None  
21
st
 Century 
Technology 
2010 Generous bonuses to its 
directors 
None 
Easyjet 2011 £1 million fixed cash 
payment to the CEO 
The CEO left the 
company 
Robert Walters 2011 Awarded bonuses 
above its self-imposed 
guidelines 
None  
Aviva 2012 Increase in CEO basic Review of golden 
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pay and ‘golden 
handshake’ bonus to 
new executives 
handshake packages, 
and CEO stand down 
Cairn’s Ernergy 2012 Bonus pay of £3m to 
the chairman 
Chairman voted out, 
increased dialogue 
with shareholders 
WPP 2012 
 
Increase in pay packet 
of CEO 
None 
Pendragon 2012 
 
Proposed to raise 
performance related pay 
to 150% of base salary 
 
Remuneration policy 
was not implemented, 
further consultations 
made with the 
shareholders 
 
City of London 
Investment Group 
plc  
2013 Payment to former 
CEO and finance 
officers leaving the 
company after three 
months of service 
None 
From the table above, 22 companies saw their remuneration report voted down within 
the periods 2003-2013. About 59% of the 22 companies above reacted to the 
shareholder remuneration votes, demonstrating that even though the shareholder vote 
was non-binding, companies still reacted to it, consequently influencing the pay 
setting process of the company. Some companies still changed their remuneration 
policy even after the remuneration policy was approved. For example in 2009, the 
shareholders of Mark & Spencer’s voted against the re-election of Louise Patten, the 
then chairman of the RC, after the company saw 10.41% of votes cast against the 
remuneration report and 89.59% votes cast in favour of the remuneration report.
818
 
This therefore implies that although shareholder votes were non-binding, it had a 
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notable impact on the remuneration setting process as the directors were trying to 
avoid shareholders voting against their re-election in the annual general meeting. 
The advisory vote only allowed shareholders to separate remuneration issues from 
issues that were specific to the executives and express their dissatisfaction in a public 
way.
819
 However, the law was limited because the outcome of the votes on 
remuneration report resolution had no effect on the validity of the remuneration policy 
as explained above. This meant that the non-binding vote was just for the shareholders 
to show their disagreement on the remuneration policy. The shareholders did not vote 
on the individual package of directors but on the report as a whole. The voting was to 
be decided by an ordinary resolution, meaning it needed only a simple majority for the 
vote to pass.
820
  
The CA 2006 requires the results on the AGM voting on remuneration report to be 
published on the company’s website.821 Together with the information to be disclosed 
by quoted companies, also required are the date of the meeting, a description of the 
subject matter of the resolution,
822
 and votes for and against and withheld votes.
823
 
The purpose for this information is to enable the company assesses shareholders 
engagement in the company’s decision making. Before 2013, companies were not 
required to disclose withheld votes making it difficult to assess shareholder 
involvement in the remuneration setting process. The disclosure of withheld votes on 
remuneration report could indicate shareholder activism in influencing the 
remuneration setting process of a company. The percentages of the votes for and 
against published on the company’s website is calculated only on the amount of votes 
that were actually cast. Of the 25 companies over the period 2003-2011, all votes on 
executive remuneration were done by poll. The voting data could not be obtained for 
the periods 1996-2002 as at the time this information was not being disclosed by the 
companies. The poll results were disclosed on the company’s website, with 24 of the 
companies disclosing the votes for, votes against and abstention votes.  Only two of 
the 25 companies have had one of their remuneration reports rejected but many of 
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them having high dissent percentages although the resolutions passed. Ignoring the 
abstention votes, most of the companies had as high as 98% and above votes in favour 
of their remuneration report. This indicated a strong agreement of the shareholders 
with the remuneration report. But what these voting results did not explain was the 
fact that executive remuneration did not stop rising, with the shareholders and the 
public lashing out on excessive executive remuneration. For example, FTSE 100 
executives experienced a 50% pay rise in the year 2010
824
 and the British Prime 
Minister, David Cameron reacted by calling on the big companies to be more 
transparent when they are deciding on executive pay.
825
 Executive remuneration has 
even been termed as ‘corrosive’ to the UK economy.826 Considering that the voting 
rights were given to the shareholders to enable them to influence the remuneration 
setting process, this result therefore leaves shareholder voting powers as a means of 
influencing the remuneration setting process questionable. This study will examine 
the shareholder non-binding voting on the remuneration report in the AGM of the 25 
companies in the study sample within the periods 2003-2011. 
The graphs below represents the dissent levels of the 25 companies individually and 
in their sectors from 2003 – 2011. Executive pay has been a contentious issue for over 
three decades in the UK and given the shareholder non-binding votes on remuneration 
reports it would have been expected for most companies to see high dissent levels on 
remuneration report. Furthermore, one would expect to see more companies having 
their remuneration reports voted down by the shareholders to demonstrate 
shareholders’ involvement in executive pay issues. The graphs tend to suggest two 
things: firstly, either the shareholders are mostly happy with remuneration reports and 
therefore voting in favour of it or secondly, shareholder are not using the powers 
vested upon them and thereby not voting on remuneration reports. From these two 
suggestions, the researcher tends to agree with the second point rather than the first 
because shareholders continue to complain about the lack of relationship between pay 
and performance. It is worth noting here that institutional investors are in a better 
position to influence the pay setting process as they hold the majority shares than 
individual shareholders. However, the graphs below do not provide evidence on the 
fact that executive pay is a contentious issue. The graphs does not provide a full 
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picture of the dissent votes for all the companies as some companies did not disclose 
voting information on their company’s website. Therefore, the graphs represent the 
companies and years for which voting data was available. Figure 21 below represent 
the dissent levels of the five companies in the mining sector. 
Figure 21: Shareholder vote against the remuneration report in the Mining Sector 
  
Xstrata plc stands out as the company that has had the highest (37%) dissent level 
within the time frame while Xstrata plc stands out as the company whose dissent 
levels have been over 20% for four years out of the nine years examined. In the four 
instances, the rebellion was centred on executive bonus awards. For example, in 2011, 
the shareholder revolted against the remuneration report because executives were 
awarded excessive bonuses at a time when the company’s performance was taking a 
downturn.
827
 In 2012, which is not included on the graph, the company saw a 40% 
shareholder vote against the remuneration report on the grounds that executive pay 
structure was not linked to company performance.
828
 This suggest that Xstrata plc 
may not be considering company performance as a significant factor in the 
determination of executive pay (as discussed in chapter 4) or it might be based on the 
performance conditions of the company (as discussed in chapter 5).The Department of 
Business Innovation & Skills considers 20% or more shareholders failing to vote for 
                                                          
827
 David Robertson, ‘Co-op Joins Investors’ Revolt Over Executive Pay at Xstrata’ (The Times, May 9 
2011). 
828
 Emily Gosden and Emma Rowley, ‘Xstrata Investors Revolt Over Glencoe Merger and Pay’ (The 
Telegraph 01 May 2012). 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
V
o
te
s 
A
ga
in
st
 (
%
) 
Year 
Rio Tinto
BHP Billiton
Antofagasta
Lonmin
Xstrata
251 
 
the remuneration report as a high level of dissent.
829
 With the new disclosure 
requirement on voting, a 20% dissent vote would be regarded as a significant 
percentage against, and the directors would be expected to give a summary of the 
reasons for the votes and any actions taken in response to the shareholders’ 
concerns.
830
 Although companies were not compelled to act on non-binding votes, 
consistent high dissent level of votes against the remuneration report was expected to 
communicate to the management the dissatisfaction of the shareholders. From the 
graph above, two companies in the sector had dissent votes of more than 20%. 
Figure 22 below represents voting dissent of the five companies in the Utility sector. 
Between the periods under study which is 2004-2011, only one company (National 
Grid) had seen dissent levels above 20%.  
Figure 22:  shareholder votes against the remuneration report in the Utility Sector 
 
The graph above indicates that the five companies in this sector between the years 
2004-2011 have been satisfied with their executive remuneration packages except for 
National Grid plc in 2011. Shareholders of National Grid plc voted against the 
remuneration report on the grounds that executives’ bonuses were increasing at a time 
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when the company was sending jobs to India.
831
 Comparing the companies in this 
sector to those of the mining sector, there appear to be more shareholder revolt on pay 
in the mining sector than the utility sector. 
Figure 23 represents the dissent levels of the companies in the retail sector. The 
companies in this sector includes: Tesco, Mark & Spencer, Morrisons, Sainsbury and 
Kingfisher. Two companies (Sainbury and Tesco) had seen their dissent levels go 
above 20%. Tesco plc’s shareholder revolted against the remuneration report in 2010 
because the remuneration level of its CEO was set at the level of US executive pay. It 
is worth re-iterating again here that US executives are generally paid higher than UK 
executives. The shareholders of Tesco plc regarded this remuneration level as 
excessive and unnecessary.
832
 In 2004, Sainsbury plc shareholders rebelled against a 
controversial 86% bonus share awarded to its former chairman despite a poor 
performance by the company which had been losing market share.
833
 The graph also 
indicates less shareholder revolt in this sector as oppose to the mining sector. 
Figure 23: Shareholder Vote against Remuneration Report in the Retail Sector 
 
Figure 24 represents the five companies in the pharmaceutical industry. This was the 
only industry within the study period that had one of its company’s remuneration 
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reported voted down by the shareholders. In 2003 GlaxoSmithKline plc saw its 
remuneration report voted down by the shareholders of the company with a 
percentage vote of 50.72% against which was the first time a remuneration report was 
ever voted down by shareholders. The report was voted down because of its former 
CEO pay-off estimated at £22 million should he be sacked before the term of his two-
year contract expires. Shareholders regarded the pay as payment for failure.
834
 
Furthermore, Smith & Nephew has seen a remuneration dissent of more than 20% 
twice within the period under consideration.  
Figure 24: Shareholder votes against the remuneration report in the Pharmaceutical 
industry 
 
Figure 25 represents the voting dissent of the five companies in the financial sector. 
Only one company (ICAP) in this sector has seen voting dissent of above 20%. In 
2011, the shareholders of ICAP plc voted against the remuneration report with 
concerns on board members earning bonuses that were many times their annual 
salaries, and also because there was no cap on bonuses. Some of its executives were 
receiving about 20 times their salaries.
835
 This graph also indicates less shareholder 
revolt than the mining sector even though one of its companies’ remuneration reports 
was voted down. 
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Figure 24: Shareholder Votes against Remuneration Report in the Financial Sector 
 
The graphs indicate that dissent level in the Utility sector and financial sector over the 
period had been the lowest and the Mining sector seeing the highest dissent level. 
This findings tend to support the fact that shareholder were not using the voting 
powers vested on them on remuneration reports. This is because over the study 
period, the financial sector in particular suffered financial crisis and executive pay
836
 
was partly blamed for the crisis.  Naturally, more shareholder revolt would have been 
expected at least within the financial crisis period, but as indicated on the graphs, 
more than 65% of the shareholders in each company under the sector voted in favour 
of the remuneration report. Xstrata plc stands out to be the company with the most 
frequency of high dissent level under the study period. The main issue that causes 
Xstrata shareholders vote against their remuneration report being executive bonuses. 
The continues rebellion could mean that the shareholders from this company are more 
involved in remuneration issues that the shareholders of the rest twenty-four 
companies or it could indicate the company’s lack of communication with its 
shareholders prior to setting remuneration policy. From the analysis of the graphs 
above, the lack of link between executive bonuses and company performance seems 
to be the main reason for shareholder discontent with remuneration reports. The 
remuneration committees award the bonuses on the basis that the performance 
conditions have been met, yet the shareholders regard the bonus as excessive and 
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unrelated to company performance. This may be confirming the findings in chapter 5 
to the effect that different performance measures have different effects on the pay for 
performance link thereby emphasising the need for uniformity in the performance 
measures used by companies in the determination of company performance. A further 
aspect to consider would be abstention votes on remuneration reports. 
The voting results published on the company’s website did not take into account the 
abstention votes, therefore, making it very difficult to assess the real level of 
shareholder engagement. Although the shareholder votes were only advisory, having a 
high level of abstention votes was expected to communicate to the company the 
shareholders dissatisfaction with the remuneration policy. For example, in 2009, the 
shareholders of Antofagasta’s votes on remuneration report revealed that 930,856,310 
votes were cast in favour of the remuneration report, 10,366,043 votes against and 
106,877,823 votes abstained. The abstention votes are more than 10 times the votes 
cast against. Disclosing this information could make the shareholders to have a 
rethink about using the powers they were vested with. Also these figures could make 
the remuneration committee to want to consider why more than 10 times the number 
of shareholders who voted against abstained from voting.  
Some of the shareholders could have abstained from voting because they thought their 
vote was not going to make any difference to the decision that the company made. In 
a study carried out by Ian Gregory-Smith et al,
837
 they considered abstention votes to 
broadly mean dissent votes. They made this assumption as many shareholders felt 
reluctant to vote considering that the company was not compelled to act on the 
outcome of the vote. Consequently, shareholders demonstrated this dissatisfaction and 
frustration with an act of withdrawal as they felt voting or withdrawal did not have 
any effect on the implementation of the remuneration policy. Ian Gregory-Smith et al 
worked with the dissent (votes against and abstention votes) to find out the effect of 
shareholder outrage on executive pay. They found out that shareholder dissent did not 
have an impact on the levels of executive pay. This contention of attributing 
abstention votes to dissent votes was followed by BIS.
838
 BIS
839
 pointed out that it 
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was common for shareholders to abstain from voting on remuneration report to signal 
their dissatisfaction. It went further to say that abstention votes were very important as 
it could represent a large number of shareholders refusing to vote for the remuneration 
report. The consultation paper also indicated that: 
between 2007 and 2011, there were 11 companies in the FTSE All-Share 
Index that saw 50% of votes cast going against the remuneration report, but 
including abstention shows that 19 companies actually failed to get a simple 
majority of all shareholders. In one FTSE 250 example, the company 
ostensibly received 97% support for its remuneration report at the 2011 AGM. 
However, a closer look at the figures shows that a substantial number of 
shareholders abstained and taking this into account, almost one third of 
shareholders failed to back the report.
840
 
If this assumption of Ian Gregory-Smith and BIS are true, then the number of 
abstention votes would be expected to reduce with the provision of the new law 
giving the shareholders a binding vote on remuneration policy.  
However, shareholder abstention from voting could indicate shareholder 
unwillingness to be involved in matters of executive remuneration. Consequently, the 
desired outcome of influencing the remuneration setting process through shareholder 
votes would not be achieved. This therefore indicates that the policy makers would 
have to come up with other ways of getting the shareholders to be involved in the 
remuneration setting process, or find ways other than through the shareholders to 
influence the executive pay setting process. Before the shareholder vote on the 
remuneration report was introduced in 2002, the Cadbury Committee
841
 had expressed 
their sceptism on more powers given to the shareholders on remuneration issues. They 
predicted that many of the shareholders will simply abstain from voting, and those 
that vote to defer in almost every case to the judgment of directors and the REMCO.  
More than 50% of the sample population under study have seen higher abstention 
votes than the votes cast against the remuneration report. This seems to supports the 
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early academics sceptism on vesting shareholders with voting powers on 
remuneration issues. Before 2002, this reaction could be attributed to the fact that the 
shareholders were unable to access the information they needed to react to executive 
remuneration.
842
 The CA 2006 disclosure requirements are extensive requiring the 
companies to disclose far more information in the remuneration report than before, 
implying that the lack of information is no longer an excuse for shareholder inaction. 
It is worth noting that although the lack of information may not be an excuse, but the 
way it is set out may be (especially if it is set out in a complex manner). However, the 
percentage of abstention votes by the shareholders is still high and even higher than 
the votes against in some companies.  
General effects of shareholder non-binding voting rights 
The shareholder vote on the remuneration report was one of the opportunities given to 
the shareholders to express their views and concerns and to ask questions in the 
general meeting on executive remuneration. Since the introduction of the shareholder 
non-binding vote on the remuneration report there seemed not to be much downward 
adjustment in remuneration level. This is justified by the fact that executive 
remuneration tends to be on the increase each year. The table below indicates 
executive pay increases between the periods 2002-2013 which is the period within 
which shareholder have been voting on remuneration report.  
Table 16: Trend executive pay rise from 2002-2013 
year Percentage (%) increase 
2002 23
843
 
2003 13
844
 
2004 16
845
 
2005 28
846
 
2006 37
847
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2009 10
848
 
2010 55
849
 
2011 49
850
 
2012 12
851
 
2013 14
852
 
The table indicates that executive remuneration has continued to increase over the 
sample period. However, highest pay increases was seen in 2010 with 55% increase 
and 2011 with 49% pay increase. There is no hard fact and evidence to justify the high 
pay increases. However, Ferri and Maber
853
 study on the effect of shareholder non-
binding vote and CEO pay revealed that shareholders’ say on pay reduced ‘reward for 
failure’ by strengthening the pay performance relationship.854 This finding 
demonstrated the fact that even though the shareholder vote was non-binding and 
companies are not compelled to act on it, companies still acted upon the outcome of 
the vote. One reason why companies reacted on the voting outcome was because the 
shareholder’s right to vote against their re-election in the AGM if dissatisfied with 
their performance. Therefore, directors’ acted upon the shareholder vote on 
remuneration report so as to avoid being voted against their re-election by the 
shareholder. Carter and Zamora
855
 study suggested that the board responded to 
shareholder votes by strengthening the pay for performance link, but not changing the 
salary.  Even though the link between pay and performance has been strengthened, it 
is still weak and in need of further strengthening as demonstrated by the findings in 
chapter 5.
856
 Although, the shareholder vote is only an advisory vote, evidence 
suggests that voting on remuneration report has had an influence on company’s 
executive remuneration setting process. As demonstrated in table 15 above (page 
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245), most of the companies responded to the shareholder votes by reviewing the 
remuneration policy as necessary. Deloitte’s857 study on the impact of shareholder 
non-binding vote found out that there had been enhanced disclosure and 
accountability by the companies on remuneration issues, with some changes in 
policies and practices on executive remuneration (e.g. a greater percentage of the 
executive pay package made up of more performance related pay). They also found 
out that there was more communication between the shareholders and the company as 
compared to pre-2002 vote on remuneration reports. To avoid shareholders from 
voting down on remuneration reports, there has been significant increase in the level 
of variable pay with meaningful performance conditions attached to incentive 
remuneration in UK with most share options being replaced with share grants tied to 
performance, with a drop in pay-out for average performance in response to investor 
pressure.
858
 Limits to the amount of share options any one executive may be granted 
and golden parachute packages shrunk to the equivalent of one years’ pay. The quality 
of reporting on pay had improved with more explanation and disclosure.
859
 However, 
there seemed to be no corresponding leap forward in company performance which 
was described by Ed Miliband ,the leader of the Labour Party in UK, as a ‘something 
for nothing’.860 Carter and Zamora861 found out that shareholder disapprove of higher 
salaries, weak pay-for-performance sensitivity in bonus pay and in response 
companies respond to negative shareholder vote by reducing excess salary and 
improving of pay performance relationship. Companies react to adverse shareholder 
votes on remuneration report in different way.  This indicates that although 
shareholder voting powers were non-binding, it had great impact on the remuneration 
setting process. 
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Shareholder voting after the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 
The response to the shareholder non-binding vote was not impressive with only 22 
remuneration reports voted down within the period 2003-2013. It was argued that 
there was therefore a need to strengthen the shareholder voting rights, which is now a 
binding vote on remuneration policy. Section 439A of the CA 2006 requires that the 
remuneration policy of quoted companies be approved by the members of the 
company by an ordinary resolution. Considering the effect that the shareholder non-
binding vote introduced in 2002 had on executive remuneration, the government 
wanted to improve shareholder involvement in voting on directors’ pay. The BIS 
consultation paper
862
 on executive pay suggested that a threshold of between 50% and 
75% shareholder vote would have to be required in favour of the remuneration policy 
before they could be approved.  It also suggested that giving the shareholders a 
binding vote on exit payments worth more than one year’s salary.863  The purpose of 
these suggestions was to empower the shareholder to prevent reward for failures and 
not to decrease executive pay. Payment for a director whose contract has been 
terminated early and without due notice (may be due to poor performance) and 
leaving the company with large sums as exit payment has been regarded as payment 
for failure.  Therefore a shareholder binding vote on exit payment exceeding the 
equivalent of one year’s salary would have given the shareholders a real say over 
payments for failure and potentially reduce drawn-out negotiations between 
companies and departing directors. 
However, the proposals were criticised by the CBI, which warned that giving the 
shareholders too much voting rights would be damaging as strategic decision making 
would be left in the hands of the minority rather than the majority.
864
 It also argued 
that giving the shareholders a 75% vote on remuneration policy would be damaging 
and would mean that the decision making about the company strategy would be in the 
hands of a minority of shareholders who may not represent the wider group of 
shareholders. The government also recognised that in a very small number of UK 
quoted companies, a single shareholder owns 25% or more of the total share value and 
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could potentially, singlehandedly reject a special resolution on remuneration policy.  
A binding vote may not empower shareholders as they could still choose to abstain 
from voting if they fear that their vote may have a negative knock-on effect on the 
share price or if their votes would cause executives to resign. Considering the analysis 
made above on the effect of shareholder non-binding vote, it could be argued that a 
75% shareholder voting right might not make a difference from the shareholder 
ordinary resolution on executive remuneration policy. This is because (as explained 
above) shareholder vote has a great influence on the pay setting process but the 
problem is that most of the shareholders are abstaining from voting. Furthermore, 
most of the FTSE 100 companies usually obtained more than 75% vote in favour of 
the remuneration policy. For example, a study conducted by Deloitte
865
 revealed that 
in 2013, all the FTSE 100 companies received more than 75% votes in favour of their 
remuneration policies. 
The shareholder vote on directors’ exit payment was also criticised by CBI866 based 
on the following arguments. First, that if the shareholder votes on exit pay were to be 
enforced, companies may introduce higher salaries so as to increase the threshold 
amount for a termination payment. Second that the directors would seek to achieve 
higher payment during employment with the knowledge that exit payments will be 
reduced. Third, that giving the shareholder the powers to vote on exit pay would 
shrink the role of the REMCO to the detriment of intelligently designed pay packages. 
Fourth, that the proposal would risk placing UK-incorporated companies at a 
competitive disadvantage in relation to foreign-incorporated companies who have 
more freedom to negotiate termination packages. Fifth, that making exit payments a 
source of dispute would likely result in a protracted tribunal dispute which would be 
costly for the company. Lastly, that the binding vote on exit payment would require 
the company to wait for the next AGM or call an EGM to approve any settlement 
beyond one year’s base salary would be impractical, costly and time consuming for 
the company.  The CBI also criticised the binding vote on exit payment on the 
grounds that a binding vote would make it difficult for companies to remove 
underperforming directors quickly and therefore will loss the flexibility of getting the 
right person needed for the job. Accordingly, these two proposals of shareholder 
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supermajority (75%) binding vote on executive remuneration policy and shareholder 
binding vote on directors’ exit payment were rejected. The binding remuneration 
policy vote requires an ordinary resolution, whilst the exit payment is regulated 
through the advisory shareholder vote on the future remuneration policy.  
Shareholders have been given a binding vote only on the policy part of the 
remuneration report. The policy part of the remuneration report sets out the 
remuneration policy of each executive for the future. All quoted companies are 
required to give notice to its members of its intention to move an ordinary resolution 
to approve the director’s remuneration policy at the annual general meeting.867 The 
main aim of the binding votes on remuneration policy is to encourage better quality 
engagement between companies and shareholders at an early stage in the process of 
devising policy.
868
 Quoted companies are expected to seek shareholder approval on 
remuneration policy at least every three years or at the next meeting following one 
where the advisory vote on the remuneration report was not passed,
869
 or where the 
remuneration policy has been amended.
870
 The original proposal was for shareholder 
vote to take place annually. This was changed to three-yearly when the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013 was passed.  
The proposal of one year voting right was watered down by BIS with the hope that 
allowing companies and shareholders the option of agreeing a three-year 
remuneration policy would encourage longer-term thinking on pay.
871
 Companies will 
also have the option of an annual vote if that is what the companies and shareholders 
want’.872  Annual votes as oppose to three-year votes might destabilised management 
teams and encourage short-term thinking which will consequently affect the long term 
success of the company.
873
 Annual voting might cause shareholders to be more 
cautious about voting against pay schemes to avoid a destabilised management and 
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thereby risking their investments in the company.
874
 This three-year flexibility over 
binding votes would allow companies to demonstrate how remuneration is aligned 
with company strategy.
875
 Furthermore, the three-year shareholder voting is intended 
to link pay to the success of the company as a whole and reduce the annual ratcheting 
up of pay.
876
 This deviation from the original proposal has been criticised
877
 on the 
grounds that shareholder activism will be diluted in the long run and a three-year 
remuneration report might be difficult for shareholders to understand in terms of what 
executives were paid annually and why. The Labour Party criticised the deviation on 
the grounds that the three-year shareholder vote would not achieve the purpose of 
giving shareholders as binding vote on pay. It was argued that shareholder vote on 
pay should have been annually to be able ‘to hold directors’ feet to the fire and ensure 
there is constant engagement with shareholders’.878 More worries were expressed that 
such votes may degenerate into a box-ticking exercise with shareholders voting on 
vague policies rather than policies on specific elements.
879
 Furthermore, it was 
argued
880
 that the administrative costs involved in arranging a general meeting for the 
board to re-submit a remuneration report that failed may cause shareholders to vote in 
favour of remuneration polices just to avoid the cost. This is a change that could be 
regarded as unmerited because the three-year binding vote might not be able to curb 
executive remuneration as expected. The three years binding vote on remuneration 
policy might make companies to draw up policies that are broad and generous as a 
means of avoiding any significant changes to the remuneration policy that might 
require shareholder vote within the three years.
881
 This reaction by the executives 
could only lead to greater increases in remuneration levels. Furthermore, within three 
years executives might have come and gone from the company. If the shareholders do 
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not approve the remuneration report, the company is required to continue to use the 
last approved remuneration policy and seek a separate approval for any specific 
remuneration or loss of office payment which are not consistent with the policy; or 
call another meeting and put the remuneration policy to shareholder approval.
882
 
Companies are required to abide by the approved remuneration policy and to change it 
only with the approval of the shareholders. Any director of the company who goes 
contrary to this provision would be liable to the company for any loss and the director 
who receives any payment must hold it on trust for the company.
883
  
Although the shareholder binding vote forms part of the major changes on executive 
remuneration, its effect on remuneration levels might not be different from when 
shareholders had only a non-binding vote on the remuneration report. As discussed 
above, the non-binding vote had notable impact on the remuneration setting process 
of executive pay packages rather; the problem was the disengagement of shareholders 
in the voting process. Directors acted upon the outcome of shareholder non-binding 
votes to prevent the shareholder voting against their re-election in the annual general 
meeting. Binding shareholder votes would mean that the company must act on the 
outcome of the voting, meaning that they will likely be less be worried about 
shareholder voting against their re-election because they are already bound to act on 
shareholder votes. This argument therefore suggests that shareholder binding votes 
may not have a massive impact on the executive remuneration setting process. Rather 
what would make a difference to the executive remuneration setting process would be 
shareholder activism. The next section would discuss shareholder activism in 
remuneration issues. 
Section 226B provides that a quoted company may not make a remuneration payment 
to a person who is, or is to be or has been, a director of the company unless the 
payment is consistent with the remuneration policy or approved by the members by a 
resolution. This provision will tend to limit the amount of generous pay package 
offered to executives when hiring an external executive. As discussed in chapter one, 
one of the main drivers of executive remuneration is the executive labour market. 
Companies tend to offer generous pay packages when hiring an external executive 
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and this drives up average executive pay which is also compounded by benchmarking 
practice. By limiting the negotiation of service contract of external hires to 
shareholder approval, directors may slow down on the rate of increase of executive 
remuneration. This could also encourage companies to engage more in promoting 
internal staffs to the desired positions which would be cost effective for the company 
than hiring an external executive.  
Section 226C provides that payments for loss of office can only be made if it is 
consistent with the remuneration policy or approved by the members of the company 
by an ordinary resolution. This provision aims to ensure that executives who are 
leaving the company for poor performance not leave office with large exit payment. 
Shareholder activism 
The shareholder binding vote together with other powers
884
 given to the shareholders 
under the CA 2006 represents an important mechanism of the shareholder voice in the 
UK. This is to enable shareholders of quoted companies to have a direct voice on the 
pay determination process of the company. The increased powers given to the 
shareholders is aim to encourage dialogue between the shareholders and the 
executives on the remuneration determination process. The shareholders would need 
to understand the remuneration report to be able to make informed decision when 
voting on remuneration issues. This comes at a cost to the shareholder as many of 
them lack the time and expertise needed to understand the report. Consequently, an 
average shareholder who owns only a tiny percentage of the company’s shares will 
need to incur the cost (time and money to pay experts to interpret the report) to be 
able to make informed decision on the remuneration policy when voting or, as is most 
likely, will simply abstain from voting.
885
 Shareholders who do not understand the 
remuneration process could only probably look at the level of remuneration and what 
they get as dividends to cast a vote for or against a remuneration report. 
Consequently, this means that for the shareholder to have a reasonable understanding 
of the remuneration report, information must be disclosed and in a way that will ease 
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the understanding of the shareholder. The 21
st
 century remuneration packages have 
developed to be more complex and technical as opposed to the past century 
remuneration packages. The complexity and technicality of these remuneration 
packages is almost defeating the very purpose of the disclosure requirements which 
was to provide shareholders with information on executive remuneration. The 
REMCO and the RCONs have expert knowledge in the field, and they spent a lot of 
time on this, meaning it cannot be easily understandable by shareholders unless they 
have some expert knowledge or pay experts to explain the remuneration report to 
them. Further, before the enactment of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013, the absence of a standard format disclosure meant that companies could swamp 
shareholders with complex information.  
Shareholder’s voting on remuneration policy has been facilitated by the disclosure 
requirement introduced in 2002. However, only few companies saw their 
remuneration reports voted down with many shareholders not using the voting powers 
they have been given. Furthermore, shareholders’ ability to have an influence on 
management will depend on the proportion of the votes which they can exercise and 
the use they make of these votes. This proposal is therefore predominantly aimed at 
institutional investors as they hold large numbers of shares in a company more than an 
ordinary shareholder. Institutional investors are large organization, such as a bank, 
pension fund, labour union, or insurance company that makes substantial investments 
on company’s shares. The UK Stewardship Code886 states that institutional investors 
should seek to vote at all AGMs where practicable, Thus, there is an expectation on 
the institutional investors to use their shares in voting to be able to influence the 
directors’ pay setting process.  
Most of the FTSE 100 company shares are owned by large institutional investors and 
with the concentration of voting rights in their hands; they can have an impact on 
executive remuneration more than an ordinary shareholder.
887
 These advantages that 
the institutional investor possess over an ordinary shareholder means that they can use 
their expertise in assessing the remuneration report, use their money to form a 
coalition with other institutional investors, and use their votes to either vote for or 
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against the remuneration report. Their votes will have a great impact on the 
remuneration report as they hold large percentage of equity shares in the company. 
However, despite the concentration of equity ownership in the hands of institutions, 
shareholder voting on executive remuneration report has not increased a great deal. 
Only a small proportion of FTSE 100 companies shares are held by UK long-term 
investors. The majority of FTSE 100 companies’ shares are in the hands of overseas 
shareholders (as shown on the table below) or short-terminist investors such as hedge 
funds that do not really care about what the executives take home as remuneration.
888
  
Table 17: Beneficial ownership of FTSE 100 companies and others 2012 
                
  
Percentage of total UK quoted 
shares   
          
  
FTSE 
100 
Other 
companies All   
Sector         
          
 Rest of the world 54.5 45.9 53.2   
 Insurance companies 6.2 6.5 6.2   
 Pension funds 4.7 4.6 4.7   
 Individuals 9.0 20.3 10.7   
 Unit trust 9.3 11.2 9.6   
 Investment trusts 1.7 1.9 1.7   
 Other financial institutions 6.6 6.5 6.6   
 Charities, churches etc. 0.6 0.5 0.6   
 Private non-financial companies 2.6 0.1 2.3   
 Public sector1 2.9 0.1 2.5   
 Banks 1.8 2.4 1.9   
          
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0   
          
 Source: Share Ownership – Share Register Survey Report 2012 
     
From the table above, it indicates that more than 50% of FTSE 100 shares are held by 
oversees shareholders who may not be able to monitor the board due to the large 
number of companies they have in their portfolio.  
                                                          
888
 Ruth Saunderland, ‘Three-Year Binding Votes Won’t Curb Executive Pay, But Public Outrage Just 
Might’ (Mailonline, 21 June 2012) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2162707/Three-year-
binding-votes-wont-curb-executive-pay-public-outrage-just-might.html assessed 5 March 2014. 
268 
 
In the banking sector, many of the banks performed poorly in recent years, but the 
sector received high support on their remuneration reports casting doubts on the 
effectiveness of institutional investors in using their voting rights on executive 
remuneration issues. For example, Barclays Bank in 2011 received a 75% approval 
for its remuneration report from investors despite their poor performance in stock and 
dividend returns.
889
 However, Dong and Ozkan
890
, studying institutional investor and 
executive pay in UK companies found out that there exist two classes of institutional 
investors - one being dedicated (in remuneration context meaning voting) and the 
other transient (not voting). Their findings showed that the dedicated institutional 
investors do restrain the level of executive pay and strengthen the pay performance 
relationship. These dedicated institutional investors use their expertise and votes to 
monitor the management. The transient institutional investors make no appreciable 
difference neither to the pay levels of the executive remuneration or strengthen the 
pay performance relationship indicating that they have failed to regulate executive 
remuneration.
891
 
Shareholder pro-activism can greatly reduce the influence shareholder could have on 
the pay determination process in a company. This disengagement by the shareholders 
also reduces the importance of the voting powers vested on the shareholders on 
remuneration matters. Consequently, shareholder binding vote may not be more 
effective than a shareholder non-binding votes and the setting of executive 
remuneration would still be inappropriately regulated. 
Other shareholder remedies 
This section discusses other remedies that are available to the shareholders in cases of 
excessive executive remuneration. These remedies are general shareholder remedies 
that can, in limited cases; result in the award of a remedy where pay is excessive. To 
better understand other shareholder remedies and to what extend they influence the 
pay setting process this part would be divided into three sections. First, directors’ 
duties would be discussed and its possible influence on the pay setting process. 
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Secondly, derivative claims would be examined and lastly the unfair prejudicial 
remedy. 
Directors’ duties 
The fiduciary relationship of the executive and the company precludes the executives’ 
entitlement to remuneration or profit making out of their duties while in office unless 
remuneration is properly authorised.
892
 However, a company’s articles of association 
often provide authority for executives to be remunerated. The executive remuneration 
is either set in the articles of association or, as is usually the case, in a separate service 
contract. The court will rarely find executive remuneration excessive because the 
courts do not want the directors’ to be hauled to court at every given opportunity.893 
Directors have general duties that they owe to the company which are set out in CA 
2006, ss 171-177. Enforcement of these general duties is a matter for the company 
and not of its members.
894
 Directors have the duty to act in the company’s interest.895 
In reference to excessive executive remuneration, it is difficult to see how executives 
are acting in the interest of the company when executive pay has no link or weakly 
linked to company performance (discussed in chapter 5). The directors’ are required 
to act with care, skill and diligence which might be exercise by a reasonable diligent 
person with the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be 
expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation 
to the company.
896
 This implies that the courts defer on the particular facts of any 
given case, accepting their merits on the remuneration decision taken.
897
 
Also the courts are reluctant to deal with issues of remuneration as they assume that 
the level of executive pay denote the responsibility that goes with the job, thus the 
higher job responsibilities the higher the pay level.
898
  
The courts have indicated that in most cases excessive executive remuneration will 
not constitute a breach of directors’ duties.899 This is because executive remuneration 
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is set in advance and shareholders approve it by ordinary resolution before it is 
implemented.
900
 In Smith v Croft
901, Walton J. rejected the claimant’s contention that 
the directors’ salaries were excessive and warned that in certain areas of business, 
such as the entertainment business, salaries were justifiable though far in excess of 
what could be earned in other professions.  
However in the case of Re Halt Garage
902
 although the court refused to interfere in 
the determination of executive remuneration, it rejected payment that was made to a 
director after she ceased working for the company. The court labelled the pay as 
gratuitous distribution of the company’s capital rather than a genuine remuneration. 
Generally, the courts have a natural disinclination to find remuneration excessive and 
will not, generally, interfere with matters which require the commercial judgment of 
the board.
903
 Where the directors breach their duties, the shareholder can seek relief 
through a derivative claim. 
Section 206(1) of the CA 2006 defines derivative claims as proceedings brought by a 
member of a company in respect of a cause of action vested in the company seeking 
relief on behalf of the company. A breach of directors’ duties (discussed above) could 
only be enforced by a member via derivative claim. Such claims must be brought only 
in respect of a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed act or omission 
involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director of a 
company.
904
  
However, it would still be difficult for a claim on excessive remuneration to succeed 
as executive remuneration determination are regarded by the court as management 
issues and are not ready to interfere.
905
 The rule in Foss v Harbottle
906
 and its 
exceptions made it difficult for shareholders to bring derivative action on claims of 
excessive remuneration to court. The rule in Foss v Harbottle was set on the premise 
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that a company is a separate legal entity, distinct from its owners and has corporate 
personality of its own.
907
 Therefore only the company had the power to redress a 
wrong against it. Directors’ duties to the company are enforceable by the company, 
which in the ordinary course of event are the directors. This is because directors are 
generally responsible for enforcing all legal claims held by the company, 
consequently giving rise to a conflict of interest when the claims that are against the 
directors themselves.
908
 However, under the common law shareholders could not 
bring a derivative claim on the company’s behalf unless it came under one of the four 
exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle. The exception includes where the act 
complaint of was illegal or ultra vires, or where the act required special majority 
sanction, or where the members personal rights were infringed, or where the act 
constituted fraud on the minority and the wrongdoers were in control of the company. 
Shareholder could bring a derivative claim of excessive remuneration under the 
exception that the act constituted a fraud on the minority shareholders of the company 
and the wrongdoers were themselves in control of the company.
909
 However, for the 
claim to succeed the shareholder would have to prove fraud on the minority and the 
fact that the wrongdoer is in control of the company. The burden of proof of fraud by 
the shareholder is difficult as the court consider executive remuneration to be set in 
advance and approved by the shareholders.
910
 
The statutory derivative claim CA 2006, s206 abolished the rule in Foss v Harbottle 
and its exceptions and replaced it with a more flexible and accessible criteria for 
determining whether a shareholder could bring a derivative claim. The purpose was to 
provide members of the company with fair and cost effective mechanisms for 
resolving disputes between members of the company and those running the company 
(directors). The derivative claim does not require the member to prove fraud or that 
the wrongdoer is in control of the company as was the case under the common law. 
However, the member would have to make an application to the court for the claim
911
, 
in which the court would decide whether to grant permission for a derivative action to 
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be brought to court.
912
 However, s 263 requires permission to be refused where the 
matter complaint of was authorised in advance or ratified. This provision makes it 
difficult for the courts to grant members of the company permission to bring a 
derivative claim on excessive executive remuneration because executive remuneration 
policy is voted upon and authorised in advance by the shareholders of the company.   
Unfair prejudicial remedy 
Shareholders are provided with the principal form of statutory protection of bringing 
an action in court for unfair prejudicial conduct under s 994 of the CA 2006. This 
section provides the shareholder with the right to petition the court for relief where the 
company’s affairs are being, or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of members generally or of some part of its members 
(including at least himself), or that an actual or proposed act or omission of the 
company (including an act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial. As 
mentioned above, the determination of executive remuneration is a matter for the 
company’s management in accordance with its articles of association or a separate 
service contract for the director. The payment of excessive remuneration to directors, 
to the detriment of the members of the company, could constitute unfairly prejudicial 
conduct. Where the directors’ remuneration is determined lawfully, to succeed in a 
claim of unfair prejudicial conduct the petitioner would have to prove unfairness. 
O’Neill v Phillips913 is the leading case, where Lord Hoffmann came up with a two-
fold test of unfairness: 
1. Unfairness arises where there has been a breach of terms which it was 
agreed the company’s affairs would be conducted 
2. Or where the majority has exercised a power in a manner regarded by 
equity as contrary to good faith. 
Going by this two-fold test, to establish a claim of excessive remuneration under s 
994, there should be a breach of an agreement (remuneration policy) concerning 
directors’ entitlement to remuneration, or process by which it is determined falls 
under the first test of unfairness. This first test was followed in the case of Andrew v 
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Hogg
914
 in which the court held that the petitioner was not entitled to a claim as there 
was no agreement on how the affairs of the company should be conducted. 
Furthermore, in Fish v Cadman
915
 it was held that the director’s failure to provide 
substantive explanation about their remuneration in the correspondence to the 
petitioner constituted unfairly prejudicial conduct because this act denied the 
petitioner of information about the company’ affairs. 
Excessive remuneration would constitute unfairly prejudicial conduct where, in 
breach of agreement between shareholders, one shareholder pays himself out of the 
company’s fund considerable sums in excess of that recovered by other 
shareholders.
916
 In Re McCarthy Surfacing Ltd
917
 a managing director awarded 
himself 45% of the company’s profits because he felt that he was receiving less than 
what he was worth in the company. The court held that his act amounted to unfairly 
prejudicial conduct. It could be argued that the decision of the court could have been 
different if the company was a public company where remuneration policy would 
have been determined and approved by the shareholders before implementation. 
In Re Cumana Ltd
918
, where the respondent was alleged to have received, during a 
period of 14 months in the region of £160,000 to £365,000 by way of bonus and 
£190,000 by a way of pension contributions, Vinelott J found that the remuneration 
paid was plainly in excess of anything the respondent had earned and was so large as 
to be unfairly prejudicial to the petitioners. In Re a Company ex p Burr
919
 Vinelott J 
went further to say that there must be sufficient evidence to show that the directors are 
paid in the aggregate more than the company would have had to pay to secure suitable 
replacements or that the level of remuneration was out of line with that paid to 
executive directors of other companies of comparable size and turnover.  As the court 
is not prepared to scrutinise the reasonableness of director’s remuneration under s 
994, having regards to the company’s turnover and the remuneration level of other 
companies is crucial in determining whether excessive executive pay constitute unfair 
prejudicial conduct.  
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Failure to ensure that the disclosed information on executive remuneration in the 
remuneration report is properly recorded can amount to unfairly prejudicial conduct, 
even if the remuneration is reasonable, authorised or the act was not deliberate.
920
 A 
remuneration policy of paying executive remuneration to directors and not 
distributing profits as dividends can constitute unfairly prejudicial conduct to 
shareholders who are not directors.
921
 Furthermore, failure of directors to consider 
where dividends should be paid to other shareholders will constitute unfair prejudicial 
conduct to the shareholders who are not directors.
922
 
Many of the cases discussed above concerned private companies. With regards to 
public companies, the courts are especially reluctant to regard excessive executive 
remuneration as unfairly prejudicial conduct.
923
 In Smith v Croft (No. 2) the court 
argued  
That although excessive remuneration paid to directors might be an abuse of 
power, where the power to decide remuneration was vested in the board, it 
could not be ultra vires the company; and that in view of the uncontradicted 
evidence about the specialised field in which the company operated and the 
high levels of remuneration obtaining there it was more likely that the 
plaintiffs would fail...
924
 
The courts have argued that the mere quantum of remuneration compared to other 
companies of the same size and turnovers may not necessarily be indicative of excess 
or unfair prejudicial conduct. Vinelott J in Re a Company, ex p Burr
925
 said; 
There is no evidence that the directors are paid in the aggregate...more than the 
company would have had to pay to secure suitable replacement or that the 
level of remuneration is out of line with that paid to executive directors of 
other companies of comparable size and turnover. 
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In most cases of excessive remuneration the judgment of the case is reached 
considering the totality of the petitioner’s complaint. In Fowler v Gruber926, Lord 
Menzies used ‘objective commercial criteria’ and ‘out with the bracket that executives 
carrying the sort of responsibility and discharging the sort of duties that the 
respondent would expect to receive’927 to reach his decision on remuneration 
constituting unfair prejudicial conduct. In Fowler’s case, a minority shareholder (the 
petitioner) argued that the company’s majority shareholder and sole director (the 
respondent) had conducted the company’s affairs in an unfairly prejudicial manner. 
The petitioner’s claims included exclusion from management of the company, the 
respondent failing to run the company in the best interest of the shareholders, the 
payment of disproportionate and excessive remuneration which endangered the 
company’s financial position, the non-payment of dividends and the issuing of shares 
with the intention of destroying the petitioner’s proportionate interest in the company. 
Lord Menzies’ considering the totality of the complaints found that the company’s 
affairs where conducted in an unfairly prejudicial manner. Using his test ‘objective 
commercial criteria’ he found that the respondent remuneration rising from £50,000 in 
2001 to £307,000 in 2006 could not be justified. 
Conclusion 
Over the past two decades, executive remuneration has continued to rise with very 
weak pay-for-performance relationship (discussed in detail in chapter 6). The 
Companies Act 2006 tends to regulate executive remuneration through implementing 
disclosure requirement and empowering the shareholders with voting powers to 
exercise on executive remuneration. The law is generally reluctant to meddle in 
corporate affairs, as they consider that the management of the company is in the best 
position to make informed decisions about the company. Therefore, by making the 
companies to disclose more information on remuneration, shareholders will be 
informed and be able to use their voting powers to indicate their views on 
remuneration matter. However, before the coming into force of the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013, disclosure requirement was seen to be far from 
constraining excessive executive remuneration because there was no set format on 
how the information should be disclosed. As a result, shareholders found themselves 
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with sump of information which they could hardly understand. Furthermore, 
shareholders had only a non-binding vote on remuneration report which meant that 
the company was not compelled to act on the voting outcome. Many shareholders 
abstained from voting on remuneration issues consequently not making use of their 
voting powers. With the introduction of a shareholder binding vote on remuneration 
policy, and the disclosure requirement format by the Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2013, shareholders are expected to use the disclosed information which is 
expected to be easy to read, and exercise their voting rights in curbing excessive 
executive remuneration. The effect of the new disclosure requirements and 
shareholder binding vote is yet to be observed, whilst the mandatory non-binding 
voting right given to the shareholder before the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013 seemed not to have affected the levels of executive remuneration. Furthermore, 
the courts reluctance to adjudicate on executive remuneration issues and its none use 
of the ‘reasonable man’s’ test in executive remuneration cases provides a safe harbour 
for executives to get away with excessive remuneration to the detriment of the 
company and its stakeholders. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
To conclude this research project, a summary of the main findings will be highlighted, 
contribution to knowledge, limitation of the study, opportunities for further research 
(where applicable) and possible recommendations. 
Executive remuneration has been a prominent issue of corporate governance in the 
UK since the early 1990s. executive remuneration package has developed from a 
simple salary and benefits in the 1980s to a complex package made up of several 
components which include, base salary, annual bonus, long-term incentive plans and 
share options. Executive remuneration has continued to increase (e.g. in 2011, 
executive remuneration was seen to increase by around 5000% since 1980).
928
 The 
increase in executive remuneration was initially driven by privatization of some utility 
companies in the early 1990s. After that executive remuneration is seen to be driven 
by  factors like globalisation, executive labour market, transnational mergers, the 
growth of multinational companies, board independence, remuneration disclosure, 
shift to incentive pay and executive remuneration benchmarking.  
In an attempt to curb on the excessive increase in executive pay, the UKCGC makes 
recommendations of how executive remuneration should be determined. Conversely, 
the CA 2006 does not make provisions on how executive remuneration should be 
determined; rather it takes a corrective measure to curbing excessive executive pay. 
The UKCGC recommends that companies should set up a REMCO made up of 
wholly independent NEDs to be responsible for the setting of executive remuneration.  
The purpose of this recommendation is to bring transparency and accountability in the 
executive remuneration setting process. However, as was discussed in chapter 4, the 
REMCO has been seen to be ineffective in discharging their responsibilities mainly 
because of their composition (mostly made up of executives and former executives of 
other companies) and their lack of independence from the board. The NEDs on the 
REMCO are often and chief executive officers of other companies. This similarity in 
job role and interest may cause the REMCO to act more in favour of the executives 
than the company and its stakeholders at large. Furthermore, in most companies, the 
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CEO of the company still sits on almost all of the REMCO’s meetings and make 
proposals on remuneration arrangements, which does not accord with the 
recommendations of the UKCGC. However, the Code operates on a ‘comply or 
explain’ basis, meaning that the RCs of listed companies need to disclose whether or 
not they comply with the Code. And if they do not, then they have to explain. The 
shareholders of the company are therefore encouraged to act on the disclosed 
information to hold the REMCO to account at the annual general meeting. If the 
shareholders are not satisfied they have the option of voting against the re-election of 
the directors, or voting against the remuneration report. 
A means of enhancing the effectiveness of the REMCO may be through the 
involvement of members from more diverse backgrounds. This means that not only 
members from business background but from other backgrounds like academia. The 
diversity of the REMCO could potentially reduce the extent to which the REMCO 
would be seen as acting in favour of the executives rather than the company. These 
committee members could be selected by nomination committee in conjuncture with 
the shareholders of the company to minimise the feeling that the members of the 
REMCO owe their seats to the executives of the company. An opportunity for further 
research in this area would be to select companies that have diverse members on the 
REMCO, and find out whether this diversity has influenced the way executive 
remuneration is determined, and whether the executives’ pay is closely linked to 
company performance as a results of diversity of members on the REMCO. 
The UKCGC also allows the REMCO to appoint any consultant in respect of 
remuneration for support and advice.  Most FTSE 100 companies engage the services 
of RCONs to advise them on executive remuneration benchmarking. The twenty-five 
companies considered in this study all used the services of RCONs to provide them 
with market data on executive remuneration that they may use to determine the pay of 
their executives. However, the UKCGC and the Companies Act 2006 does not make 
any recommendations/provisions on what factors to consider when benchmarking 
executive remuneration. In this study, six prominent RCONs were interviewed on the 
methodology of benchmarking. The study found out that there was lack of uniformity 
in the factors used when selecting comparator groups and elements of the 
remuneration package considered for benchmarking. The study also found out that the 
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consultants expressed different views as to their objectivity in the nature of advice 
they offer to the REMCO and the effect of benchmarking on executive remuneration.  
The study identified in general seven factors that are considered when selecting 
comparator groups which were:  company size, sector, geographical location, 
company performance, role of the executives, company remuneration policy and 
complexity. From the findings, company size, company sector and geographical 
location of the business were more influential than the rest. Furthermore, 
remuneration benchmarking could be done by considering the total remuneration 
package or on an element-by-element basis depending on the consultant. The study 
also found out that RCONs may be bias in the nature of advice they provide to the 
REMCO if they also offer other services to the company as a means of keeping their 
business relationship. A majority of the consultants interviewed (five) were of the 
opinion the executive remuneration benchmarking drives executive remuneration, 
whilst one of the respondents was of the opinion that it curbs excessive remuneration. 
This study gives a detail understanding of executive remuneration benchmarking 
which no past study has explored before. It is therefore setting the foundation for 
further qualitative and quantitative research on the subject area by involving more 
RCONs, REMCO, shareholders etc. views on benchmarking methodology. 
The UKCGC also recommends that the REMCO should set pay so as to be linked to 
individual and corporate performance but it does not recommend specific 
performance measures for companies to use. It is therefore left to the company to 
decide on which performance measure they deem necessary is to use. This study 
found a wide array of factors used, with each company using a different selection of 
performance measures. This demonstrated a lack of uniformity in the use of 
performance measures and by extension a lack of uniformity in the information 
disclosed in the remuneration reports by companies. This lack of uniformity makes it 
difficult for shareholders to understand pay packages and compare them across 
companies. Performance measures can be financial or non-financial. In this study two 
financial performance measures and one non-financial (market performance) was used 
to determine the link between executive pay and company performance; and also the 
effect of different performance measures on the pay for performance link. The three 
performance measures were EPS, TSR and ROA. TSR was chosen as its reflect the 
shareholders interest, EPS was chosen as more than half of the companies in the study 
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used it, and ROA was chosen because less companies and few past studies used it. 
These were chosen to give an understanding of the effect different performance 
measures could have on the pay for performance link. As noted earlier, there exist a 
wide range of performance measures, all having different limitations thereby 
acknowledging the limitations of the chosen performance measures used in this study. 
The study was based on nineteen companies selected from the FTSE 100 companies 
2010. The important results were obtained from the study were as follows 
First, the results demonstrated that there existed a positive relationship between 
executive total remuneration and company performance in most of the companies 
using EPS as the performance measure. EPS is a short term performance measure that 
measures earnings available to shareholders divided by the number of ordinary shares 
outstanding. Fourteen out of nineteen companies demonstrated a positive weak, 
moderate or strong relationship between executive pay and company performance. Six 
out of the fourteen companies demonstrated a strong significant relationship, three 
demonstrated a moderate relationship and five demonstrated a weak relationship 
between executive total remuneration and company performance using EPS as the 
performance measure.  This result indicates that, in relation to EPS, the link between 
executive remuneration and company performance is stronger than the link obtained 
by most past studies on the subject. The results obtained for executives were very 
similar to the results obtained for CEOs. Contrary to the significant relationship 
obtained between executive total remuneration and company performance using EPS 
as the performance measure, the results obtained using ROA and TSR suggested that 
there existed a very weak positive or negative relationship between executive total 
remuneration and company performance using ROA and TSR as the performance 
measures. Only six companies out of the nineteen demonstrated a weak positive 
relationship between executive total remuneration and company performance using 
ROA as the performance measure. The other thirteen companies demonstrated a 
negative relationship indicating that executive total remuneration is not related to 
company performance. Whilst only five demonstrated a weak positive relationship 
between executive total remuneration and company performance using TSR as the 
performance measure and the other fourteen demonstrated a negative relationship. 
This result suggests that in the case of ROA and TSR, most companies do not 
consider company performance as a factor for determining executive remuneration. It 
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also supports the findings discussed in chapter 4 to the effect that five RCONs did not 
consider company performance as a factor for selecting comparator groups for 
executive remuneration benchmarking. The results obtained for executive 
performance-related pay and company performance was very similar to the results 
obtained for executive total remuneration. This therefore indicates that there exist a 
significant link between executive remuneration and company performance using EPS 
as the performance measure, and there is very weak or no link between executive 
remuneration and company performance using ROA and TSR as the performance 
measures. This suggest that executives rely on short-term performance measures 
which consequently leads to short term profits rather than the long term success of the 
company. This might be as a result of the pressure from the shareholders and 
investors on the executive for the company to yield profits. As a means of appeasing 
the shareholders and investors, the executives may rely on performance conditions 
that will yield short term profits as demonstrated by EPS at the expense of the long-
term success of the company. 
Secondly, the results demonstrate that different performance measures have different 
effects on the pay for performance link and could also relay a message on company’s 
long/short term dealing. EPS demonstrated a significant positive effect on the pay for 
performance relationship. However, EPS is a short term performance measure 
indicating that most companies are relying on the short term performance of the 
company rather than the desired long term success of the company. TSR and ROA are 
a longer term performance measures than EPS. Therefore the result indicates that 
most companies are not focusing on the long-term success of the company as more 
than 50% of the companies considered in this study use EPS as the only performance 
measure or in conjuncture with other performance measures.  
Lastly, companies use increase in company size and company performance as a 
justification for high executive remuneration. This study therefore hypothesised that if 
executive pay is strongly correlated with company size and company performance, 
then it is expected that company size should be strongly related to company 
performance. This hypothesis is derived from the assumption that a good performing 
company tends to increase in size which will then justify executives high pay levels. 
This hypothesis was confirmed in this study with most of the companies 
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demonstrating a strong positive relationship between company size and company 
performance. This result therefore suggest that the lack of a strong relationship 
between executive remuneration and company performance may be due to other 
factors that influence company performance and executive determination process, e.g. 
drivers of executive remuneration discussed in chapter1. The study therefore may be 
confirming the literature discussed in chapter 1 & 4 where drivers of executive pay 
and theories that influence RC’s pay setting process.  
This study on pay for performance link builds on existing literature by confirming that 
there exists a weak or no relationship between executive pay and company 
performance (considering TSR and ROA as the performance measure). However, the 
study also indicates that there exist a significant relationship between executive pay 
and company performance (using EPS as the performance measure) contrary to the 
findings of past studies. This study recommends further research on the subject area 
that would consider a larger sample (more than nineteen) of companies, more 
performance measures both from financial and non-financial to determine the pay for 
performance link and the effect of the performance measure on the link. A further 
qualitative study could also investigate the various performance measures that 
company use and the reason behind their choices. 
The Companies Act 2006’s provisions on executive remuneration have an indirect 
influence on the determination process of executive pay.  The Act requires companies 
to provide extensive disclosure on the process involved the determination of executive 
pay. The purpose of the disclosure requirement is to make the pay setting process 
transparent.  The shareholders are encouraged to use this information to make an 
informed judgement on executive remuneration in the annual general meeting. 
However, executives have used the availability of this information to compare their 
pay with those of their peers resulting in a demand for more pay or a threat to move to 
a different company that will pay more. The disclosure requirement is achieving its 
aim of making information available to the shareholders. Furthermore, the Act has 
provided the shareholders of quoted companies with a three-year binding vote on 
remuneration policy and an annual vote on the implementation report. It is unsure 
how well the shareholders will use the voting powers to curb excessive executive 
remuneration. Before the shareholder vote on remuneration report was made binding 
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in 2013, shareholders had a non-binding vote on remuneration report. Although, 
companies were not compelled to act on the outcome of the vote, many did because 
they were avoiding the shareholdings from voting against their re-election. With these 
powers to curb excessive executive remuneration only about 22 companies saw their 
remuneration reports voted down between the periods 2002-2013. Looking at the 
voting attitude of the twenty-five companies considered in this study, the data 
indicated that many shareholders were abstaining from voting, with some companies 
having more abstentions votes than votes cast against. It therefore implied that many 
shareholders are not using the voting powers vested upon them to curb excessive pay. 
Doubts are cast on the introduction of binding votes by the government in 2013 as to 
whether it would make any difference. In my opinion, I do not think that a binding 
vote on executive remuneration would change the voting attitude of shareholders. 
Furthermore, considering that the binding vote is not annual but rather a three-year 
vote, it is most unlikely that it will make a difference. Further research is encouraged 
in this area to determine the effect of the three-year binding vote on pay-for-
performance link (whether it has strengthened or weakened), its effect on shareholder 
voting (whether it has made more shareholder to be involved or not) and the 
remuneration committee style of setting a three-year effective remuneration policy. 
Finally, the aim of this study was to examine the regulation on the determination of 
executive remuneration in the UK. This aim has been met by taking a mixed method 
approach to investigate the various phenomenon involved. The study as noted in 
chapter one has demonstrated the complex nature of the present day remuneration 
package and the difficulty in determining such complex pay packages. This study 
demonstrate the importance of getting the pay setting process right, and until that is 
achieved, executive pay may continue to be a prominent issue of corporate 
governance. 
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Appendix  
INTERVIEW INVITATION LETTER 
University Letterhead 
 
 
Dear (Name of potential Participant), 
Re: An Invitation to participate in a research study titled: Executive 
Remuneration: Methods of Regulation in FTSE-100 Companies 
I wish to invite you to participate in a research study on Executive Remuneration. I 
am a PhD student at the University of Portsmouth, School of Law. I am engaged in 
research concerning executive remuneration to gain an understanding of the criteria 
that remuneration consultants employ in benchmarking executive remuneration. 
This study involves remuneration consultants from the following consultancy firms: 
Towers Perrin, Hewitt, Pricewaterhousecoopers, Newbridge Street, Monks, Deloitte, 
Mercer Human Resource, KPMG, BDO, Grand, Ernest and Young and accountancy 
firms. You were chosen based on the information provided on your firm’s website. 
I have attached a full information sheet about the study and a consent form for you to 
sign if you are interested in participating in the study. You can contact me or my 
supervisor (Dr. Lee Roach) either by phone, fax, or the email address below. 
Participation in this study is entirely up to you and, should you decide during the 
course of the study to withdraw, you can without any problems at the interview stage. 
But it can be a little difficult if your data has already been analysed to withdraw your 
personal contribution. 
Thank you for taking the time to read through this letter and I hope you are able to 
help me with my research. 
 
Sincerely 
Ernestine Ndzi 
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Contact Details 
Ernestine Ndzi 
University of Portsmouth Business School 
School of Law 
Richmond Building 
Portland Street 
Portsmouth 
PO1 3DE 
Email: Ernestine.ndzi@port.ac.uk 
Tel:    02392844830 
 
Dr Lee Roach 
Senior Lecturer in Law 
School of Law 
University of Portsmouth Business School 
Richmond Building 
Portland Street 
Portsmouth 
PO1 3DE 
Email: Lee.roach@port.ac.uk 
Tel:    02392844106 
Fax:   02392844037 
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INTERVIEW INFORMATION SHEET 
Executive Remuneration: Methods of Regulation in FTSE-100 
Companies 
My name is Ernestine Ndzi, and I am a registered PhD student at the School of Law, 
University of Portsmouth. I would like to invite you to take part in a research study 
that I am undertaking. Before you decide, I would like you to understand why the 
research is being conducted and what it would involve for you.  
The study is aimed at acquiring a deeper understanding of the criteria remuneration 
consultants use to benchmark executive remuneration, to understand to what extent 
they implement any existing regulation, and how the information they provide affects 
executive pay in general. 
This study will hopefully involve remuneration consultants from the following 
consultancy firms: Towers Perrin, Hewitt, Pricewaterhousecoopers, Newbridge Street, 
Monks, Deloitte, Mercer Human Resource, KPMG, BDO, Grand, Ernest and Young 
and accountancy firms. You happen to be a compensation consultant from one of 
these firms and your information was accessed from the firm’s website. 
The research will last for three years and will involve a 20 – 30 minutes interview. I 
seek to obtain your personal opinion on benchmarking and not your firm’s opinion, 
although the firm’s opinion will be important as well. This information will be strictly 
confidential and used only for the purpose of the study. Participation in this study is 
voluntary and should you decide to withdraw during the course of the study, you can 
without any problems at the stage of interview. But it can be a little difficult if your 
data has already been analysed to withdraw your personal contribution. When this 
study is finished, the results will be published. 
This study will not pose a major disadvantage to you while you are participating. But 
this study will take up some of your time, and the inconvenience of participating. This 
study seeks to understand the policies that can make a difference to Regulatory 
methods of Executive remuneration and consequently the remuneration package as a 
whole. If you have any concern about any aspect of this study, you should speak to 
the researcher or my supervisor, who will do their best to answer your questions. If 
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you are not satisfied and wish to complain formally, you can do this through, The 
Head of Department, Department of Law, University of Portsmouth. 
The study is supervised by the University of Portsmouth. Also research in the 
University of Portsmouth is looked at by independent Research Ethics Committee, to 
protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given a favourable opinion 
by the University of Portsmouth Research Ethics Committee. Should you require 
further information on general or specific issues of the study, we can be contacted 
through phone or email as provided. 
Thank you so much for taking out the time to read through the information sheet. 
Should you decide to participate in the study, you will be given a copy of the 
information sheet to keep and a consent form to sign to indicate you are happy to 
participate in the study. 
Thank You 
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EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
 
 
  Please 
initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information 
sheet. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these questions answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving reasons up to the point when the 
data is analysed. 
 
3. I agree to the data I contribute being retained for future, Research 
Ethics Committee approved research. 
 
 
4. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Name of 
Participant: 
 
 
 
   
     
 
Signature: 
 
 
 
  
Date: 
 
 
 
 
